kernel-hardening mailing list - 2021/03

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kernel-hardening mailing list - 2021/03

Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat	Sun
¹ 3	² 5	³	⁴ 2	⁵ 1	⁶	⁷ 14
⁸	⁹ 9	¹⁰ 24	¹¹ 9	¹² 3	¹³	¹⁴
¹⁵ 12	¹⁶ 28	¹⁷	¹⁸ 11	¹⁹ 31	²⁰ 7	²¹ 8
²² 1	²³ 16	²⁴ 18	²⁵ 1	²⁶ 3	²⁷ 2	²⁸ 2
²⁹ 4	³⁰ 15	³¹ 15

Messages by day:

March 1 (3 messages)

5b5c35b757: BUG:KASAN:use-after-free_in_dec_rlimit_ucounts (kernel test robot <oliver.sang@...el.com>)
e1e57d56fe: stress-ng.access.ops_per_sec -41.6% regression (kernel test robot <oliver.sang@...el.com>)
Re: [PATCH 07/20] SUNRPC: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values (Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@...cle.com>)

March 2 (5 messages)

[security/brute] cfe92ab6a3: WARNING:inconsistent_lock_state (kernel test robot <oliver.sang@...el.com>)
Re: [PATCH 07/20] SUNRPC: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values (Romain Perier <romain.perier@...il.com>)
Re: [PATCH 06/20] ima: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values (Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>)
Re: [PATCH v5 7/8] Documentation: Add documentation for the Brute LSM (John Wood <john.wood@....com>)
Re: [security/brute] cfe92ab6a3: WARNING:inconsistent_lock_state (John Wood <john.wood@....com>)

March 4 (2 messages)

Re: [PATCH 02/20] crypto: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values (Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>)
Re: [PATCH 02/20] crypto: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values (Romain Perier <romain.perier@...il.com>)

March 5 (1 message)

Re: d28296d248: stress-ng.sigsegv.ops_per_sec -82.7% regression (ebiederm@...ssion.com (Eric W. Biederman))

March 7 (14 messages)

[PATCH v6 0/8] Fork brute force attack mitigation (John Wood <john.wood@....com>)
[PATCH v6 1/8] security: Add LSM hook at the point where a task gets a fatal signal (John Wood <john.wood@....com>)
[PATCH v6 2/8] security/brute: Define a LSM and manage statistical data (John Wood <john.wood@....com>)
[PATCH v6 3/8] securtiy/brute: Detect a brute force attack (John Wood <john.wood@....com>)
[PATCH v6 4/8] security/brute: Fine tuning the attack detection (John Wood <john.wood@....com>)
[PATCH v6 5/8] security/brute: Mitigate a brute force attack (John Wood <john.wood@....com>)
[PATCH v6 6/8] selftests/brute: Add tests for the Brute LSM (John Wood <john.wood@....com>)
[PATCH v6 7/8] Documentation: Add documentation for the Brute LSM (John Wood <john.wood@....com>)
[PATCH v6 8/8] MAINTAINERS: Add a new entry for the Brute LSM (John Wood <john.wood@....com>)
Re: [PATCH v5 7/8] Documentation: Add documentation for the Brute LSM (Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>)
Re: [PATCH v5 7/8] Documentation: Add documentation for the Brute LSM (John Wood <john.wood@....com>)
Re: [PATCH v5 7/8] Documentation: Add documentation for the Brute LSM (Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>)
Re: [PATCH v5 7/8] Documentation: Add documentation for the Brute LSM (John Wood <john.wood@....com>)
Re: [PATCH v5 7/8] Documentation: Add documentation for the Brute LSM (Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>)

March 9 (9 messages)

Re: [PATCH v5 7/8] Documentation: Add documentation for the Brute LSM (John Wood <john.wood@....com>)
[PATCH v5 1/7] mm: Restore init_on_* static branch defaults (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH v5 3/7] init_on_alloc: Unpessimize default-on builds (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH v5 2/7] jump_label: Provide CONFIG-driven build state defaults (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH v5 5/7] x86/entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH v5 6/7] arm64: entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH v5 0/7] Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH v5 7/7] lkdtm: Add REPORT_STACK for checking stack offsets (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH v5 4/7] stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)

