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Message-ID: <Y9Jh2x9XJE1KEUg6@unreal> Date: Thu, 26 Jan 2023 13:19:55 +0200 From: Leon Romanovsky <leon@...nel.org> To: "Reshetova, Elena" <elena.reshetova@...el.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>, "Shishkin, Alexander" <alexander.shishkin@...el.com>, "Shutemov, Kirill" <kirill.shutemov@...el.com>, "Kuppuswamy, Sathyanarayanan" <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...el.com>, "Kleen, Andi" <andi.kleen@...el.com>, "Hansen, Dave" <dave.hansen@...el.com>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>, "Wunner, Lukas" <lukas.wunner@...el.com>, Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@...ux.intel.com>, "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@...hat.com>, Jason Wang <jasowang@...hat.com>, "Poimboe, Josh" <jpoimboe@...hat.com>, "aarcange@...hat.com" <aarcange@...hat.com>, Cfir Cohen <cfir@...gle.com>, Marc Orr <marcorr@...gle.com>, "jbachmann@...gle.com" <jbachmann@...gle.com>, "pgonda@...gle.com" <pgonda@...gle.com>, "keescook@...omium.org" <keescook@...omium.org>, James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>, Michael Kelley <mikelley@...rosoft.com>, "Lange, Jon" <jlange@...rosoft.com>, "linux-coco@...ts.linux.dev" <linux-coco@...ts.linux.dev>, Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com> Subject: Re: Linux guest kernel threat model for Confidential Computing On Wed, Jan 25, 2023 at 03:29:07PM +0000, Reshetova, Elena wrote: > Replying only to the not-so-far addressed points. > > > On Wed, Jan 25, 2023 at 12:28:13PM +0000, Reshetova, Elena wrote: > > > Hi Greg, <...> > > > 3) All the tools are open-source and everyone can start using them right away > > even > > > without any special HW (readme has description of what is needed). > > > Tools and documentation is here: > > > https://github.com/intel/ccc-linux-guest-hardening > > > > Again, as our documentation states, when you submit patches based on > > these tools, you HAVE TO document that. Otherwise we think you all are > > crazy and will get your patches rejected. You all know this, why ignore > > it? > > Sorry, I didn’t know that for every bug that is found in linux kernel when > we are submitting a fix that we have to list the way how it has been found. > We will fix this in the future submissions, but some bugs we have are found by > plain code audit, so 'human' is the tool. My problem with that statement is that by applying different threat model you "invent" bugs which didn't exist in a first place. For example, in this [1] latest submission, authors labeled correct behaviour as "bug". [1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230119170633.40944-1-alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com/ Thanks
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