|
Message-ID: <20240708.ujeeDahkee4e@digikod.net> Date: Mon, 8 Jul 2024 19:05:39 +0200 From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net> To: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@...gle.com> Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>, Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>, Christian Brauner <brauner@...nel.org>, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>, Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>, Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>, Alejandro Colomar <alx@...nel.org>, Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@...har.com>, Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>, Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>, Christian Heimes <christian@...hon.org>, Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>, Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>, Eric Chiang <ericchiang@...gle.com>, Fan Wu <wufan@...ux.microsoft.com>, Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@...ux-m68k.org>, James Morris <jamorris@...ux.microsoft.com>, Jan Kara <jack@...e.cz>, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>, Jordan R Abrahams <ajordanr@...gle.com>, Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@...ux.microsoft.com>, Luca Boccassi <bluca@...ian.org>, Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@...nel.org>, "Madhavan T . Venkataraman" <madvenka@...ux.microsoft.com>, Matt Bobrowski <mattbobrowski@...gle.com>, Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...f.ucam.org>, Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>, Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@...hat.com>, Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>, Nicolas Bouchinet <nicolas.bouchinet@....gouv.fr>, Scott Shell <scottsh@...rosoft.com>, Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>, Stephen Rothwell <sfr@...b.auug.org.au>, Steve Dower <steve.dower@...hon.org>, Steve Grubb <sgrubb@...hat.com>, Thibaut Sautereau <thibaut.sautereau@....gouv.fr>, Vincent Strubel <vincent.strubel@....gouv.fr>, Xiaoming Ni <nixiaoming@...wei.com>, Yin Fengwei <fengwei.yin@...el.com>, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, linux-api@...r.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2) On Mon, Jul 08, 2024 at 09:40:45AM -0700, Jeff Xu wrote: > On Mon, Jul 8, 2024 at 9:26 AM Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com> wrote: > > > > * Jeff Xu: > > > > > Will dynamic linkers use the execveat(AT_CHECK) to check shared > > > libraries too ? or just the main executable itself. > > > > I expect that dynamic linkers will have to do this for everything they > > map. Correct, that would enable to safely handle LD_PRELOAD for instance. > Then all the objects (.so, .sh, etc.) will go through the check from > execveat's main to security_bprm_creds_for_exec(), some of them might > be specific for the main executable ? > e.g. ChromeOS uses security_bprm_creds_for_exec to block executable > memfd [1], applying this means automatically extending the block to > the .so object. That's a good example of how this AT_CHECK check makes sense. Landlock will probably get a similar (optional) restriction too: https://github.com/landlock-lsm/linux/issues/37 > > I'm not sure if other LSMs need to be updated ? e.g. will SELINUX > check for .so with its process transaction policy ? LSM should not need to be updated with this patch series. However, systems/components/containers enabling this new check should make sure it works with their current policy. > > [1] https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromiumos/third_party/kernel/+/3834992 > > -Jeff > > > > Usually, that does not include the maim program, but this can > > happen with explicit loader invocations (“ld.so /bin/true”). > > > > Thanks, > > Florian > >
Powered by blists - more mailing lists
Confused about mailing lists and their use? Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia and check out these guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.