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Message-ID: <20241112191858.162021-4-mic@digikod.net>
Date: Tue, 12 Nov 2024 20:18:55 +0100
From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>
To: Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
Christian Brauner <brauner@...nel.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
Serge Hallyn <serge@...lyn.com>
Cc: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>,
Adhemerval Zanella Netto <adhemerval.zanella@...aro.org>,
Alejandro Colomar <alx@...nel.org>,
Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@...har.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
Christian Heimes <christian@...hon.org>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>,
Elliott Hughes <enh@...gle.com>,
Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>,
Eric Chiang <ericchiang@...gle.com>,
Fan Wu <wufan@...ux.microsoft.com>,
Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>,
Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@...ux-m68k.org>,
James Morris <jamorris@...ux.microsoft.com>,
Jan Kara <jack@...e.cz>,
Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
Jeff Xu <jeffxu@...gle.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
Jordan R Abrahams <ajordanr@...gle.com>,
Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@...ux.microsoft.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Luca Boccassi <bluca@...ian.org>,
Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@...nel.org>,
"Madhavan T . Venkataraman" <madvenka@...ux.microsoft.com>,
Matt Bobrowski <mattbobrowski@...gle.com>,
Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...f.ucam.org>,
Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>,
Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@...hat.com>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>,
Nicolas Bouchinet <nicolas.bouchinet@....gouv.fr>,
Scott Shell <scottsh@...rosoft.com>,
Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>,
Stephen Rothwell <sfr@...b.auug.org.au>,
Steve Dower <steve.dower@...hon.org>,
Steve Grubb <sgrubb@...hat.com>,
Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>,
Thibaut Sautereau <thibaut.sautereau@....gouv.fr>,
Vincent Strubel <vincent.strubel@....gouv.fr>,
Xiaoming Ni <nixiaoming@...wei.com>,
Yin Fengwei <fengwei.yin@...el.com>,
kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com,
linux-api@...r.kernel.org,
linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v21 3/6] selftests/exec: Add 32 tests for AT_EXECVE_CHECK and exec securebits
Test that checks performed by execveat(..., AT_EXECVE_CHECK) are
consistent with noexec mount points and file execute permissions.
Test that SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE and SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE are
inherited by child processes and that they can be pinned with the
appropriate SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE_LOCKED and
SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE_LOCKED bits.
Cc: Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@...nel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@...lyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241112191858.162021-4-mic@digikod.net
---
Changes since v20:
* Rename AT_CHECK to AT_EXECVE_CHECK.
Changes since v19:
* Rename securebits.
* Rename test file.
Changes since v18:
* Rewrite tests with the new design: execveat/AT_CHECK and securebits.
* Simplify the capability dropping and improve it with the NOROOT
securebits.
* Replace most ASSERT with EXPECT.
* Fix NULL execve's argv to avoid kernel warning.
* Move tests to exec/
* Build a "false" static binary to test full execution path.
Changes since v14:
* Add Reviewed-by Kees Cook.
Changes since v13:
* Move -I to CFLAGS (suggested by Kees Cook).
* Update sysctl name.
Changes since v12:
* Fix Makefile's license.
Changes since v10:
* Update selftest Makefile.
Changes since v9:
* Rename the syscall and the sysctl.
* Update tests for enum trusted_for_usage
Changes since v8:
* Update with the dedicated syscall introspect_access(2) and the renamed
fs.introspection_policy sysctl.
* Remove check symlink which can't be use as is anymore.
* Use socketpair(2) to test UNIX socket.
Changes since v7:
* Update tests with faccessat2/AT_INTERPRETED, including new ones to
check that setting R_OK or W_OK returns EINVAL.
* Add tests for memfd, pipefs and nsfs.
* Rename and move back tests to a standalone directory.
Changes since v6:
* Add full combination tests for all file types, including block
devices, character devices, fifos, sockets and symlinks.
* Properly save and restore initial sysctl value for all tests.
Changes since v5:
* Refactor with FIXTURE_VARIANT, which make the tests much more easy to
read and maintain.
* Save and restore initial sysctl value (suggested by Kees Cook).
* Test with a sysctl value of 0.
* Check errno in sysctl_access_write test.
* Update tests for the CAP_SYS_ADMIN switch.
* Update tests to check -EISDIR (replacing -EACCES).
* Replace FIXTURE_DATA() with FIXTURE() (spotted by Kees Cook).
* Use global const strings.
Changes since v3:
* Replace RESOLVE_MAYEXEC with O_MAYEXEC.
* Add tests to check that O_MAYEXEC is ignored by open(2) and openat(2).
