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Message-ID: <CALmYWFuYVHHz7aoxk+U=auLLT4xvJdzyOyzQ2u+E0kM3uc_rTw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 25 Nov 2024 09:38:51 -0800
From: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@...gle.com>
To: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>
Cc: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@...omium.org>, Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
Christian Brauner <brauner@...nel.org>, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>, Serge Hallyn <serge@...lyn.com>,
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linux-api@...r.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>,
audit@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v21 1/6] exec: Add a new AT_EXECVE_CHECK flag to execveat(2)
On Fri, Nov 22, 2024 at 6:50 AM Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net> wrote:
>
> On Thu, Nov 21, 2024 at 10:27:40AM -0800, Jeff Xu wrote:
> > On Thu, Nov 21, 2024 at 5:40 AM Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net> wrote:
> > >
> > > On Wed, Nov 20, 2024 at 08:06:07AM -0800, Jeff Xu wrote:
> > > > On Wed, Nov 20, 2024 at 1:42 AM Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net> wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > > On Tue, Nov 19, 2024 at 05:17:00PM -0800, Jeff Xu wrote:
> > > > > > On Tue, Nov 12, 2024 at 11:22 AM Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net> wrote:
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Add a new AT_EXECVE_CHECK flag to execveat(2) to check if a file would
> > > > > > > be allowed for execution. The main use case is for script interpreters
> > > > > > > and dynamic linkers to check execution permission according to the
> > > > > > > kernel's security policy. Another use case is to add context to access
> > > > > > > logs e.g., which script (instead of interpreter) accessed a file. As
> > > > > > > any executable code, scripts could also use this check [1].
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > This is different from faccessat(2) + X_OK which only checks a subset of
> > > > > > > access rights (i.e. inode permission and mount options for regular
> > > > > > > files), but not the full context (e.g. all LSM access checks). The main
> > > > > > > use case for access(2) is for SUID processes to (partially) check access
> > > > > > > on behalf of their caller. The main use case for execveat(2) +
> > > > > > > AT_EXECVE_CHECK is to check if a script execution would be allowed,
> > > > > > > according to all the different restrictions in place. Because the use
> > > > > > > of AT_EXECVE_CHECK follows the exact kernel semantic as for a real
> > > > > > > execution, user space gets the same error codes.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > An interesting point of using execveat(2) instead of openat2(2) is that
> > > > > > > it decouples the check from the enforcement. Indeed, the security check
> > > > > > > can be logged (e.g. with audit) without blocking an execution
> > > > > > > environment not yet ready to enforce a strict security policy.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > LSMs can control or log execution requests with
> > > > > > > security_bprm_creds_for_exec(). However, to enforce a consistent and
> > > > > > > complete access control (e.g. on binary's dependencies) LSMs should
> > > > > > > restrict file executability, or mesure executed files, with
> > > > > > > security_file_open() by checking file->f_flags & __FMODE_EXEC.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Because AT_EXECVE_CHECK is dedicated to user space interpreters, it
> > > > > > > doesn't make sense for the kernel to parse the checked files, look for
> > > > > > > interpreters known to the kernel (e.g. ELF, shebang), and return ENOEXEC
> > > > > > > if the format is unknown. Because of that, security_bprm_check() is
> > > > > > > never called when AT_EXECVE_CHECK is used.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > It should be noted that script interpreters cannot directly use
> > > > > > > execveat(2) (without this new AT_EXECVE_CHECK flag) because this could
> > > > > > > lead to unexpected behaviors e.g., `python script.sh` could lead to Bash
> > > > > > > being executed to interpret the script. Unlike the kernel, script
> > > > > > > interpreters may just interpret the shebang as a simple comment, which
> > > > > > > should not change for backward compatibility reasons.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Because scripts or libraries files might not currently have the
> > > > > > > executable permission set, or because we might want specific users to be
> > > > > > > allowed to run arbitrary scripts, the following patch provides a dynamic
> > > > > > > configuration mechanism with the SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE and
> > > > > > > SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE securebits.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > This is a redesign of the CLIP OS 4's O_MAYEXEC:
> > > > > > > https://github.com/clipos-archive/src_platform_clip-patches/blob/f5cb330d6b684752e403b4e41b39f7004d88e561/1901_open_mayexec.patch
> > > > > > > This patch has been used for more than a decade with customized script
> > > > > > > interpreters. Some examples can be found here:
> > > > > > > https://github.com/clipos-archive/clipos4_portage-overlay/search?q=O_MAYEXEC
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Cc: Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>
> > > > > > > Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@...nel.org>
> > > > > > > Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
> > > > > > > Cc: Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>
> > > > > > > Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@...lyn.com>
> > > > > > > Link: https://docs.python.org/3/library/io.html#io.open_code [1]
> > > > > > > Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>
> > > > > > > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241112191858.162021-2-mic@digikod.net
> > > > > > > ---
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Changes since v20:
> > > > > > > * Rename AT_CHECK to AT_EXECVE_CHECK, requested by Amir Goldstein and
> > > > > > > Serge Hallyn.
