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Message-ID: <2023040207-pretender-legislate-2e8b@gregkh> Date: Sun, 2 Apr 2023 19:23:44 +0200 From: Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org> To: Hanno Böck <hanno@...eck.de> Cc: kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com Subject: Re: [PATCH] Restrict access to TIOCLINUX On Sun, Apr 02, 2023 at 07:16:52PM +0200, Hanno Böck wrote: > On Sun, 2 Apr 2023 16:55:01 +0200 > Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org> wrote: > > > You just now broke any normal user programs that required this (or the > > other ioctls), and so you are going to have to force them to be run > > with CAP_SYS_ADMIN permissions? > > Are you aware of such normal user programs? > It was my impression that this is a relatively obscure feature and gpm > is pretty much the only tool using it. "Pretty much" does not mean "none" :( > > And you didn't change anything for programs like gpm that already had > > root permission (and shouldn't that permission be dropped anyway?) > > Well, you could restrict all that to a specific capability. However, it > is my understanding that the existing capability system is limited in > the number of capabilities and new ones should only be introduced in > rare cases. It does not seem a feature probably few people use anyway > deserves a new capability. I did not suggest that a new capability be created for this, that would be an abust of the capability levels for sure. > Do you have other proposals how to fix this issue? One could introduce > an option like for TIOCSTI that allows disabling selection features by > default. What exact issue are you trying to fix here? thanks, greg k-h
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