Changes since v2:
* Move tests from exec/ to openat2/ .
* Replace O_MAYEXEC with RESOLVE_MAYEXEC from openat2(2).
* Cleanup tests.
Changes since v1:
* Move tests from yama/ to exec/ .
* Fix _GNU_SOURCE in kselftest_harness.h .
* Add a new test sysctl_access_write to check if CAP_MAC_ADMIN is taken
into account.
* Test directory execution which is always forbidden since commit
73601ea5b7b1 ("fs/open.c: allow opening only regular files during
execve()"), and also check that even the root user can not bypass file
execution checks.
* Make sure delete_workspace() always as enough right to succeed.
* Cosmetic cleanup.
---
tools/testing/selftests/exec/.gitignore | 2 +
tools/testing/selftests/exec/Makefile | 7 +
tools/testing/selftests/exec/check-exec.c | 448 ++++++++++++++++++++++
tools/testing/selftests/exec/config | 2 +
tools/testing/selftests/exec/false.c | 5 +
5 files changed, 464 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/exec/check-exec.c
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/exec/config
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/exec/false.c
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/exec/.gitignore b/tools/testing/selftests/exec/.gitignore
index a0dc5d4bf733..a32c63bb4df1 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/exec/.gitignore
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/exec/.gitignore
@@ -9,6 +9,8 @@ execveat.ephemeral
execveat.denatured
non-regular
null-argv
+/check-exec
+/false
/load_address.*
!load_address.c
/recursion-depth
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/exec/Makefile b/tools/testing/selftests/exec/Makefile
index ba012bc5aab9..8713d1c862ae 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/exec/Makefile
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/exec/Makefile
@@ -1,6 +1,9 @@
# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
CFLAGS = -Wall
CFLAGS += -Wno-nonnull
+CFLAGS += $(KHDR_INCLUDES)
+
+LDLIBS += -lcap
ALIGNS := 0x1000 0x200000 0x1000000
ALIGN_PIES := $(patsubst %,load_address.%,$(ALIGNS))
@@ -9,12 +12,14 @@ ALIGNMENT_TESTS := $(ALIGN_PIES) $(ALIGN_STATIC_PIES)
TEST_PROGS := binfmt_script.py
TEST_GEN_PROGS := execveat non-regular $(ALIGNMENT_TESTS)
+TEST_GEN_PROGS_EXTENDED := false
TEST_GEN_FILES := execveat.symlink execveat.denatured script subdir
# Makefile is a run-time dependency, since it's accessed by the execveat test
TEST_FILES := Makefile
TEST_GEN_PROGS += recursion-depth
TEST_GEN_PROGS += null-argv
+TEST_GEN_PROGS += check-exec
EXTRA_CLEAN := $(OUTPUT)/subdir.moved $(OUTPUT)/execveat.moved $(OUTPUT)/xxxxx* \
$(OUTPUT)/S_I*.test
@@ -38,3 +43,5 @@ $(OUTPUT)/load_address.0x%: load_address.c
$(OUTPUT)/load_address.static.0x%: load_address.c
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -Wl,-z,max-page-size=$(lastword $(subst ., ,$@)) \
-fPIE -static-pie $< -o $@
+$(OUTPUT)/false: false.c
+ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -static $< -o $@
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/exec/check-exec.c b/tools/testing/selftests/exec/check-exec.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..c3aa046d8d68
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/exec/check-exec.c
@@ -0,0 +1,448 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Test execveat(2) with AT_EXECVE_CHECK, and prctl(2) with
+ * SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE, SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE, and their locked
+ * counterparts.
+ *
+ * Copyright © 2018-2020 ANSSI
+ * Copyright © 2024 Microsoft Corporation
+ *
+ * Author: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>
+ */
+
+#include <asm-generic/unistd.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <linux/prctl.h>
+#include <linux/securebits.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <sys/capability.h>
+#include <sys/mount.h>
+#include <sys/prctl.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/sysmacros.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+/* Defines AT_EXECVE_CHECK without type conflicts. */
+#define _ASM_GENERIC_FCNTL_H
+#include <linux/fcntl.h>
+
+#include "../kselftest_harness.h"
+
+static void drop_privileges(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata)
+{
+ const unsigned int noroot = SECBIT_NOROOT | SECBIT_NOROOT_LOCKED;
+ cap_t cap_p;
+
+ if ((cap_get_secbits() & noroot) != noroot)
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, cap_set_secbits(noroot));
+
+ cap_p = cap_get_proc();
+ EXPECT_NE(NULL, cap_p);
+ EXPECT_NE(-1, cap_clear(cap_p));
+
+ /*
+ * Drops everything, especially CAP_SETPCAP, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE, and
+ * CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH.
