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Message-ID: <20230402160815.74760f87.hanno@hboeck.de>
Date: Sun, 2 Apr 2023 16:08:15 +0200
From: Hanno Böck <hanno@...eck.de>
To: kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: [PATCH] Restrict access to TIOCLINUX
Hi,
I'm sending this here before I'll try to send it to lkml and the
respective maintainers to get some feedback first.
The TIOCLINUX functionality in the kernel can be abused for privilege
escalation, similar to TIOCSTI. I considered a few options how to fix
this, and this is what I came up with.
Restrict access to TIOCLINUX
TIOCLINUX can be used for privilege escalation on virtual terminals when
code is executed via tools like su/sudo.
By abusing the selection features a lower-privileged application can
write content to the console, select and copy/paste that content and
thereby executing code on the privileged account. See also the poc here:
https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2023/03/14/3
Selection is usually used by tools like gpm that provide mouse features
on the virtual console. gpm already runs as root (due to earlier
changes that restrict access to a user on the current tty), therefore
it will still work with this change.
The security problem mitigated is similar to the security risks caused
by TIOCSTI, which, since kernel 6.2, can be disabled with
CONFIG_LEGACY_TIOCSTI=n.
Signed-off-by: Hanno Böck <hanno@...eck.de>
---
drivers/tty/vt/vt.c | 6 ++++++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/tty/vt/vt.c b/drivers/tty/vt/vt.c
index 3c2ea9c098f7..3671173109b8 100644
--- a/drivers/tty/vt/vt.c
+++ b/drivers/tty/vt/vt.c
@@ -3146,10 +3146,14 @@ int tioclinux(struct tty_struct *tty, unsigned
long arg) switch (type)
{
case TIOCL_SETSEL:
+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
ret = set_selection_user((struct
tiocl_selection __user *)(p+1), tty);
break;
case TIOCL_PASTESEL:
+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
ret = paste_selection(tty);
break;
case TIOCL_UNBLANKSCREEN:
@@ -3158,6 +3162,8 @@ int tioclinux(struct tty_struct *tty, unsigned
long arg) console_unlock();
break;
case TIOCL_SELLOADLUT:
+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
console_lock();
ret = sel_loadlut(p);
console_unlock();
--
2.40.0
--
Hanno Böck
https://hboeck.de/
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