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Message-ID: <alpine.LRH.2.20.1702142357560.29914@namei.org>
Date: Tue, 14 Feb 2017 23:59:34 +1100 (AEDT)
From: James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>
To: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.SAKURA.ne.jp>
cc: keescook@...omium.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: Re: [RFC PATCH 1/4] security: mark LSM hooks
as __ro_after_init
On Tue, 14 Feb 2017, Tetsuo Handa wrote:
> James Morris wrote:
> > > Disallowing dynamically loadable security modules is as silly idea as
> > > getting rid of LSM framework ( https://lwn.net/Articles/138042/
> > > http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LFD.0.999.0710010854120.3579@woody.linux-foundation.org )
> > > unless we accept whatever out-of-tree LSM modules and maintain them as in-tree
> > > modules and enable them in distributor's kernels. But such things won't happen.
> > > If we legally allow LKM based LSMs, we don't need to make security/ directory
> > > look like /dev/random .
> >
> > Dynamically loadable LSMs are legally allowed, we just don't cater to them
> > in mainline.
> >
> I'm saying that this patch will make dynamically loadable LSMs illegal, for
> not allowing updating struct list_head prevents dynamically loadable LSMs from
> registering.
The next patch set will include an option to allow writable hooks (for
SELinux runtime disable).
--
James Morris
<jmorris@...ei.org>
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