+ */
+ EXPECT_NE(-1, cap_set_proc(cap_p));
+ EXPECT_NE(-1, cap_free(cap_p));
+}
+
+static int test_secbits_set(const unsigned int secbits)
+{
+ int err;
+
+ err = prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, secbits);
+ if (err)
+ return errno;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+FIXTURE(access)
+{
+ int memfd, pipefd;
+ int pipe_fds[2], socket_fds[2];
+};
+
+FIXTURE_VARIANT(access)
+{
+ const bool mount_exec;
+ const bool file_exec;
+};
+
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(access, mount_exec_file_exec){
+ .mount_exec = true,
+ .file_exec = true,
+};
+
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(access, mount_exec_file_noexec){
+ .mount_exec = true,
+ .file_exec = false,
+};
+
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(access, mount_noexec_file_exec){
+ .mount_exec = false,
+ .file_exec = true,
+};
+
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(access, mount_noexec_file_noexec){
+ .mount_exec = false,
+ .file_exec = false,
+};
+
+static const char binary_path[] = "./false";
+static const char workdir_path[] = "./test-mount";
+static const char reg_file_path[] = "./test-mount/regular_file";
+static const char dir_path[] = "./test-mount/directory";
+static const char block_dev_path[] = "./test-mount/block_device";
+static const char char_dev_path[] = "./test-mount/character_device";
+static const char fifo_path[] = "./test-mount/fifo";
+
+FIXTURE_SETUP(access)
+{
+ int procfd_path_size;
+ static const char path_template[] = "/proc/self/fd/%d";
+ char procfd_path[sizeof(path_template) + 10];
+
+ /* Makes sure we are not already restricted nor locked. */
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_secbits_set(0));
+
+ /*
+ * Cleans previous workspace if any error previously happened (don't
+ * check errors).
+ */
+ umount(workdir_path);
+ rmdir(workdir_path);
+
+ /* Creates a clean mount point. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, mkdir(workdir_path, 00700));
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, mount("test", workdir_path, "tmpfs",
+ MS_MGC_VAL | (variant->mount_exec ? 0 : MS_NOEXEC),
+ "mode=0700,size=9m"));
+
+ /* Creates a regular file. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, mknod(reg_file_path,
+ S_IFREG | (variant->file_exec ? 0700 : 0600), 0));
+ /* Creates a directory. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, mkdir(dir_path, variant->file_exec ? 0700 : 0600));
+ /* Creates a character device: /dev/null. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, mknod(char_dev_path, S_IFCHR | 0400, makedev(1, 3)));
+ /* Creates a block device: /dev/loop0 */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, mknod(block_dev_path, S_IFBLK | 0400, makedev(7, 0)));
+ /* Creates a fifo. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, mknod(fifo_path, S_IFIFO | 0600, 0));
+
+ /* Creates a regular file without user mount point. */
+ self->memfd = memfd_create("test-exec-probe", MFD_CLOEXEC);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, self->memfd);
+ /* Sets mode, which must be ignored by the exec check. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, fchmod(self->memfd, variant->file_exec ? 0700 : 0600));
+
+ /* Creates a pipefs file descriptor. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, pipe(self->pipe_fds));
+ procfd_path_size = snprintf(procfd_path, sizeof(procfd_path),
+ path_template, self->pipe_fds[0]);
+ ASSERT_LT(procfd_path_size, sizeof(procfd_path));
+ self->pipefd = open(procfd_path, O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, self->pipefd);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, fchmod(self->pipefd, variant->file_exec ? 0700 : 0600));
+
+ /* Creates a socket file descriptor. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_DGRAM | SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0,
+ self->socket_fds));
+}
+
+FIXTURE_TEARDOWN_PARENT(access)
+{
+ /* There is no need to unlink the test files. */
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, umount(workdir_path));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, rmdir(workdir_path));
+}
+
+static void fill_exec_fd(struct __test_metadata *_metadata, const int fd_out)
+{
+ char buf[1024];
+ size_t len;
+ int fd_in;
+
+ fd_in = open(binary_path, O_CLOEXEC | O_RDONLY);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, fd_in);
+ /* Cannot use copy_file_range(2) because of EXDEV. */
+ len = read(fd_in, buf, sizeof(buf));
+ EXPECT_LE(0, len);
+ while (len > 0) {
+ EXPECT_EQ(len, write(fd_out, buf, len))
+ {
+ TH_LOG("Failed to write: %s (%d)", strerror(errno),
+ errno);
+ }
+ len = read(fd_in, buf, sizeof(buf));
+ EXPECT_LE(0, len);
+ }
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(fd_in));
+}
+
+static void fill_exec_path(struct __test_metadata *_metadata,
+ const char *const path)
+{
+ int fd_out;
+
+ fd_out = open(path, O_CLOEXEC | O_WRONLY);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, fd_out)
+ {
+ TH_LOG("Failed to open %s: %s", path, strerror(errno));
+ }
+ fill_exec_fd(_metadata, fd_out);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(fd_out));
+}
+
+static void test_exec_fd(struct __test_metadata *_metadata, const int fd,
+ const int err_code)
+{
+ char *const argv[] = { "", NULL };
+ int access_ret, access_errno;
+
+ /*
+ * If we really execute fd, filled with the "false" binary, the current
+ * thread will exits with an error, which will be interpreted by the
+ * test framework as an error. With AT_EXECVE_CHECK, we only check a
+ * potential successful execution.