> > > > > > > * Move the UAPI documentation to a dedicated RST file.
> > > > > > > * Add Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Changes since v19:
> > > > > > > * Remove mention of "role transition" as suggested by Andy.
> > > > > > > * Highlight the difference between security_bprm_creds_for_exec() and
> > > > > > > the __FMODE_EXEC check for LSMs (in commit message and LSM's hooks) as
> > > > > > > discussed with Jeff.
> > > > > > > * Improve documentation both in UAPI comments and kernel comments
> > > > > > > (requested by Kees).
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > New design since v18:
> > > > > > > https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220104155024.48023-3-mic@digikod.net
> > > > > > > ---
> > > > > > > Documentation/userspace-api/check_exec.rst | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++
> > > > > > > Documentation/userspace-api/index.rst | 1 +
> > > > > > > fs/exec.c | 20 +++++++++++--
> > > > > > > include/linux/binfmts.h | 7 ++++-
> > > > > > > include/uapi/linux/fcntl.h | 4 +++
> > > > > > > kernel/audit.h | 1 +
> > > > > > > kernel/auditsc.c | 1 +
> > > > > > > security/security.c | 10 +++++++
> > > > > > > 8 files changed, 75 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> > > > > > > create mode 100644 Documentation/userspace-api/check_exec.rst
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/check_exec.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/check_exec.rst
> > > > > > > new file mode 100644
> > > > > > > index 000000000000..ad1aeaa5f6c0
> > > > > > > --- /dev/null
> > > > > > > +++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/check_exec.rst
> > > > > > > @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
> > > > > > > +===================
> > > > > > > +Executability check
> > > > > > > +===================
> > > > > > > +
> > > > > > > +AT_EXECVE_CHECK
> > > > > > > +===============
> > > > > > > +
> > > > > > > +Passing the ``AT_EXECVE_CHECK`` flag to :manpage:`execveat(2)` only performs a
> > > > > > > +check on a regular file and returns 0 if execution of this file would be
> > > > > > > +allowed, ignoring the file format and then the related interpreter dependencies
> > > > > > > +(e.g. ELF libraries, script's shebang).
> > > > > > > +
> > > > > > > +Programs should always perform this check to apply kernel-level checks against
> > > > > > > +files that are not directly executed by the kernel but passed to a user space
> > > > > > > +interpreter instead. All files that contain executable code, from the point of
> > > > > > > +view of the interpreter, should be checked. However the result of this check
> > > > > > > +should only be enforced according to ``SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE`` or
> > > > > > > +``SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE.``.
> > > > > > Regarding "should only"
> > > > > > Userspace (e.g. libc) could decide to enforce even when
> > > > > > SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE=0), i.e. if it determines not-enforcing
> > > > > > doesn't make sense.
> > > > >
> > > > > User space is always in control, but I don't think it would be wise to
> > > > > not follow the configuration securebits (in a generic system) because
> > > > > this could result to unattended behaviors (I don't have a specific one
> > > > > in mind but...). That being said, configuration and checks are
> > > > > standalones and specific/tailored systems are free to do the checks they
> > > > > want.
> > > > >
> > > > In the case of dynamic linker, we can always enforce honoring the
> > > > execveat(AT_EXECVE_CHECK) result, right ? I can't think of a case not
> > > > to, the dynamic linker doesn't need to check the
> > > > SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE bit.
