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Message-ID: <CABi2SkWgSOx__YafOC1NXxsxLJim4dGALthy5uCFnSCrzQ4zkA@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 19 Nov 2024 17:30:13 -0800
From: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@...omium.org>
To: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>, Christian Brauner <brauner@...nel.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
Serge Hallyn <serge@...lyn.com>, Adhemerval Zanella Netto <adhemerval.zanella@...aro.org>,
Alejandro Colomar <alx@...nel.org>, Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@...har.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>, Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
Christian Heimes <christian@...hon.org>, Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>,
Elliott Hughes <enh@...gle.com>, Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>,
Eric Chiang <ericchiang@...gle.com>, Fan Wu <wufan@...ux.microsoft.com>,
Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>, Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@...ux-m68k.org>,
James Morris <jamorris@...ux.microsoft.com>, Jan Kara <jack@...e.cz>,
Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>, Jeff Xu <jeffxu@...gle.com>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
Jordan R Abrahams <ajordanr@...gle.com>, Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@...ux.microsoft.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>, Luca Boccassi <bluca@...ian.org>,
Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@...nel.org>,
"Madhavan T . Venkataraman" <madvenka@...ux.microsoft.com>, Matt Bobrowski <mattbobrowski@...gle.com>,
Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...f.ucam.org>, Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>,
Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@...hat.com>, Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>,
Nicolas Bouchinet <nicolas.bouchinet@....gouv.fr>, Scott Shell <scottsh@...rosoft.com>,
Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>, Stephen Rothwell <sfr@...b.auug.org.au>,
Steve Dower <steve.dower@...hon.org>, Steve Grubb <sgrubb@...hat.com>,
"Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@....edu>, Thibaut Sautereau <thibaut.sautereau@....gouv.fr>,
Vincent Strubel <vincent.strubel@....gouv.fr>, Xiaoming Ni <nixiaoming@...wei.com>,
Yin Fengwei <fengwei.yin@...el.com>, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com,
linux-api@...r.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v21 2/6] security: Add EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE and
EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE securebits
On Tue, Nov 12, 2024 at 12:06 PM Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net> wrote:
>
> The new SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE, SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE, and
> their *_LOCKED counterparts are designed to be set by processes setting
> up an execution environment, such as a user session, a container, or a
> security sandbox. Unlike other securebits, these ones can be set by
> unprivileged processes. Like seccomp filters or Landlock domains, the
> securebits are inherited across processes.
>
> When SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE is set, programs interpreting code should
> control executable resources according to execveat(2) + AT_EXECVE_CHECK
> (see previous commit).
>
> When SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE is set, a process should deny
> execution of user interactive commands (which excludes executable
> regular files).
>
> Being able to configure each of these securebits enables system
> administrators or owner of image containers to gradually validate the
> related changes and to identify potential issues (e.g. with interpreter
> or audit logs).
>
> It should be noted that unlike other security bits, the
> SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE and SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE bits are
> dedicated to user space willing to restrict itself. Because of that,
> they only make sense in the context of a trusted environment (e.g.
> sandbox, container, user session, full system) where the process
> changing its behavior (according to these bits) and all its parent
> processes are trusted. Otherwise, any parent process could just execute
> its own malicious code (interpreting a script or not), or even enforce a
> seccomp filter to mask these bits.
>
> Such a secure environment can be achieved with an appropriate access
> control (e.g. mount's noexec option, file access rights, LSM policy) and
> an enlighten ld.so checking that libraries are allowed for execution
> e.g., to protect against illegitimate use of LD_PRELOAD.
>
> Ptrace restrictions according to these securebits would not make sense
> because of the processes' trust assumption.
>
> Scripts may need some changes to deal with untrusted data (e.g. stdin,
> environment variables), but that is outside the scope of the kernel.
>
> See chromeOS's documentation about script execution control and the
> related threat model:
> https://www.chromium.org/chromium-os/developer-library/guides/security/noexec-shell-scripts/
>
> Cc: Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>
> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
> Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@...nel.org>
> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
> Cc: Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>
> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@...lyn.com>
> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241112191858.162021-3-mic@digikod.net
> ---
>
> Changes since v20:
> * Move UAPI documentation to a dedicated RST file and format it.
>
> Changes since v19:
> * Replace SECBIT_SHOULD_EXEC_CHECK and SECBIT_SHOULD_EXEC_RESTRICT with
> SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE and SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE:
> https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240710.eiKohpa4Phai@digikod.net/
> * Remove the ptrace restrictions, suggested by Andy.
