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Message-ID: <CAGXu5j+H63jhcDpHpXK5aWvgUBz=5vB0FK_zRoc+wZEk32B2fg@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 16 Feb 2016 13:52:33 -0800
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: David Brown <david.brown@...aro.org>
Cc: Russell King <linux@....linux.org.uk>,
"linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org" <linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org>,
"kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com" <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@...erman.id.au>, Mathias Krause <minipli@...glemail.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, "x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
PaX Team <pageexec@...email.hu>, Emese Revfy <re.emese@...il.com>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, linux-arch <linux-arch@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] ARM: vdso: Mark vDSO code as read-only
On Tue, Feb 16, 2016 at 1:36 PM, David Brown <david.brown@...aro.org> wrote:
> Although the arm vDSO is cleanly separated by code/data with the code
> being read-only in userspace mappings, the code page is still writable
> from the kernel. There have been exploits (such as
> http://itszn.com/blog/?p=21) that take advantage of this on x86 to go
> from a bad kernel write to full root.
>
> Prevent this specific exploit on arm by putting the vDSO code page in
> post-init read-only memory as well.
Is the vdso dynamically built at init time like on x86, or can this
just use .rodata directly?
-Kees
>
> Before:
> vdso: 1 text pages at base 80927000
> root@...press:/ cat /sys/kernel/debug/kernel_page_tables
> ---[ Modules ]---
> ---[ Kernel Mapping ]---
> 0x80000000-0x80100000 1M RW NX SHD
> 0x80100000-0x80600000 5M ro x SHD
> 0x80600000-0x80800000 2M ro NX SHD
> 0x80800000-0xbe000000 984M RW NX SHD
>
> After:
> vdso: 1 text pages at base 8072b000
> root@...press:/ cat /sys/kernel/debug/kernel_page_tables
> ---[ Modules ]---
> ---[ Kernel Mapping ]---
> 0x80000000-0x80100000 1M RW NX SHD
> 0x80100000-0x80600000 5M ro x SHD
> 0x80600000-0x80800000 2M ro NX SHD
> 0x80800000-0xbe000000 984M RW NX SHD
>
> Inspired by https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/1/19/494 based on work by the
> PaX Team, Brad Spengler, and Kees Cook.
>
> Signed-off-by: David Brown <david.brown@...aro.org>
> ---
> This patch depends on Kees Cook's series
> https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/1/19/497 which adds the ro_after_init
> section.
>
> arch/arm/vdso/vdso.S | 3 +--
> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/arm/vdso/vdso.S b/arch/arm/vdso/vdso.S
> index b2b97e3..a62a7b6 100644
> --- a/arch/arm/vdso/vdso.S
> +++ b/arch/arm/vdso/vdso.S
> @@ -23,9 +23,8 @@
> #include <linux/const.h>
> #include <asm/page.h>
>
> - __PAGE_ALIGNED_DATA
> -
> .globl vdso_start, vdso_end
> + .section .data..ro_after_init
> .balign PAGE_SIZE
> vdso_start:
> .incbin "arch/arm/vdso/vdso.so"
> --
> 2.7.1
>
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS & Brillo Security
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