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Message-ID: <CALnMstVtyE18nY7rSkJLQhixWfRQ0hBK5bZOBPzZDg6PzgDHdw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 29 Mar 2019 19:52:37 +0300
From: Anton Dedov <adedov@...il.com>
To: passwords@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: UX/security of TOTP configuration process
So, keeping TOTP secret as a backup should be considered anti-pattern?
Thanks
пт, 29 мар. 2019 г., 19:50 Jim Fenton <fenton@...epopcorn.net>:
> Many TOTP agents have mechanisms for transferring the secret from one
> device to another (for example, when a user’s smartphone is replaced). This
> is somewhat out of control of the application using TOTP (and unfortunately
> some of these applications do not do this transfer in a fully 2FA manner,
> but again that is out of the application’s control).
>
> But I think it’s good to provide one-time recovery codes in case the user
> can’t transfer the recovery secret.
>
> -Jim
>
> > On Mar 29, 2019, at 5:03 PM, Anton Dedov <adedov@...il.com> wrote:
> >
> > Hello folks!
> >
> > A question on implementing TOTP 2FA in an application.
> >
> > Is it ok to ask users to backup TOTP secret in a secure place during 2fa
> configuration process? Or it's better to provide one-time recovery codes?
> >
> > The argument against TOTP secret backup can be an assumption that if the
> secret leak it can be maliciously used without victim user ever noticing it.
> >
> > --
> > Anton Dedov
>
>
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