> * Improve documentation according to the discussion with Jeff.
>
> New design since v18:
> https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220104155024.48023-3-mic@digikod.net
> ---
> Documentation/userspace-api/check_exec.rst | 97 ++++++++++++++++++++++
> include/uapi/linux/securebits.h | 24 +++++-
> security/commoncap.c | 29 +++++--
> 3 files changed, 143 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/check_exec.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/check_exec.rst
> index ad1aeaa5f6c0..1df5c7534af9 100644
> --- a/Documentation/userspace-api/check_exec.rst
> +++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/check_exec.rst
> @@ -2,6 +2,21 @@
> Executability check
> ===================
>
> +The ``AT_EXECVE_CHECK`` :manpage:`execveat(2)` flag, and the
> +``SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE`` and ``SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE`` securebits
> +are intended for script interpreters and dynamic linkers to enforce a
> +consistent execution security policy handled by the kernel. See the
> +`samples/check-exec/inc.c`_ example.
> +
> +Whether an interpreter should check these securebits or not depends on the
> +security risk of running malicious scripts with respect to the execution
> +environment, and whether the kernel can check if a script is trustworthy or
> +not. For instance, Python scripts running on a server can use arbitrary
> +syscalls and access arbitrary files. Such interpreters should then be
> +enlighten to use these securebits and let users define their security policy.
> +However, a JavaScript engine running in a web browser should already be
> +sandboxed and then should not be able to harm the user's environment.
> +
> AT_EXECVE_CHECK
> ===============
>
> @@ -32,3 +47,85 @@ be executable, which also requires integrity guarantees.
> To avoid race conditions leading to time-of-check to time-of-use issues,
> ``AT_EXECVE_CHECK`` should be used with ``AT_EMPTY_PATH`` to check against a
> file descriptor instead of a path.
> +
> +SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE and SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE
> +==========================================================
> +
> +When ``SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE`` is set, a process should only interpret or
> +execute a file if a call to :manpage:`execveat(2)` with the related file
> +descriptor and the ``AT_EXECVE_CHECK`` flag succeed.
> +
> +This secure bit may be set by user session managers, service managers,
> +container runtimes, sandboxer tools... Except for test environments, the
> +related ``SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE_LOCKED`` bit should also be set.
> +
> +Programs should only enforce consistent restrictions according to the
> +securebits but without relying on any other user-controlled configuration.
> +Indeed, the use case for these securebits is to only trust executable code
> +vetted by the system configuration (through the kernel), so we should be
> +careful to not let untrusted users control this configuration.
> +
> +However, script interpreters may still use user configuration such as
> +environment variables as long as it is not a way to disable the securebits
> +checks. For instance, the ``PATH`` and ``LD_PRELOAD`` variables can be set by
> +a script's caller. Changing these variables may lead to unintended code
> +executions, but only from vetted executable programs, which is OK. For this to
> +make sense, the system should provide a consistent security policy to avoid
> +arbitrary code execution e.g., by enforcing a write xor execute policy.
> +
> +When ``SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE`` is set, a process should never interpret
> +interactive user commands (e.g. scripts). However, if such commands are passed
> +through a file descriptor (e.g. stdin), its content should be interpreted if a
> +call to :manpage:`execveat(2)` with the related file descriptor and the
> +``AT_EXECVE_CHECK`` flag succeed.
> +
> +For instance, script interpreters called with a script snippet as argument
> +should always deny such execution if ``SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE`` is set.
> +
> +This secure bit may be set by user session managers, service managers,
> +container runtimes, sandboxer tools... Except for test environments, the
> +related ``SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE_LOCKED`` bit should also be set.
> +
> +Here is the expected behavior for a script interpreter according to combination
> +of any exec securebits:
> +
> +1. ``SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE=0`` and ``SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE=0``
> +
> + Always interpret scripts, and allow arbitrary user commands (default).
> +
> + No threat, everyone and everything is trusted, but we can get ahead of
> + potential issues thanks to the call to :manpage:`execveat(2)` with
> + ``AT_EXECVE_CHECK`` which should always be performed but ignored by the
> + script interpreter. Indeed, this check is still important to enable systems
> + administrators to verify requests (e.g. with audit) and prepare for
> + migration to a secure mode.
> +
> +2. ``SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE=1`` and ``SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE=0``
> +
> + Deny script interpretation if they are not executable, but allow
> + arbitrary user commands.
> +
> + The threat is (potential) malicious scripts run by trusted (and not fooled)
> + users. That can protect against unintended script executions (e.g. ``sh
> + /tmp/*.sh``). This makes sense for (semi-restricted) user sessions.
