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Message-ID: <20150330044153.GK6817@brightrain.aerifal.cx>
Date: Mon, 30 Mar 2015 00:41:53 -0400
From: Rich Felker <dalias@...c.org>
To: musl@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: Security advisory for musl libc - stack-based buffer
overflow in ipv6 literal parsing [CVE-2015-1817]
On Mon, Mar 30, 2015 at 11:33:37AM +0700, Рысь wrote:
> On Mon, 30 Mar 2015 00:01:25 -0400
> Rich Felker <dalias@...c.org> wrote:
>
> > A stack-based buffer overflow has been found in musl libc's ipv6
> > address literal parsing code. Programs which call the inet_pton or
> > getaddrinfo function with AF_INET6 or AF_UNSPEC and untrusted address
> > strings are affected. Successful exploitation yields control of the
> > return address. Having enabled stack protector at the application
> > level does not mitigate the issue. All users should patch or upgrade.
> >
> > Software: musl libc (http://www.musl-libc.org)
> >
> > Severity: high
> >
> > Affected Versions: 0.9.15 - 1.0.4, 1.1.0 - 1.1.7.
> >
> > Bug introduced in commit: 78f889153167452de4cbced921f6428b3d4f663a
> >
> > Bug fixed in commit: fc13acc3dcb5b1f215c007f583a63551f6a71363
> >
> > Patch: musl_dn_expand_overflow_fix.diff (attached) (fix+hardening)
>
> How much it affects readonly embedded systems as well? Does almost
> latest dropbear listening ssh port publicly is actually vulnerable?
I don't think so, but I haven't done analysis of specific software.
Busybox is affected if it's installed setuid and ping is enabled (a
configuration I strongly recommend not using since they don't handle
setuid securely in general) but that's limited to local attacks. I
don't think there's any way you can make dropbear (server) attempt to
parse ip literal strings remotely, but verifying this would take some
checking of the source.
Rich
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