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Message-ID: <20240709.aa5ahChoo7No@digikod.net> Date: Tue, 9 Jul 2024 22:42:26 +0200 From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net> To: Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com> Cc: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@...gle.com>, Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>, Christian Brauner <brauner@...nel.org>, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>, Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>, Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>, Alejandro Colomar <alx@...nel.org>, Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@...har.com>, Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>, Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>, Christian Heimes <christian@...hon.org>, Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>, Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>, Eric Chiang <ericchiang@...gle.com>, Fan Wu <wufan@...ux.microsoft.com>, Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@...ux-m68k.org>, James Morris <jamorris@...ux.microsoft.com>, Jan Kara <jack@...e.cz>, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>, Jordan R Abrahams <ajordanr@...gle.com>, Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@...ux.microsoft.com>, Luca Boccassi <bluca@...ian.org>, Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@...nel.org>, "Madhavan T . Venkataraman" <madvenka@...ux.microsoft.com>, Matt Bobrowski <mattbobrowski@...gle.com>, Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...f.ucam.org>, Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>, Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@...hat.com>, Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>, Nicolas Bouchinet <nicolas.bouchinet@....gouv.fr>, Scott Shell <scottsh@...rosoft.com>, Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>, Stephen Rothwell <sfr@...b.auug.org.au>, Steve Dower <steve.dower@...hon.org>, Steve Grubb <sgrubb@...hat.com>, Thibaut Sautereau <thibaut.sautereau@....gouv.fr>, Vincent Strubel <vincent.strubel@....gouv.fr>, Xiaoming Ni <nixiaoming@...wei.com>, Yin Fengwei <fengwei.yin@...el.com>, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, linux-api@...r.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2) On Tue, Jul 09, 2024 at 12:05:50PM +0200, Florian Weimer wrote: > * Mickaël Salaün: > > >> > If we want to avoid that, we could have an agreed-upon error code which > >> > the LSM can signal that it'll never fail AT_CHECK checks, so we only > >> > have to perform the extra system call once. > > > > I'm not sure to follow. Either we check executable code or we don't, > > but it doesn't make sense to only check some parts (except for migration > > of user space code in a system, which is one purpose of the securebits > > added with the next patch). > > > > The idea with AT_CHECK is to unconditionnaly check executable right the > > same way it is checked when a file is executed. User space can decide > > to check that or not according to its policy (i.e. securebits). > > I meant it purely as a performance optimization, to skip future system > calls if we know they won't provide any useful information for this > process. In the grand scheme of things, the extra system call probably > does not matter because we already have to do costly things like mmap. Indeed, the performance impact of execveat+AT_CHECK should be negligible compared to everything else needed to interpret a script or spawn a process. Moreover, these checks should only be performed when SECBIT_SHOULD_EXEC_CHECK is set for the caller.
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