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Message-ID: <202103151405.88334370F@keescook>
Date: Mon, 15 Mar 2021 14:17:48 -0700
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>, James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
Serge Hallyn <serge@...lyn.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@...ntu.com>,
Christoph Hellwig <hch@....de>, David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
Dominik Brodowski <linux@...inikbrodowski.net>,
"Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
John Johansen <john.johansen@...onical.com>,
Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@...data.co.jp>,
Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.sakura.ne.jp>,
kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ux.microsoft.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2)
On Thu, Mar 11, 2021 at 11:52:42AM +0100, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> [...]
> This change may not impact systems relying on other permission models
> than POSIX capabilities (e.g. Tomoyo). Being able to use chroot(2) on
> such systems may require to update their security policies.
>
> Only the chroot system call is relaxed with this no_new_privs check; the
> init_chroot() helper doesn't require such change.
>
> Allowing unprivileged users to use chroot(2) is one of the initial
> objectives of no_new_privs:
> https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/userspace-api/no_new_privs.html
> This patch is a follow-up of a previous one sent by Andy Lutomirski:
> https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/0e2f0f54e19bff53a3739ecfddb4ffa9a6dbde4d.1327858005.git.luto@amacapital.net/
I liked it back when Andy first suggested it, and I still like it now.
:) I'm curious, do you have a specific user in mind for this feature?
> [...]
> @@ -546,8 +547,18 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(chroot, const char __user *, filename)
> if (error)
> goto dput_and_out;
>
> + /*
> + * Changing the root directory for the calling task (and its future
> + * children) requires that this task has CAP_SYS_CHROOT in its
> + * namespace, or be running with no_new_privs and not sharing its
> + * fs_struct and not escaping its current root (cf. create_user_ns()).
> + * As for seccomp, checking no_new_privs avoids scenarios where
> + * unprivileged tasks can affect the behavior of privileged children.
> + */
> error = -EPERM;
> - if (!ns_capable(current_user_ns(), CAP_SYS_CHROOT))
> + if (!ns_capable(current_user_ns(), CAP_SYS_CHROOT) &&
> + !(task_no_new_privs(current) && current->fs->users == 1
> + && !current_chrooted()))
> goto dput_and_out;
> error = security_path_chroot(&path);
> if (error)
I think the logic here needs to be rearranged to avoid setting
PF_SUPERPRIV, and I find the many negations hard to read. Perhaps:
static inline int current_chroot_allowed(void)
{
/* comment here */
if (task_no_new_privs(current) && current->fs->users == 1 &&
!current_chrooted())
return 0;
if (ns_capable(current_user_ns(), CAP_SYS_CHROOT))
return 0;
return -EPERM;
}
...
error = current_chroot_allowed();
if (error)
goto dput_and_out;
I can't think of a way to race current->fs->users ...
--
Kees Cook
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