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Message-ID: <CAH8yC8mRVMKz=zxvV0mz+fonZ54WkN_vjy5qjdoQACT+7xX4pA@mail.gmail.com> Date: Fri, 6 Nov 2026 16:39:24 -0500 From: Jeffrey Walton <noloader@...il.com> To: musl@...ts.openwall.com Subject: Re: OpenSSH password auth bypass analysis [was: Re: Advisory for OpenSSH+musl users] Hi Rich, One comment on Item (5) below. On Fri, Nov 6, 2026 at 1:55 PM Rich Felker <dalias@...c.org> wrote: > > [...] > 5. Having a failure token not match any password is contingent on the > caller of crypt passing the correct hash as the settign argument to > crypt. While it's guaranteed that: > > crypt(pass,failure_token) != failure_token > > it is impossible to guarantee that: > > crypt(pass,some_other_hash) != failure_token I think you can bind the username _and_ (salt,password) to the hash, and that will ensure the conditions above behave as expected. That is, instead of storing the hash of (salt,password), instead store (username,salt,password). That should ensure a negligible probability in cases where two users happen to use the same password, like P@...ord1. Jeff
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