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Message-Id: <20210331205458.1871746-1-keescook@chromium.org> Date: Wed, 31 Mar 2021 13:54:52 -0700 From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> To: Will Deacon <will@...nel.org> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>, Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@...el.com>, x86@...nel.org, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>, Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>, Alexander Popov <alex.popov@...ux.com>, Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>, Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>, David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>, Mike Rapoport <rppt@...ux.ibm.com>, Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>, Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, linux-hardening@...r.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org, linux-mm@...ck.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v9 0/6] Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall Hi Will (and Mark and Catalin), Can you take this via the arm64 tree for v5.13 please? Thomas has added his Reviewed-by, so it only leaves arm64's. :) v9: - comment position nit (tglx) - Added tglx's Reviewed-by v8: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210330205750.428816-1-keescook@chromium.org/ v7: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210319212835.3928492-1-keescook@chromium.org/ v6: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210315180229.1224655-1-keescook@chromium.org/ v5: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210309214301.678739-1-keescook@chromium.org/ v4: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200622193146.2985288-1-keescook@chromium.org/ v3: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200406231606.37619-1-keescook@chromium.org/ v2: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200324203231.64324-1-keescook@chromium.org/ rfc: https://lore.kernel.org/kernel-hardening/20190329081358.30497-1-elena.reshetova@intel.com/ This is a continuation and refactoring of Elena's earlier effort to add kernel stack base offset randomization. In the time since the earlier discussions, two attacks[1][2] were made public that depended on stack determinism, so we're no longer in the position of "this is a good idea but we have no examples of attacks". :) Earlier discussions also devolved into debates on entropy sources, which is mostly a red herring, given the already low entropy available due to stack size. Regardless, entropy can be changed/improved separately from this series as needed. Earlier discussions also got stuck debating how much syscall overhead was too much, but this is also a red herring since the feature itself needs to be selectable at boot with no cost for those that don't want it: this is solved here with static branches. So, here is the latest improved version, made as arch-agnostic as possible, with usage added for x86 and arm64. It also includes some small static branch clean ups, and addresses some surprise performance issues due to the stack canary[3]. Thanks! -Kees [1] https://a13xp0p0v.github.io/2020/02/15/CVE-2019-18683.html [2] https://repositorio-aberto.up.pt/bitstream/10216/125357/2/374717.pdf [3] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/202003281520.A9BFF461@keescook/ Kees Cook (6): jump_label: Provide CONFIG-driven build state defaults init_on_alloc: Optimize static branches stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall x86/entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support arm64: entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support lkdtm: Add REPORT_STACK for checking stack offsets .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 11 ++++ Makefile | 4 ++ arch/Kconfig | 23 ++++++++ arch/arm64/Kconfig | 1 + arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile | 5 ++ arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c | 16 ++++++ arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 + arch/x86/entry/common.c | 3 ++ arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h | 16 ++++++ drivers/misc/lkdtm/bugs.c | 17 ++++++ drivers/misc/lkdtm/core.c | 1 + drivers/misc/lkdtm/lkdtm.h | 1 + include/linux/jump_label.h | 19 +++++++ include/linux/mm.h | 10 ++-- include/linux/randomize_kstack.h | 54 +++++++++++++++++++ init/main.c | 23 ++++++++ mm/page_alloc.c | 4 +- mm/slab.h | 6 ++- 18 files changed, 207 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) create mode 100644 include/linux/randomize_kstack.h -- 2.25.1
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