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Message-ID: <CAGXu5jLzF7=jpt4h6gdJiiKmAV=JobY+pLh48pCcza=8mzrKLA@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 16 Aug 2016 16:11:05 -0700
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>
Cc: "Paul E . McKenney" <paulmck@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>, Stephen Boyd <sboyd@...eaurora.org>,
Daniel Micay <danielmicay@...il.com>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>, Josh Triplett <josh@...htriplett.org>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>, Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@...icios.com>,
Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@...il.com>, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Tejun Heo <tj@...nel.org>, Michael Ellerman <mpe@...erman.id.au>,
"Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>, Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>, Jan Kara <jack@...e.cz>, Josef Bacik <jbacik@...com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@...tuozzo.com>,
Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@...ulusnetworks.com>, Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com" <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4/5] bug: Provide toggle for BUG on data corruption
On Tue, Aug 16, 2016 at 2:50 PM, Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com> wrote:
> On 08/16/2016 02:11 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
>>
>> The kernel checks for several cases of data structure corruption under
>> either normal runtime, or under various CONFIG_DEBUG_* settings. When
>> corruption is detected, some systems may want to BUG() immediately instead
>> of letting the corruption continue. Many of these manipulation primitives
>> can be used by security flaws to gain arbitrary memory write control. This
>> provides CONFIG_BUG_ON_CORRUPTION to control newly added BUG() locations.
>>
>> This is inspired by similar hardening in PaX and Grsecurity, and by
>> Stephen Boyd in MSM kernels.
>>
>
> This was never my favorite patch in the MSM tree, mostly because it seemed
> to proliferate in random places. Some of these like the list were legit
> corruption but others like the spinlock and workqueue were indication of
> more hardware induced corruption and less kernel or software bugs.
> I'd rather see the detection added in structures specifically identified to
> be vulnerable. spinlocks and workqueues don't seem to be high on the
> list to me. If they are, I think this could use some explanation of why
> these in particular deserve checks vs. any other place where we might
> detect corruption.
Ah, interesting. I was wondering about why those two were added,
especially the workqueue one which seemed to be a counter issue
(hopefully we'll get the counter protection in soon too).
Unless Stephen speaks up, I'll just drop the spinlock and workqueue chunks.
>> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
>> ---
>> include/linux/bug.h | 7 +++++++
>> kernel/locking/spinlock_debug.c | 1 +
>> kernel/workqueue.c | 2 ++
>> lib/Kconfig.debug | 10 ++++++++++
>> lib/list_debug.c | 7 +++++++
>> 5 files changed, 27 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/include/linux/bug.h b/include/linux/bug.h
>> index e51b0709e78d..7e69758dd798 100644
>> --- a/include/linux/bug.h
>> +++ b/include/linux/bug.h
>> @@ -118,4 +118,11 @@ static inline enum bug_trap_type report_bug(unsigned
>> long bug_addr,
>> }
>>
>> #endif /* CONFIG_GENERIC_BUG */
>> +
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_BUG_ON_CORRUPTION
>> +# define CORRUPTED_DATA_STRUCTURE true
>> +#else
>> +# define CORRUPTED_DATA_STRUCTURE false
>> +#endif
>> +
>> #endif /* _LINUX_BUG_H */
>> diff --git a/kernel/locking/spinlock_debug.c
>> b/kernel/locking/spinlock_debug.c
>> index 0374a596cffa..d5f833769feb 100644
>> --- a/kernel/locking/spinlock_debug.c
>> +++ b/kernel/locking/spinlock_debug.c
>> @@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ static void spin_dump(raw_spinlock_t *lock, const char
>> *msg)
>> owner ? owner->comm : "<none>",
>> owner ? task_pid_nr(owner) : -1,
>> lock->owner_cpu);
>> + BUG_ON(CORRUPTED_DATA_STRUCTURE);
>> dump_stack();
>> }
>>
>> diff --git a/kernel/workqueue.c b/kernel/workqueue.c
>> index ef071ca73fc3..ea0132b55eca 100644
>> --- a/kernel/workqueue.c
>> +++ b/kernel/workqueue.c
>> @@ -48,6 +48,7 @@
>> #include <linux/nodemask.h>
>> #include <linux/moduleparam.h>
>> #include <linux/uaccess.h>
>> +#include <linux/bug.h>
>>
>> #include "workqueue_internal.h"
>>
>> @@ -2108,6 +2109,7 @@ __acquires(&pool->lock)
>> current->comm, preempt_count(),
>> task_pid_nr(current),
>> worker->current_func);
>> debug_show_held_locks(current);
>> + BUG_ON(CORRUPTED_DATA_STRUCTURE);
>> dump_stack();
>> }
>>
>> diff --git a/lib/Kconfig.debug b/lib/Kconfig.debug
>> index 2307d7c89dac..d64bd6b6fd45 100644
>> --- a/lib/Kconfig.debug
>> +++ b/lib/Kconfig.debug
>> @@ -1987,6 +1987,16 @@ config TEST_STATIC_KEYS
>>
>> If unsure, say N.
