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Message-ID: <20230127090526-mutt-send-email-mst@kernel.org>
Date: Fri, 27 Jan 2023 09:32:49 -0500
From: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@...hat.com>
To: "Reshetova, Elena" <elena.reshetova@...el.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
"Shishkin, Alexander" <alexander.shishkin@...el.com>,
"Shutemov, Kirill" <kirill.shutemov@...el.com>,
"Kuppuswamy, Sathyanarayanan" <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...el.com>,
"Kleen, Andi" <andi.kleen@...el.com>,
"Hansen, Dave" <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
"Wunner, Lukas" <lukas.wunner@...el.com>,
Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@...ux.intel.com>,
Jason Wang <jasowang@...hat.com>,
"Poimboe, Josh" <jpoimboe@...hat.com>,
"aarcange@...hat.com" <aarcange@...hat.com>,
Cfir Cohen <cfir@...gle.com>, Marc Orr <marcorr@...gle.com>,
"jbachmann@...gle.com" <jbachmann@...gle.com>,
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"keescook@...omium.org" <keescook@...omium.org>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
Michael Kelley <mikelley@...rosoft.com>,
"Lange, Jon" <jlange@...rosoft.com>,
"linux-coco@...ts.linux.dev" <linux-coco@...ts.linux.dev>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>
Subject: Re: Linux guest kernel threat model for Confidential Computing
On Fri, Jan 27, 2023 at 12:25:09PM +0000, Reshetova, Elena wrote:
>
> > On Fri, Jan 27, 2023 at 08:52:22AM +0000, Reshetova, Elena wrote:
> > > > On Wed, Jan 25, 2023 at 03:29:07PM +0000, Reshetova, Elena wrote:
> > > > > And this is a very special aspect of 'hardening' since it is about hardening a
> > > > kernel
> > > > > under different threat model/assumptions.
> > > >
> > > > I am not sure it's that special in that hardening IMHO is not a specific
> > > > threat model or a set of assumptions. IIUC it's just something that
> > > > helps reduce severity of vulnerabilities. Similarly, one can use the CC
> > > > hardware in a variety of ways I guess. And one way is just that -
> > > > hardening linux such that ability to corrupt guest memory does not
> > > > automatically escalate into guest code execution.
> > >
> > > I am not sure if I fully follow you on this. I do agree that it is in principle
> > > the same 'hardening' that we have been doing in Linux for decades just
> > > applied to a new attack surface, host <-> guest, vs userspace <->kernel.
> >
> > Sorry about being unclear this is not the type of hardening I meant
> > really. The "hardening" you meant is preventing kernel vulnerabilities,
> > right? This is what we've been doing for decades.
> > But I meant slightly newer things like e.g. KASLR or indeed ASLR generally -
> > we are trying to reduce a chance a vulnerability causes random
> > code execution as opposed to a DOS. To think in these terms you do not
> > need to think about attack surfaces - in the system including
> > a hypervisor, guest supervisor and guest userspace hiding
> > one component from others is helpful even if they share
> > a privelege level.
>
> Do you mean that the fact that CoCo guest has memory encrypted
> can help even in non-CoCo scenarios?
Yes.
> I am sorry, I still seem not to be able
> to grasp your idea fully. When the privilege level is shared, there is no
> incentive to perform privilege escalation attacks across components,
> so why hide them from each other?
Because limiting horisontal movement between components is still valuable.
> Data protection? But I don’t think you
> are talking about this? I do agree that KASLR is stronger when you remove
> the possibility to read the memory (make sure kernel code is execute only)
> you are trying to attack, but again not sure if you mean this.
It's an example. If kernel was 100% secure we won't need KASLR. Nothing
ever is though.
> >
> >
> >
> > > Interfaces have changed, but the types of vulnerabilities, etc are the same.
> > > The attacker model is somewhat different because we have
> > > different expectations on what host/hypervisor should be able to do
> > > to the guest (following business reasons and use-cases), versus what we
> > > expect normal userspace being able to "do" towards kernel. The host and
> > > hypervisor still has a lot of control over the guest (ability to start/stop it,
> > > manage its resources, etc). But the reasons behind this doesn’t come
> > > from the fact that security CoCo HW not being able to support this stricter
> > > security model (it cannot now indeed, but this is a design decision), but
> > > from the fact that it is important for Cloud service providers to retain that
> > > level of control over their infrastructure.
> >
> > Surely they need ability to control resource usage, not ability to execute DOS
> > attacks. Current hardware just does not have ability to allow the former
> > without the later.
>
> I don’t see why it cannot be added to HW if requirement comes. However, I think
> in cloud provider world being able to control resources equals to being able
> to deny these resources when required, so being able to denial of service its clients
> is kind of build-in expectation that everyone just agrees on.
>
> >
> > > >
> > > > If you put it this way, you get to participate in a well understood
> > > > problem space instead of constantly saying "yes but CC is special". And
> > > > further, you will now talk about features as opposed to fixing bugs.
> > > > Which will stop annoying people who currently seem annoyed by the
> > > > implication that their code is buggy simply because it does not cache in
> > > > memory all data read from hardware. Finally, you then don't really need
> > > > to explain why e.g. DoS is not a problem but info leak is a problem - when
> > > > for many users it's actually the reverse - the reason is not that it's
> > > > not part of a threat model - which then makes you work hard to define
> > > > the threat model - but simply that CC hardware does not support this
> > > > kind of hardening.
> > >
> > > But this won't be correct statement, because it is not limitation of HW, but the
> > > threat and business model that Confidential Computing exists in. I am not
> > > aware of a single cloud provider who would be willing to use the HW that
> > > takes the full control of their infrastructure and running confidential guests,
> > > leaving them with no mechanisms to control the load balancing, enforce
> > > resource usage, etc. So, given that nobody needs/willing to use such HW,
> > > such HW simply doesn’t exist.
> > >
> > > So, I would still say that the model we operate in CoCo usecases is somewhat
> > > special, but I do agree that given that we list a couple of these special
> > assumptions
> > > (over which ones we have no control or ability to influence, none of us are
> > business
> > > people), then the rest becomes just careful enumeration of attack surface
> > interfaces
> > > and break up of potential mitigations.
> > >
> > > Best Regards,
> > > Elena.
> > >
> >
> > I'd say each business has a slightly different business model, no?
> > Finding common ground is what helps us share code ...
>
> Fully agree, and a good discussion with everyone willing to listen and cooperate
> can go a long way into defining the best implementation.
>
> Best Regards,
> Elena.
Right. My point was that trying to show how CC usecases are similar to other
existing ones will be more helpful for everyone than just focusing on how they
are different. I hope I was able to show some similarities.
--
MST
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