+ */
+ access_ret =
+ execveat(fd, "", argv, NULL, AT_EMPTY_PATH | AT_EXECVE_CHECK);
+ access_errno = errno;
+ if (err_code) {
+ EXPECT_EQ(-1, access_ret);
+ EXPECT_EQ(err_code, access_errno)
+ {
+ TH_LOG("Wrong error for execveat(2): %s (%d)",
+ strerror(access_errno), errno);
+ }
+ } else {
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, access_ret)
+ {
+ TH_LOG("Access denied: %s", strerror(access_errno));
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+static void test_exec_path(struct __test_metadata *_metadata,
+ const char *const path, const int err_code)
+{
+ int flags = O_CLOEXEC;
+ int fd;
+
+ /* Do not block on pipes. */
+ if (path == fifo_path)
+ flags |= O_NONBLOCK;
+
+ fd = open(path, flags | O_RDONLY);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, fd)
+ {
+ TH_LOG("Failed to open %s: %s", path, strerror(errno));
+ }
+ test_exec_fd(_metadata, fd, err_code);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(fd));
+}
+
+/* Tests that we don't get ENOEXEC. */
+TEST_F(access, regular_file_empty)
+{
+ const int exec = variant->mount_exec && variant->file_exec;
+
+ test_exec_path(_metadata, reg_file_path, exec ? 0 : EACCES);
+
+ drop_privileges(_metadata);
+ test_exec_path(_metadata, reg_file_path, exec ? 0 : EACCES);
+}
+
+TEST_F(access, regular_file_elf)
+{
+ const int exec = variant->mount_exec && variant->file_exec;
+
+ fill_exec_path(_metadata, reg_file_path);
+
+ test_exec_path(_metadata, reg_file_path, exec ? 0 : EACCES);
+
+ drop_privileges(_metadata);
+ test_exec_path(_metadata, reg_file_path, exec ? 0 : EACCES);
+}
+
+/* Tests that we don't get ENOEXEC. */
+TEST_F(access, memfd_empty)
+{
+ const int exec = variant->file_exec;
+
+ test_exec_fd(_metadata, self->memfd, exec ? 0 : EACCES);
+
+ drop_privileges(_metadata);
+ test_exec_fd(_metadata, self->memfd, exec ? 0 : EACCES);
+}
+
+TEST_F(access, memfd_elf)
+{
+ const int exec = variant->file_exec;
+
+ fill_exec_fd(_metadata, self->memfd);
+
+ test_exec_fd(_metadata, self->memfd, exec ? 0 : EACCES);
+
+ drop_privileges(_metadata);
+ test_exec_fd(_metadata, self->memfd, exec ? 0 : EACCES);
+}
+
+TEST_F(access, non_regular_files)
+{
+ test_exec_path(_metadata, dir_path, EACCES);
+ test_exec_path(_metadata, block_dev_path, EACCES);
+ test_exec_path(_metadata, char_dev_path, EACCES);
+ test_exec_path(_metadata, fifo_path, EACCES);
+ test_exec_fd(_metadata, self->socket_fds[0], EACCES);
+ test_exec_fd(_metadata, self->pipefd, EACCES);
+}
+
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE(secbits) {};
+/* clang-format on */
+
+FIXTURE_VARIANT(secbits)
+{
+ const bool is_privileged;
+ const int error;
+};
+
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(secbits, priv) {
+ /* clang-format on */
+ .is_privileged = true,
+ .error = 0,
+};
+
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(secbits, unpriv) {
+ /* clang-format on */
+ .is_privileged = false,
+ .error = EPERM,
+};
+
+FIXTURE_SETUP(secbits)
+{
+ /* Makes sure no exec bits are set. */
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_secbits_set(0));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS));
+
+ if (!variant->is_privileged)
+ drop_privileges(_metadata);
+}
+
+FIXTURE_TEARDOWN(secbits)
+{
+}
+
+TEST_F(secbits, legacy)
+{
+ EXPECT_EQ(variant->error, test_secbits_set(0));
+}
+
+#define CHILD(...) \
+ do { \
+ pid_t child = vfork(); \
+ EXPECT_LE(0, child); \
+ if (child == 0) { \
+ __VA_ARGS__; \
+ _exit(0); \
+ } \
+ } while (0)
+
+TEST_F(secbits, exec)
+{
+ unsigned int secbits = prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS);
+
+ secbits |= SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE;
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_secbits_set(secbits));
+ EXPECT_EQ(secbits, prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS));
+ CHILD(EXPECT_EQ(secbits, prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS)));
+
+ secbits |= SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE;