March 10 (24 messages)

[PATCH v8 0/8] Count rlimits in each user namespace (Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@...il.com>)
[PATCH v8 1/8] Increase size of ucounts to atomic_long_t (Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@...il.com>)
[PATCH v8 2/8] Add a reference to ucounts for each cred (Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@...il.com>)
[PATCH v8 3/8] Use atomic_t for ucounts reference counting (Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@...il.com>)
[PATCH v8 4/8] Reimplement RLIMIT_NPROC on top of ucounts (Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@...il.com>)
[PATCH v8 5/8] Reimplement RLIMIT_MSGQUEUE on top of ucounts (Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@...il.com>)
[PATCH v8 6/8] Reimplement RLIMIT_SIGPENDING on top of ucounts (Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@...il.com>)
[PATCH v8 7/8] Reimplement RLIMIT_MEMLOCK on top of ucounts (Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@...il.com>)
[PATCH v8 8/8] kselftests: Add test to check for rlimit changes in different user namespaces (Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@...il.com>)
Re: [PATCH v5 3/7] init_on_alloc: Unpessimize default-on builds (Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...gle.com>)
[PATCH v1 0/1] Unprivileged chroot (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
[PATCH v1 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2) (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
Re: [PATCH v1 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2) (ebiederm@...ssion.com (Eric W. Biederman))
Re: [PATCH v1 0/1] Unprivileged chroot (Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>)
Re: [PATCH v1 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2) (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
Re: [PATCH v1 0/1] Unprivileged chroot (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
[PATCH v2 0/1] Unprivileged chroot (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
[PATCH v2 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2) (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
Re: [PATCH v2 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2) (ebiederm@...ssion.com (Eric W. Biederman))
Re: [PATCH v2 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2) (Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>)
Re: [PATCH v1 0/1] Unprivileged chroot (Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>)
Re: [PATCH v5 3/7] init_on_alloc: Unpessimize default-on builds (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH v8 3/8] Use atomic_t for ucounts reference counting (Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>)
Re: [PATCH v5 1/7] mm: Restore init_on_* static branch defaults (Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>)

March 11 (9 messages)

RE: [PATCH v2 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2) (David Laight <David.Laight@...LAB.COM>)
Re: [PATCH v2 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2) (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
Re: [PATCH v1 0/1] Unprivileged chroot (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
[PATCH v3 0/1] Unprivileged chroot (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
[PATCH v3 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2) (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
Re: [PATCH v5 7/8] Documentation: Add documentation for the Brute LSM (John Wood <john.wood@....com>)
Re: [PATCH v5 7/8] Documentation: Add documentation for the Brute LSM (Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>)
Re: [PATCH v5 7/8] Documentation: Add documentation for the Brute LSM (Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>)
Re: [PATCH v5 5/8] security/brute: Mitigate a brute force attack (peter enderborg <peter.enderborg@...y.com>)

March 12 (3 messages)

Re: [PATCH v5 5/8] security/brute: Mitigate a brute force attack (John Wood <john.wood@....com>)
Re: [PATCH v5 7/8] Documentation: Add documentation for the Brute LSM (John Wood <john.wood@....com>)
Re: [PATCH v5 7/8] Documentation: Add documentation for the Brute LSM (John Wood <john.wood@....com>)

March 15 (12 messages)

Re: [PATCH v5 1/7] mm: Restore init_on_* static branch defaults (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH v6 1/6] jump_label: Provide CONFIG-driven build state defaults (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH v6 0/6] Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH v6 2/6] init_on_alloc: Optimize static branches (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH v6 4/6] x86/entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH v6 3/6] stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH v6 5/6] arm64: entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH v6 6/6] lkdtm: Add REPORT_STACK for checking stack offsets (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH v3 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2) (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH v8 3/8] Use atomic_t for ucounts reference counting (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH v6 2/6] init_on_alloc: Optimize static branches (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH v8 3/8] Use atomic_t for ucounts reference counting (Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>)

March 16 (28 messages)

