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Message-ID: <202103191056.71AB0515A@keescook>
Date: Fri, 19 Mar 2021 11:03:42 -0700
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
Anton Ivanov <anton.ivanov@...bridgegreys.com>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>, Jeff Dike <jdike@...toit.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@...il.com>,
Richard Weinberger <richard@....at>, Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>,
Vincent Dagonneau <vincent.dagonneau@....gouv.fr>,
kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, linux-api@...r.kernel.org,
linux-arch@...r.kernel.org, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org,
linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org,
Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ux.microsoft.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v30 12/12] landlock: Add user and kernel documentation
On Tue, Mar 16, 2021 at 09:42:52PM +0100, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ux.microsoft.com>
>
> This documentation can be built with the Sphinx framework.
Well, yes. :) Maybe describe what the documentation covers instead here.
Regardless: yay docs! This is great.
> [...]
> +Bind mounts and OverlayFS
> +-------------------------
> +
> +Landlock enables to restrict access to file hierarchies, which means that these
> +access rights can be propagated with bind mounts (cf.
> +:doc:`/filesystems/sharedsubtree`) but not with :doc:`/filesystems/overlayfs`.
> +
> +A bind mount mirrors a source file hierarchy to a destination. The destination
> +hierarchy is then composed of the exact same files, on which Landlock rules can
> +be tied, either via the source or the destination path. These rules restrict
> +access when they are encountered on a path, which means that they can restrict
> +access to multiple file hierarchies at the same time, whether these hierarchies
> +are the result of bind mounts or not.
> +
> +An OverlayFS mount point consists of upper and lower layers. These layers are
> +combined in a merge directory, result of the mount point. This merge hierarchy
> +may include files from the upper and lower layers, but modifications performed
> +on the merge hierarchy only reflects on the upper layer. From a Landlock
> +policy point of view, each OverlayFS layers and merge hierarchies are
> +standalone and contains their own set of files and directories, which is
> +different from bind mounts. A policy restricting an OverlayFS layer will not
> +restrict the resulted merged hierarchy, and vice versa.
Can you include some examples about what a user of landlock should do?
i.e. what are some examples of unexpected results when trying to write
policy that runs on top of overlayfs, etc?
> [...]
> +File renaming and linking
> +-------------------------
> +
> +Because Landlock targets unprivileged access controls, it is needed to properly
> +handle composition of rules. Such property also implies rules nesting.
> +Properly handling multiple layers of ruleset, each one of them able to restrict
> +access to files, also implies to inherit the ruleset restrictions from a parent
> +to its hierarchy. Because files are identified and restricted by their
> +hierarchy, moving or linking a file from one directory to another implies to
> +propagate the hierarchy constraints. To protect against privilege escalations
> +through renaming or linking, and for the sack of simplicity, Landlock currently
typo: sack -> sake
> [...]
> +Special filesystems
> +-------------------
> +
> +Access to regular files and directories can be restricted by Landlock,
> +according to the handled accesses of a ruleset. However, files that do not
> +come from a user-visible filesystem (e.g. pipe, socket), but can still be
> +accessed through /proc/self/fd/, cannot currently be restricted. Likewise,
> +some special kernel filesystems such as nsfs, which can be accessed through
> +/proc/self/ns/, cannot currently be restricted. For now, these kind of special
> +paths are then always allowed. Future Landlock evolutions will enable to
> +restrict such paths with dedicated ruleset flags.
With this series, can /proc (at the top level) be blocked? (i.e. can a
landlock user avoid the weirdness by making /proc/$pid/ unavailable?)
> +Ruleset layers
> +--------------
> +
> +There is a limit of 64 layers of stacked rulesets. This can be an issue for a
> +task willing to enforce a new ruleset in complement to its 64 inherited
> +rulesets. Once this limit is reached, sys_landlock_restrict_self() returns
> +E2BIG. It is then strongly suggested to carefully build rulesets once in the
> +life of a thread, especially for applications able to launch other applications
> +that may also want to sandbox themselves (e.g. shells, container managers,
> +etc.).
How was this value (64) chosen?
--
Kees Cook
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