> +
> +3. ``SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE=0`` and ``SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE=1``
> +
> + Always interpret scripts, but deny arbitrary user commands.
> +
> + This use case may be useful for secure services (i.e. without interactive
> + user session) where scripts' integrity is verified (e.g. with IMA/EVM or
> + dm-verity/IPE) but where access rights might not be ready yet. Indeed,
> + arbitrary interactive commands would be much more difficult to check.
> +
> +4. ``SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE=1`` and ``SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE=1``
> +
> + Deny script interpretation if they are not executable, and also deny
> + any arbitrary user commands.
> +
> + The threat is malicious scripts run by untrusted users (but trusted code).
> + This makes sense for system services that may only execute trusted scripts.
> +
> +.. Links
> +.. _samples/check-exec/inc.c:
> + https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/tree/samples/check-exec/inc.c
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/securebits.h b/include/uapi/linux/securebits.h
> index d6d98877ff1a..3fba30dbd68b 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/securebits.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/securebits.h
> @@ -52,10 +52,32 @@
> #define SECBIT_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE_LOCKED \
> (issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE_LOCKED))
>
> +/* See Documentation/userspace-api/check_exec.rst */
> +#define SECURE_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE 8
> +#define SECURE_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE_LOCKED 9 /* make bit-8 immutable */
> +
> +#define SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE (issecure_mask(SECURE_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE))
> +#define SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE_LOCKED \
> + (issecure_mask(SECURE_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE_LOCKED))
> +
> +/* See Documentation/userspace-api/check_exec.rst */
> +#define SECURE_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE 10
> +#define SECURE_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE_LOCKED 11 /* make bit-10 immutable */
> +
> +#define SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE \
> + (issecure_mask(SECURE_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE))
> +#define SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE_LOCKED \
> + (issecure_mask(SECURE_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE_LOCKED))
> +
> #define SECURE_ALL_BITS (issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT) | \
> issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP) | \
> issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS) | \
> - issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE))
> + issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE) | \
> + issecure_mask(SECURE_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE) | \
> + issecure_mask(SECURE_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE))
> #define SECURE_ALL_LOCKS (SECURE_ALL_BITS << 1)
>
> +#define SECURE_ALL_UNPRIVILEGED (issecure_mask(SECURE_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE) | \
> + issecure_mask(SECURE_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE))
> +
> #endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_SECUREBITS_H */
> diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
> index cefad323a0b1..52ea01acb453 100644
> --- a/security/commoncap.c
> +++ b/security/commoncap.c
> @@ -1302,21 +1302,38 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
> & (old->securebits ^ arg2)) /*[1]*/
> || ((old->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS & ~arg2)) /*[2]*/
> || (arg2 & ~(SECURE_ALL_LOCKS | SECURE_ALL_BITS)) /*[3]*/
> - || (cap_capable(current_cred(),
> - current_cred()->user_ns,
> - CAP_SETPCAP,
> - CAP_OPT_NONE) != 0) /*[4]*/
> /*
> * [1] no changing of bits that are locked
> * [2] no unlocking of locks
> * [3] no setting of unsupported bits
> - * [4] doing anything requires privilege (go read about
> - * the "sendmail capabilities bug")
> */
> )
> /* cannot change a locked bit */
> return -EPERM;
>
> + /*
> + * Doing anything requires privilege (go read about the
> + * "sendmail capabilities bug"), except for unprivileged bits.
> + * Indeed, the SECURE_ALL_UNPRIVILEGED bits are not
> + * restrictions enforced by the kernel but by user space on
> + * itself.
> + */
> + if (cap_capable(current_cred(), current_cred()->user_ns,
> + CAP_SETPCAP, CAP_OPT_NONE) != 0) {
> + const unsigned long unpriv_and_locks =
> + SECURE_ALL_UNPRIVILEGED |
> + SECURE_ALL_UNPRIVILEGED << 1;
> + const unsigned long changed = old->securebits ^ arg2;
> +
> + /* For legacy reason, denies non-change. */
> + if (!changed)
> + return -EPERM;
> +
> + /* Denies privileged changes. */
> + if (changed & ~unpriv_and_locks)
> + return -EPERM;
> + }
> +
Is above a refactor (without functional change) or a bug fix ?
maybe a separate commit with description ?
> new = prepare_creds();
> if (!new)
> return -ENOMEM;
> --
> 2.47.0
>
>
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