Re: [PATCH v3 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2) (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
[PATCH v4 0/1] Unprivileged chroot (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
[PATCH v4 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2) (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
Re: [PATCH v4 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2) (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH v8 3/8] Use atomic_t for ucounts reference counting (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH v4 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2) (Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>)
Re: [PATCH v4 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2) (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH v4 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2) (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
Re: [PATCH v4 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2) (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
Re: [PATCH v4 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2) (Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>)
Re: [PATCH v8 3/8] Use atomic_t for ucounts reference counting (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH v8 3/8] Use atomic_t for ucounts reference counting (Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>)
Re: [PATCH v4 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2) (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
[PATCH v5 0/1] Unprivileged chroot (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
[PATCH v5 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2) (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
[PATCH v30 00/12] Landlock LSM (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
[PATCH v30 01/12] landlock: Add object management (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
[PATCH v30 02/12] landlock: Add ruleset and domain management (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
[PATCH v30 03/12] landlock: Set up the security framework and manage credentials (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
[PATCH v30 04/12] landlock: Add ptrace restrictions (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
[PATCH v30 05/12] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
[PATCH v30 06/12] fs,security: Add sb_delete hook (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
[PATCH v30 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
[PATCH v30 08/12] landlock: Add syscall implementations (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
[PATCH v30 09/12] arch: Wire up Landlock syscalls (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
[PATCH v30 10/12] selftests/landlock: Add user space tests (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
[PATCH v30 11/12] samples/landlock: Add a sandbox manager example (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
[PATCH v30 12/12] landlock: Add user and kernel documentation (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)

March 18 (11 messages)

Re: [PATCH v6 1/8] security: Add LSM hook at the point where a task gets a fatal signal (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH v6 2/8] security/brute: Define a LSM and manage statistical data (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH v6 3/8] securtiy/brute: Detect a brute force attack (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH v6 4/8] security/brute: Fine tuning the attack detection (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH v6 5/8] security/brute: Mitigate a brute force attack (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH v6 6/8] selftests/brute: Add tests for the Brute LSM (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH v6 7/8] Documentation: Add documentation for the Brute LSM (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH v6 2/6] init_on_alloc: Optimize static branches (Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>)
Re: Fine-grained Forward CFI on top of Intel CET / IBT (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH v30 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control (James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>)
Re: [PATCH v30 00/12] Landlock LSM (James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>)

March 19 (31 messages)

Re: [PATCH v30 00/12] Landlock LSM (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
Re: [PATCH v30 05/12] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH v30 06/12] fs,security: Add sb_delete hook (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH v30 11/12] samples/landlock: Add a sandbox manager example (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH v30 10/12] selftests/landlock: Add user space tests (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH v30 12/12] landlock: Add user and kernel documentation (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH v30 01/12] landlock: Add object management (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH v30 02/12] landlock: Add ruleset and domain management (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH v30 10/12] selftests/landlock: Add user space tests (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
Re: [PATCH v30 03/12] landlock: Set up the security framework and manage credentials (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH v30 04/12] landlock: Add ptrace restrictions (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH v30 12/12] landlock: Add user and kernel documentation (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
Re: [PATCH v30 01/12] landlock: Add object management (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
Re: [PATCH v30 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH v30 02/12] landlock: Add ruleset and domain management (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
Re: [PATCH v30 08/12] landlock: Add syscall implementations (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH v30 03/12] landlock: Set up the security framework and manage credentials (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
Re: [PATCH v30 10/12] selftests/landlock: Add user space tests (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH v30 02/12] landlock: Add ruleset and domain management (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH v30 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
[PATCH v7 2/6] init_on_alloc: Optimize static branches (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH v7 0/6] Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH v7 1/6] jump_label: Provide CONFIG-driven build state defaults (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH v7 4/6] x86/entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH v7 3/6] stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH v7 6/6] lkdtm: Add REPORT_STACK for checking stack offsets (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH v7 5/6] arm64: entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: Fine-grained Forward CFI on top of Intel CET / IBT (Joao Moreira <joao@...rdrivepizza.com>)
Re: [PATCH v30 08/12] landlock: Add syscall implementations (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
Re: [PATCH v30 10/12] selftests/landlock: Add user space tests (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
Re: Fine-grained Forward CFI on top of Intel CET / IBT (Joao Moreira <joao@...rdrivepizza.com>)

