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Message-ID: <ZUFmW8DrxrhOhuVs@mailbox.org>
Date: Tue, 31 Oct 2023 21:40:59 +0100
From: Stefan Bavendiek <stefan.bavendiek@...lbox.org>
To: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>
Cc: kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, linux-hardening@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: Isolating abstract sockets

On Tue, Oct 24, 2023 at 11:07:14AM -0500, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> In 2005, before namespaces were upstreamed, I posted the 'bsdjail' LSM,
> which briefly made it into the -mm kernel, but was eventually rejected as
> being an abuse of the LSM interface for OS level virtualization :)
> 
> It's not 100% clear to me whether Stefan only wants isolation, or
> wants something closer to virtualization.
> 
> Stefan, would an LSM allowing you to isolate certain processes from
> some abstract unix socket paths (or by label, whatever0 suffice for you?
>

My intention was to find a clean way to isolate abstract sockets in network
applications without adding dependencies like LSMs. However the entire approach
of using namespaces for this is something I have mostly abandoned. LSMs like
Apparmor and SELinux would work fine for process isolation when you can control
the target system, but for general deployment of sandboxed processes, I found it
to be significantly easier (and more effective) to build this into the
application itself by using a multi process approach with seccomp (Basically how
OpenSSH did it)

- Stefan

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