> > >
> > > If the library file is not allowed to be executed by *all* access
> > > control systems (not just mount and file permission, but all LSMs), then
> > > the AT_EXECVE_CHECK will fail, which is OK as long as it is not a hard
> > > requirement.
> > Yes. specifically for the library loading case, I can't think of a
> > case where we need to by-pass LSMs. (letting user space to by-pass
> > LSM check seems questionable in concept, and should only be used when
> > there aren't other solutions). In the context of SELINUX enforcing
> > mode, we will want to enforce it. In the context of process level LSM
> > such as landlock, the process can already decide for itself by
> > selecting the policy for its own domain, it is unnecessary to use
> > another opt-out solution.
>
> My answer wasn't clear. The execveat(AT_EXECVE_CHECK) can and should
> always be done, but user space should only enforce restrictions
> according to the securebits.
>
I knew this part (AT_EXESCVE_CHECK is called always)
Since the securebits are enforced by userspace, setting it to 0 is
equivalent to opt-out enforcement, that is what I meant by opt-out.
> It doesn't make sense to talk about user space "bypassing" kernel
> checks. This patch series provides a feature to enable user space to
> enforce (at its level) the same checks as the kernel.
>
> There is no opt-out solution, but compatibility configuration bits
> through securebits (which can also be set by LSMs).
>
> To answer your question about the dynamic linker, there should be no
> difference of behavior with a script interpreter. Both should check
> executability but only enforce restriction according to the securebits
> (as explained in the documentation). Doing otherwise on a generic
> distro could lead to unexpected behaviors (e.g. if a user enforced a
> specific SELinux policy that doesn't allow execution of library files).
>
> >
> > There is one case where I see a difference:
> > ld.so a.out (when a.out is on non-exec mount)
> >
> > If the dynamic linker doesn't read SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE setting,
> > above will always fail. But that is more of a bugfix.
>
> No, the dynamic linker should only enforce restrictions according to the
> securebits, otherwise a user space update (e.g. with a new dynamic
> linker ignoring the securebits) could break an existing system.
>
OK. upgrade is a valid concern. Previously, I was just thinking about
a new LSM based on this check, not existing LSM policies.
Do you happen to know which SELinux policy/LSM could break ? i.e. it
will be applied to libraries once we add AT_EXESCVE_CHECK in the
dynamic linker.
We could give heads up and prepare for that.
> >
> > >Relying on the securebits to know if this is a hard
> > > requirement or not enables system administrator and distros to control
> > > this potential behavior change.
> > >
> > I think, for the dynamic linker, it can be a hard requirement.
>
> Not on a generic distro.
>
Ok. Maybe this can be done through a configuration option for the
dynamic linker.
The consideration I have is: securebits is currently designed to
control both dynamic linker and shell scripts.
The case for dynamic linker is simpler than scripts cases, (non-exec
mount, and perhaps some LSM policies for libraries) and distributions
such as ChromeOS can enforce the dynamic linker case ahead of scripts
interrupter cases, i.e. without waiting for python/shell being
upgraded, that can take sometimes.
> >
> > For scripts, the cases are more complicated and we can't just enforce
> > it, therefore have to rely on security bits to give a pre-process
> > level control.
> >
> > > >
> > > > script interpreters need to check this though, because the apps might
> > > > need to adjust/test the scripts they are calling, so
> > > > SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE can be used to opt-out the enforcement.
> > > >
> > > > > > When SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE=1, userspace is bound to enforce.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > > +
> > > > > > > +The main purpose of this flag is to improve the security and consistency of an
> > > > > > > +execution environment to ensure that direct file execution (e.g.
> > > > > > > +``./script.sh``) and indirect file execution (e.g. ``sh script.sh``) lead to
> > > > > > > +the same result. For instance, this can be used to check if a file is
> > > > > > > +trustworthy according to the caller's environment.
> > > > > > > +
> > > > > > > +In a secure environment, libraries and any executable dependencies should also
> > > > > > > +be checked. For instance, dynamic linking should make sure that all libraries
> > > > > > > +are allowed for execution to avoid trivial bypass (e.g. using ``LD_PRELOAD``).
> > > > > > > +For such secure execution environment to make sense, only trusted code should
> > > > > > > +be executable, which also requires integrity guarantees.