>>
>> +config BUG_ON_CORRUPTION
>> + bool "Trigger a BUG when data corruption is detected"
>> + help
>> + Select this option if the kernel should BUG when it encounters
>> + data corruption in various kernel memory structures during
>> checks
>> + added by options like CONFIG_DEBUG_LIST, CONFIG_DEBUG_SPINLOCK,
>> + etc.
>> +
>> + If unsure, say N.
>> +
>> source "samples/Kconfig"
>>
>> source "lib/Kconfig.kgdb"
>> diff --git a/lib/list_debug.c b/lib/list_debug.c
>> index 80e2e40a6a4e..161c7e7d3478 100644
>> --- a/lib/list_debug.c
>> +++ b/lib/list_debug.c
>> @@ -26,16 +26,19 @@ bool __list_add_debug(struct list_head *new,
>> if (unlikely(next->prev != prev)) {
>> WARN(1, "list_add corruption. next->prev should be prev
>> (%p), but was %p. (next=%p).\n",
>> prev, next->prev, next);
>> + BUG_ON(CORRUPTED_DATA_STRUCTURE);
>> return false;
>> }
>> if (unlikely(prev->next != next)) {
>> WARN(1, "list_add corruption. prev->next should be next
>> (%p), but was %p. (prev=%p).\n",
>> next, prev->next, prev);
>> + BUG_ON(CORRUPTED_DATA_STRUCTURE);
>> return false;
>> }
>> if (unlikely(new == prev || new == next)) {
>> WARN(1, "list_add double add: new=%p, prev=%p,
>> next=%p.\n",
>> new, prev, next);
>> + BUG_ON(CORRUPTED_DATA_STRUCTURE);
>> return false;
>> }
>> return true;
>> @@ -52,21 +55,25 @@ bool __list_del_entry_debug(struct list_head *entry)
>> if (unlikely(next == LIST_POISON1)) {
>> WARN(1, "list_del corruption, %p->next is LIST_POISON1
>> (%p)\n",
>> entry, LIST_POISON1);
>> + BUG_ON(CORRUPTED_DATA_STRUCTURE);
>> return false;
>> }
>> if (unlikely(prev == LIST_POISON2)) {
>> WARN(1, "list_del corruption, %p->prev is LIST_POISON2
>> (%p)\n",
>> entry, LIST_POISON2);
>> + BUG_ON(CORRUPTED_DATA_STRUCTURE);
>> return false;
>> }
>> if (unlikely(prev->next != entry)) {
>> WARN(1, "list_del corruption. prev->next should be %p, but
>> was %p\n",
>> entry, prev->next);
>> + BUG_ON(CORRUPTED_DATA_STRUCTURE);
>> return false;
>> }
>> if (unlikely(next->prev != entry)) {
>> WARN(1, "list_del corruption. next->prev should be %p, but
>> was %p\n",
>> entry, next->prev);
>> + BUG_ON(CORRUPTED_DATA_STRUCTURE);
>> return false;
>> }
>> return true;
>>
>
> The git history shows 924d9addb9b1 ("list debugging: use
> WARN() instead of BUG()") deliberately switched this from BUG to WARN.
> Do we still need the WARN at all or can we just switch to BUG permanently?
Hah. Yeah, okay, so that explains the history of this a little more.
Looks like when this was converted to WARN, the "stop execution flow"
part of that was not retained (which is what PaX/Grsecurity added
back). Regardless, it certainly supports having a CONFIG for "should
this WARN and abort, or BUG?"
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Nexus Security
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