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Message-ID: <20240708.zooj9Miaties@digikod.net> Date: Mon, 8 Jul 2024 10:56:59 +0200 From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net> To: Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>, Christian Brauner <brauner@...nel.org>, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>, Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>, Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>, Alejandro Colomar <alx@...nel.org>, Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@...har.com>, Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>, Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>, Christian Heimes <christian@...hon.org>, Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>, Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>, Eric Chiang <ericchiang@...gle.com>, Fan Wu <wufan@...ux.microsoft.com>, Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@...ux-m68k.org>, James Morris <jamorris@...ux.microsoft.com>, Jan Kara <jack@...e.cz>, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>, Jeff Xu <jeffxu@...gle.com>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>, Jordan R Abrahams <ajordanr@...gle.com>, Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@...ux.microsoft.com>, Luca Boccassi <bluca@...ian.org>, Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@...nel.org>, "Madhavan T . Venkataraman" <madvenka@...ux.microsoft.com>, Matt Bobrowski <mattbobrowski@...gle.com>, Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...f.ucam.org>, Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>, Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@...hat.com>, Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>, Nicolas Bouchinet <nicolas.bouchinet@....gouv.fr>, Scott Shell <scottsh@...rosoft.com>, Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>, Stephen Rothwell <sfr@...b.auug.org.au>, Steve Dower <steve.dower@...hon.org>, Steve Grubb <sgrubb@...hat.com>, Thibaut Sautereau <thibaut.sautereau@....gouv.fr>, Vincent Strubel <vincent.strubel@....gouv.fr>, Xiaoming Ni <nixiaoming@...wei.com>, Yin Fengwei <fengwei.yin@...el.com>, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, linux-api@...r.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2) On Sat, Jul 06, 2024 at 05:32:12PM +0200, Florian Weimer wrote: > * Mickaël Salaün: > > > On Fri, Jul 05, 2024 at 08:03:14PM +0200, Florian Weimer wrote: > >> * Mickaël Salaün: > >> > >> > Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2) to check if a file would be > >> > allowed for execution. The main use case is for script interpreters and > >> > dynamic linkers to check execution permission according to the kernel's > >> > security policy. Another use case is to add context to access logs e.g., > >> > which script (instead of interpreter) accessed a file. As any > >> > executable code, scripts could also use this check [1]. > >> > >> Some distributions no longer set executable bits on most shared objects, > >> which I assume would interfere with AT_CHECK probing for shared objects. > > > > A file without the execute permission is not considered as executable by > > the kernel. The AT_CHECK flag doesn't change this semantic. Please > > note that this is just a check, not a restriction. See the next patch > > for the optional policy enforcement. > > > > Anyway, we need to define the policy, and for Linux this is done with > > the file permission bits. So for systems willing to have a consistent > > execution policy, we need to rely on the same bits. > > Yes, that makes complete sense. I just wanted to point out the odd > interaction with the old binutils bug and the (sadly still current) > kernel bug. > > >> Removing the executable bit is attractive because of a combination of > >> two bugs: a binutils wart which until recently always set the entry > >> point address in the ELF header to zero, and the kernel not checking for > >> a zero entry point (maybe in combination with an absent program > >> interpreter) and failing the execve with ELIBEXEC, instead of doing the > >> execve and then faulting at virtual address zero. Removing the > >> executable bit is currently the only way to avoid these confusing > >> crashes, so I understand the temptation. > > > > Interesting. Can you please point to the bug report and the fix? I > > don't see any ELIBEXEC in the kernel. > > The kernel hasn't been fixed yet. I do think this should be fixed, so > that distributions can bring back the executable bit. Can you please point to the mailing list discussion or the bug report?
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