|
|
Message-ID: <au6hw0HOjwww8_CD@pie> Date: Sat, 7 Nov 2026 03:57:55 +0000 From: Yao Zi <me@...ao.cc> To: musl@...ts.openwall.com Cc: Yao Zi <me@...ao.cc> Subject: Re: OpenSSH password auth bypass analysis [was: Re: Advisory for OpenSSH+musl users] On Fri, Nov 06, 2026 at 04:39:24PM -0500, Jeffrey Walton wrote: > Hi Rich, > > One comment on Item (5) below. > > On Fri, Nov 6, 2026 at 1:55 PM Rich Felker <dalias@...c.org> wrote: > > > > [...] > > 5. Having a failure token not match any password is contingent on the > > caller of crypt passing the correct hash as the settign argument to > > crypt. While it's guaranteed that: > > > > crypt(pass,failure_token) != failure_token > > > > it is impossible to guarantee that: > > > > crypt(pass,some_other_hash) != failure_token > > I think you can bind the username _and_ (salt,password) to the hash, > and that will ensure the conditions above behave as expected. That > is, instead of storing the hash of (salt,password), instead store > (username,salt,password). That should ensure a negligible probability > in cases where two users happen to use the same password, like > P@...ord1. This couldn't be achieved in the current way that crypt() is commonly used, right? > Jeff Regards, Yao Zi
Powered by blists - more mailing lists
Confused about mailing lists and their use? Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia and check out these guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.