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_secbits_set(secbits));
+ EXPECT_EQ(secbits, prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS));
+ CHILD(EXPECT_EQ(secbits, prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS)));
+
+ secbits &= ~(SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE | SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_secbits_set(secbits));
+ EXPECT_EQ(secbits, prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS));
+ CHILD(EXPECT_EQ(secbits, prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS)));
+}
+
+TEST_F(secbits, check_locked_set)
+{
+ unsigned int secbits = prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS);
+
+ secbits |= SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE;
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_secbits_set(secbits));
+ secbits |= SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE_LOCKED;
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_secbits_set(secbits));
+
+ /* Checks lock set but unchanged. */
+ EXPECT_EQ(variant->error, test_secbits_set(secbits));
+ CHILD(EXPECT_EQ(variant->error, test_secbits_set(secbits)));
+
+ secbits &= ~SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE;
+ EXPECT_EQ(EPERM, test_secbits_set(0));
+ CHILD(EXPECT_EQ(EPERM, test_secbits_set(0)));
+}
+
+TEST_F(secbits, check_locked_unset)
+{
+ unsigned int secbits = prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS);
+
+ secbits |= SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE_LOCKED;
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_secbits_set(secbits));
+
+ /* Checks lock unset but unchanged. */
+ EXPECT_EQ(variant->error, test_secbits_set(secbits));
+ CHILD(EXPECT_EQ(variant->error, test_secbits_set(secbits)));
+
+ secbits &= ~SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE;
+ EXPECT_EQ(EPERM, test_secbits_set(0));
+ CHILD(EXPECT_EQ(EPERM, test_secbits_set(0)));
+}
+
+TEST_F(secbits, restrict_locked_set)
+{
+ unsigned int secbits = prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS);
+
+ secbits |= SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE;
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_secbits_set(secbits));
+ secbits |= SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE_LOCKED;
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_secbits_set(secbits));
+
+ /* Checks lock set but unchanged. */
+ EXPECT_EQ(variant->error, test_secbits_set(secbits));
+ CHILD(EXPECT_EQ(variant->error, test_secbits_set(secbits)));
+
+ secbits &= ~SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE;
+ EXPECT_EQ(EPERM, test_secbits_set(0));
+ CHILD(EXPECT_EQ(EPERM, test_secbits_set(0)));
+}
+
+TEST_F(secbits, restrict_locked_unset)
+{
+ unsigned int secbits = prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS);
+
+ secbits |= SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE_LOCKED;
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_secbits_set(secbits));
+
+ /* Checks lock unset but unchanged. */
+ EXPECT_EQ(variant->error, test_secbits_set(secbits));
+ CHILD(EXPECT_EQ(variant->error, test_secbits_set(secbits)));
+
+ secbits &= ~SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE;
+ EXPECT_EQ(EPERM, test_secbits_set(0));
+ CHILD(EXPECT_EQ(EPERM, test_secbits_set(0)));
+}
+
+TEST_HARNESS_MAIN
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/exec/config b/tools/testing/selftests/exec/config
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..c308079867b3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/exec/config
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+CONFIG_BLK_DEV=y
+CONFIG_BLK_DEV_LOOP=y
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/exec/false.c b/tools/testing/selftests/exec/false.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..104383ec3a79
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/exec/false.c
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+int main(void)
+{
+ return 1;
+}
--
2.47.0
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