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Message-ID: <CAFUG7Cfzg7LaQhhN_Vk+doOzXQ_3n4aY--mK2mORsd36MWWJjQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 24 Oct 2023 11:55:43 -0400
From: Boris Lukashev <blukashev@...pervictus.com>
To: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>
Cc: kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com,
Stefan Bavendiek <stefan.bavendiek@...lbox.org>, linux-hardening@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: Isolating abstract sockets
Good point: from the "resources granted to a user" perspective, that does
help bound their consumption. The nomenclature distinction seems like a
good one to have, but if "network namespaces" *change the meaning of the
term *and the original definition becomes "network device namespaces," then
there would be a period where older and newer kernels have very different
functions mapped to the same conceptual name. Might this make a bit more
sense as "network namespaces" meaning what they do now - "network device
namespaces," effectively; while the new concept would be "socket
namespaces" to account for the various socket style interfaces provided?
Thanks
-Boris
On Tue, Oct 24, 2023 at 10:15 AM Serge E. Hallyn <serge@...lyn.com> wrote:
> Thanks for the reply. Do you have any papers which came out of this r&d
> phase? Sounds very interesting.
>
> > Multiple NS' sharing an IP stack would exhaust ephemeral ranges faster
>
> Yes, but that could be a feature. I think of it as: I'm unprivileged
> user serge, and I want to fire off firefox in a whatzit-namespace so
> that I can redirect or forbid some connections. In this case, the
> admins have not agreed to let me double my resource usage, so the fact
> that the new namespace is sharing mine is a feature. And this lets
> me use network-namespace-like features completely unprivileged, without
> having to use a setuid-root helper to hook up a bridge.
>
> But, I didn't send this reply to advocate this approach. My main point
> was to mention that "network namespaces are network device namespaces"
> and hope that others would bring other suggestions for alternatives.
>
> -serge
>
> On Tue, Oct 24, 2023 at 10:05:29AM -0400, Boris Lukashev wrote:
> > Namespacing at OSI4 seems a bit fraught as the underlying route, mac,
> and physdev fall outside the callers control. Multiple NS' sharing an IP
> stack would exhaust ephemeral ranges faster (likely asymmetrically too) and
> have bound socket collisions opaque to each other requiring handling
> outside the NS/containers purview. We looked at this sort of thing during
> the r&d phase of our assured comms work (namespaces were young) and found a
> bunch of overhead and collision concerns. Not saying it can't be done, but
> getting consumers to play nice enough with such an approach may be a heavy
> lift.
> >
> > Thanks,
> > -Boris
> >
> >
> > On October 24, 2023 9:46:08 AM EDT, "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>
> wrote:
> > >On Sun, Dec 18, 2022 at 08:29:10PM +0100, Stefan Bavendiek wrote:
> > >> When building userspace application sandboxes, one issue that does
> not seem trivial to solve is the isolation of abstract sockets.
> > >
> > >Veeery late reply. Have you had any productive discussions about this
> in
> > >other threads or venues?
> > >
> > >> While most IPC mechanism can be isolated by mechanisms like mount
> namespaces, abstract sockets are part of the network namespace.
> > >> It is possible to isolate abstract sockets by using a new network
> namespace, however, unprivileged processes can only create a new empty
> network namespace, which removes network access as well and makes this
> useless for network clients.
> > >>
> > >> Same linux sandbox projects try to solve this by bridging the
> existing network interfaces into the new namespace or use something like
> slirp4netns to archive this, but this does not look like an ideal solution
> to this problem, especially since sandboxing should reduce the kernel
> attack surface without introducing more complexity.
> > >>
> > >> Aside from containers using namespaces, sandbox implementations based
> on seccomp and landlock would also run into the same problem, since
> landlock only provides file system isolation and seccomp cannot filter the
> path argument and therefore it can only be used to block new unix domain
> socket connections completely.
> > >>
> > >> Currently there does not seem to be any way to disable network
> namespaces in the kernel without also disabling unix domain sockets.
> > >>
> > >> The question is how to solve the issue of abstract socket isolation
> in a clean and efficient way, possibly even without namespaces.
> > >> What would be the ideal way to implement a mechanism to disable
> abstract sockets either globally or even better, in the context of a
> process.
> > >> And would such a patch have a realistic chance to make it into the
> kernel?
> > >
> > >Disabling them altogether would break lots of things depending on them,
> > >like X :) (@/tmp/.X11-unix/X0). The other path is to reconsider
> network
> > >namespaces. There are several directions this could lead. For one, as
> > >Dinesh Subhraveti often points out, the current "network" namespace is
> > >really a network device namespace. If we instead namespace at the
> > >bind/connect/etc calls, we end up with much different abilities. You
> > >can implement something like this today using seccomp-filter.
> > >
> > >-serge
>
--
Boris Lukashev
Systems Architect
Semper Victus <https://www.sempervictus.com>
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