> > > > > > > +
> > > > > > > +To avoid race conditions leading to time-of-check to time-of-use issues,
> > > > > > > +``AT_EXECVE_CHECK`` should be used with ``AT_EMPTY_PATH`` to check against a
> > > > > > > +file descriptor instead of a path.
> > > > > > > diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/index.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/index.rst
> > > > > > > index 274cc7546efc..6272bcf11296 100644
> > > > > > > --- a/Documentation/userspace-api/index.rst
> > > > > > > +++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/index.rst
> > > > > > > @@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ Security-related interfaces
> > > > > > > mfd_noexec
> > > > > > > spec_ctrl
> > > > > > > tee
> > > > > > > + check_exec
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Devices and I/O
> > > > > > > ===============
> > > > > > > diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
> > > > > > > index 6c53920795c2..bb83b6a39530 100644
> > > > > > > --- a/fs/exec.c
> > > > > > > +++ b/fs/exec.c
> > > > > > > @@ -891,7 +891,8 @@ static struct file *do_open_execat(int fd, struct filename *name, int flags)
> > > > > > > .lookup_flags = LOOKUP_FOLLOW,
> > > > > > > };
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > - if ((flags & ~(AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW | AT_EMPTY_PATH)) != 0)
> > > > > > > + if ((flags &
> > > > > > > + ~(AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW | AT_EMPTY_PATH | AT_EXECVE_CHECK)) != 0)
> > > > > > > return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
> > > > > > > if (flags & AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW)
> > > > > > > open_exec_flags.lookup_flags &= ~LOOKUP_FOLLOW;
> > > > > > > @@ -1545,6 +1546,21 @@ static struct linux_binprm *alloc_bprm(int fd, struct filename *filename, int fl
> > > > > > > }
> > > > > > > bprm->interp = bprm->filename;
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > + /*
> > > > > > > + * At this point, security_file_open() has already been called (with
> > > > > > > + * __FMODE_EXEC) and access control checks for AT_EXECVE_CHECK will
> > > > > > > + * stop just after the security_bprm_creds_for_exec() call in
> > > > > > > + * bprm_execve(). Indeed, the kernel should not try to parse the
> > > > > > > + * content of the file with exec_binprm() nor change the calling
> > > > > > > + * thread, which means that the following security functions will be
> > > > > > > + * not called:
> > > > > > > + * - security_bprm_check()
> > > > > > > + * - security_bprm_creds_from_file()
> > > > > > > + * - security_bprm_committing_creds()
> > > > > > > + * - security_bprm_committed_creds()
> > > > > > > + */
> > > > > > > + bprm->is_check = !!(flags & AT_EXECVE_CHECK);
> > > > > > > +
> > > > > > > retval = bprm_mm_init(bprm);
> > > > > > > if (!retval)
> > > > > > > return bprm;
> > > > > > > @@ -1839,7 +1855,7 @@ static int bprm_execve(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > /* Set the unchanging part of bprm->cred */
> > > > > > > retval = security_bprm_creds_for_exec(bprm);
> > > > > > > - if (retval)
> > > > > > > + if (retval || bprm->is_check)
> > > > > > > goto out;
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > retval = exec_binprm(bprm);
> > > > > > > diff --git a/include/linux/binfmts.h b/include/linux/binfmts.h
> > > > > > > index e6c00e860951..8ff0eb3644a1 100644
> > > > > > > --- a/include/linux/binfmts.h
> > > > > > > +++ b/include/linux/binfmts.h
> > > > > > > @@ -42,7 +42,12 @@ struct linux_binprm {
> > > > > > > * Set when errors can no longer be returned to the
> > > > > > > * original userspace.
> > > > > > > */
> > > > > > > - point_of_no_return:1;
> > > > > > > + point_of_no_return:1,
> > > > > > > + /*
> > > > > > > + * Set by user space to check executability according to the
> > > > > > > + * caller's environment.
