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Message-ID: <CALCETrUK1umtXMEXXKzMAccNQCVTPA8_XNDf01B5=gAZuJwvsQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 30 Aug 2016 13:18:58 -0700
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
To: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>, David Drysdale <drysdale@...gle.com>,
"kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com" <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
James Morris <james.l.morris@...cle.com>, Sargun Dhillon <sargun@...gun.me>,
Network Development <netdev@...r.kernel.org>, Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
LSM List <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, "David S . Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Daniel Mack <daniel@...que.org>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>, Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>,
Paul Moore <pmoore@...hat.com>, Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@...el.com>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>
Subject: Re: [RFC v2 06/10] landlock: Add LSM hooks
On Tue, Aug 30, 2016 at 1:10 PM, Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net> wrote:
>
> On 30/08/2016 20:56, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>> On Aug 25, 2016 12:34 PM, "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@...ikod.net> wrote:
>>>
>>> Add LSM hooks which can be used by userland through Landlock (eBPF)
>>> programs. This programs are limited to a whitelist of functions (cf.
>>> next commit). The eBPF program context is depicted by the struct
>>> landlock_data (cf. include/uapi/linux/bpf.h):
>>> * hook: LSM hook ID (useful when using the same program for multiple LSM
>>> hooks);
>>> * cookie: the 16-bit value from the seccomp filter that triggered this
>>> Landlock program;
>>> * args[6]: array of LSM hook arguments.
>>>
>>> The LSM hook arguments can contain raw values as integers or
>>> (unleakable) pointers. The only way to use the pointers are to pass them
>>> to an eBPF function according to their types (e.g. the
>>> bpf_landlock_cmp_fs_beneath_with_struct_file function can use a struct
>>> file pointer).
>>>
>>> For now, there is three hooks for file system access control:
>>> * file_open;
>>> * file_permission;
>>> * mmap_file.
>>>
>>
>> What's the purpose of exposing struct cred * to userspace? It's
>> primarily just an optimization to save a bit of RAM, and it's a
>> dubious optimization at that. What are you using it for? Would it
>> make more sense to use struct task_struct * or struct pid * instead?
>>
>> Also, exposing struct cred * has a really weird side-effect: it allows
>> (maybe even encourages) checking for pointer equality between two
>> struct cred * objects. Doing so will have erratic results.
>>
>
> The pointers exposed in the ePBF context are not directly readable by an
> unprivileged eBPF program thanks to the strong typing of the Landlock
> context and the static eBPF verification. There is no way to leak a
> kernel pointer to userspace from an unprivileged eBPF program: pointer
> arithmetic and comparison are prohibited. Pointers can only be pass as
> argument to dedicated eBPF functions.
I'm not talking about leaking the value -- I'm talking about leaking
the predicate (a == b) for two struct cred pointers. That predicate
shouldn't be available because it has very odd effects.
>
> For now, struct cred * is simply not used by any eBPF function and then
> not usable at all. It only exist here because I map the LSM hook
> arguments in a generic/automatic way to the eBPF context.
Maybe remove it from this patch set then?
--Andy
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