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Message-Id: <20210310161000.382796-1-mic@digikod.net>
Date: Wed, 10 Mar 2021 17:09:59 +0100
From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>
To: Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
Serge Hallyn <serge@...lyn.com>
Cc: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@...ntu.com>,
Christoph Hellwig <hch@....de>,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
Dominik Brodowski <linux@...inikbrodowski.net>,
Eric Biederman <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
John Johansen <john.johansen@...onical.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@...data.co.jp>,
Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.sakura.ne.jp>,
kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com,
linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v1 0/1] Unprivileged chroot
Hi,
The chroot system call is currently limited to be used by processes with
the CAP_SYS_CHROOT capability. This protects against malicious
procesess willing to trick SUID-like binaries. The following patch
allows unprivileged users to safely use chroot(2).
This patch is a follow-up of a previous one sent by Andy Lutomirski some
time ago:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/0e2f0f54e19bff53a3739ecfddb4ffa9a6dbde4d.1327858005.git.luto@amacapital.net/
This patch can be applied on top of v5.12-rc2 . I would really
appreciate constructive reviews.
Regards,
Mickaël Salaün (1):
fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2)
fs/open.c | 64 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 61 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
base-commit: a38fd8748464831584a19438cbb3082b5a2dab15
--
2.30.2
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