> > > > > > > + */
> > > > > > > + is_check:1;
> > > > > > > struct file *executable; /* Executable to pass to the interpreter */
> > > > > > > struct file *interpreter;
> > > > > > > struct file *file;
> > > > > > > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/fcntl.h b/include/uapi/linux/fcntl.h
> > > > > > > index 87e2dec79fea..2e87f2e3a79f 100644
> > > > > > > --- a/include/uapi/linux/fcntl.h
> > > > > > > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/fcntl.h
> > > > > > > @@ -154,6 +154,10 @@
> > > > > > > usable with open_by_handle_at(2). */
> > > > > > > #define AT_HANDLE_MNT_ID_UNIQUE 0x001 /* Return the u64 unique mount ID. */
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > +/* Flags for execveat2(2). */
> > > > > > > +#define AT_EXECVE_CHECK 0x10000 /* Only perform a check if execution
> > > > > > > + would be allowed. */
> > > > > > > +
> > > > > > > #if defined(__KERNEL__)
> > > > > > > #define AT_GETATTR_NOSEC 0x80000000
> > > > > > > #endif
> > > > > > > diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
> > > > > > > index a60d2840559e..8ebdabd2ab81 100644
> > > > > > > --- a/kernel/audit.h
> > > > > > > +++ b/kernel/audit.h
> > > > > > > @@ -197,6 +197,7 @@ struct audit_context {
> > > > > > > struct open_how openat2;
> > > > > > > struct {
> > > > > > > int argc;
> > > > > > > + bool is_check;
> > > > > > > } execve;
> > > > > > > struct {
> > > > > > > char *name;
> > > > > > > diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> > > > > > > index cd57053b4a69..8d9ba5600cf2 100644
> > > > > > > --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> > > > > > > +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> > > > > > > @@ -2662,6 +2662,7 @@ void __audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > context->type = AUDIT_EXECVE;
> > > > > > > context->execve.argc = bprm->argc;
> > > > > > > + context->execve.is_check = bprm->is_check;
> > > > > > Where is execve.is_check used ?
> > > > >
> > > > > It is used in bprm_execve(), exposed to the audit framework, and
> > > > > potentially used by LSMs.
> > > > >
> > > > bprm_execve() uses bprm->is_check, not the context->execve.is_check.
> > >
> > > Correct, this is only for audit but not used yet.
> > >
> > > Paul, Eric, do you want me to remove this field, leave it, or extend
> > > this patch like this?
> > >
> > > diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> > > index 8d9ba5600cf2..12cf89fa224a 100644
> > > --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> > > +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> > > @@ -1290,6 +1290,8 @@ static void audit_log_execve_info(struct audit_context *context,
> > > }
> > > } while (arg < context->execve.argc);
> > >
> > > + audit_log_format(*ab, " check=%d", context->execve.is_check);
> > > +
> > > /* NOTE: the caller handles the final audit_log_end() call */
> > >
> > > out:
> > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > > > }
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> > > > > > > index c5981e558bc2..456361ec249d 100644
> > > > > > > --- a/security/security.c
> > > > > > > +++ b/security/security.c
> > > > > > > @@ -1249,6 +1249,12 @@ int security_vm_enough_memory_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
> > > > > > > * to 1 if AT_SECURE should be set to request libc enable secure mode. @bprm
> > > > > > > * contains the linux_binprm structure.
> > > > > > > *
> > > > > > > + * If execveat(2) is called with the AT_EXECVE_CHECK flag, bprm->is_check is
> > > > > > > + * set. The result must be the same as without this flag even if the execution
> > > > > > > + * will never really happen and @bprm will always be dropped.
> > > > > > > + *
> > > > > > > + * This hook must not change current->cred, only @bprm->cred.
> > > > > > > + *
> > > > > > > * Return: Returns 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted.
> > > > > > > */
> > > > > > > int security_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
> > > > > > > @@ -3100,6 +3106,10 @@ int security_file_receive(struct file *file)
> > > > > > > * Save open-time permission checking state for later use upon file_permission,
> > > > > > > * and recheck access if anything has changed since inode_permission.
> > > > > > > *
> > > > > > > + * We can check if a file is opened for execution (e.g. execve(2) call), either
> > > > > > > + * directly or indirectly (e.g. ELF's ld.so) by checking file->f_flags &
> > > > > > > + * __FMODE_EXEC .
> > > > > > > + *
> > > > > > > * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
> > > > > > > */
> > > > > > > int security_file_open(struct file *file)
> > > > > > > --
> > > > > > > 2.47.0
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > >
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