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Message-Id: <201702142150.BEF81226.tOOFQVFJOHFMSL@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Date: Tue, 14 Feb 2017 21:50:36 +0900
From: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.SAKURA.ne.jp>
To: jmorris@...ei.org
Cc: keescook@...omium.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: Re: [RFC PATCH 1/4] security: mark LSM hooks as __ro_after_init
James Morris wrote:
> > Disallowing dynamically loadable security modules is as silly idea as
> > getting rid of LSM framework ( https://lwn.net/Articles/138042/
> > http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LFD.0.999.0710010854120.3579@woody.linux-foundation.org )
> > unless we accept whatever out-of-tree LSM modules and maintain them as in-tree
> > modules and enable them in distributor's kernels. But such things won't happen.
> > If we legally allow LKM based LSMs, we don't need to make security/ directory
> > look like /dev/random .
>
> Dynamically loadable LSMs are legally allowed, we just don't cater to them
> in mainline.
>
I'm saying that this patch will make dynamically loadable LSMs illegal, for
not allowing updating struct list_head prevents dynamically loadable LSMs from
registering.
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