March 20 (7 messages)

Re: [PATCH v7 4/6] x86/entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support (Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>)
Re: [PATCH v6 2/8] security/brute: Define a LSM and manage statistical data (John Wood <john.wood@....com>)
Re: [PATCH v6 3/8] securtiy/brute: Detect a brute force attack (John Wood <john.wood@....com>)
Re: [PATCH v6 4/8] security/brute: Fine tuning the attack detection (John Wood <john.wood@....com>)
Re: [PATCH v6 5/8] security/brute: Mitigate a brute force attack (John Wood <john.wood@....com>)
Re: [PATCH v6 6/8] selftests/brute: Add tests for the Brute LSM (John Wood <john.wood@....com>)
Re: [PATCH v6 7/8] Documentation: Add documentation for the Brute LSM (John Wood <john.wood@....com>)

March 21 (8 messages)

Re: [PATCH v6 3/8] securtiy/brute: Detect a brute force attack (John Wood <john.wood@....com>)
Re: [PATCH v7 4/6] x86/entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH v6 2/8] security/brute: Define a LSM and manage statistical data (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH v6 4/8] security/brute: Fine tuning the attack detection (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH v6 5/8] security/brute: Mitigate a brute force attack (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH v6 3/8] securtiy/brute: Detect a brute force attack (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH v6 3/8] securtiy/brute: Detect a brute force attack (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH v6 7/8] Documentation: Add documentation for the Brute LSM (Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>)

March 22 (1 message)

Re: [PATCH v6 3/8] securtiy/brute: Detect a brute force attack (John Wood <john.wood@....com>)

March 23 (16 messages)

Re: [PATCH v30 02/12] landlock: Add ruleset and domain management (Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>)
Re: [PATCH v30 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control (Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>)
Re: [PATCH v30 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
Re: [PATCH v30 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control (Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>)
Re: [PATCH v30 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
Re: [PATCH v30 12/12] landlock: Add user and kernel documentation (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
Re: [PATCH v30 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
[PATCH v9 0/8] Count rlimits in each user namespace (Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@...il.com>)
[PATCH v9 1/8] Increase size of ucounts to atomic_long_t (Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@...il.com>)
[PATCH v9 2/8] Add a reference to ucounts for each cred (Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@...il.com>)
[PATCH v9 3/8] Use atomic_t for ucounts reference counting (Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@...il.com>)
[PATCH v9 4/8] Reimplement RLIMIT_NPROC on top of ucounts (Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@...il.com>)
[PATCH v9 6/8] Reimplement RLIMIT_SIGPENDING on top of ucounts (Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@...il.com>)
[PATCH v9 5/8] Reimplement RLIMIT_MSGQUEUE on top of ucounts (Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@...il.com>)
[PATCH v9 8/8] kselftests: Add test to check for rlimit changes in different user namespaces (Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@...il.com>)
[PATCH v9 7/8] Reimplement RLIMIT_MEMLOCK on top of ucounts (Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@...il.com>)

March 24 (18 messages)

Re: [PATCH v30 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control (Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>)
Re: [PATCH v30 08/12] landlock: Add syscall implementations (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
Re: [PATCH v30 12/12] landlock: Add user and kernel documentation (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
[PATCH v31 00/12] Landlock LSM (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
[PATCH v31 01/12] landlock: Add object management (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
[PATCH v31 02/12] landlock: Add ruleset and domain management (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
[PATCH v31 03/12] landlock: Set up the security framework and manage credentials (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
[PATCH v31 04/12] landlock: Add ptrace restrictions (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
[PATCH v31 05/12] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
[PATCH v31 06/12] fs,security: Add sb_delete hook (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
[PATCH v31 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
[PATCH v31 08/12] landlock: Add syscall implementations (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
[PATCH v31 09/12] arch: Wire up Landlock syscalls (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
[PATCH v31 10/12] selftests/landlock: Add user space tests (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
[PATCH v31 11/12] samples/landlock: Add a sandbox manager example (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
[PATCH v31 12/12] landlock: Add user and kernel documentation (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
Re: [PATCH v31 01/12] landlock: Add object management (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
Re: [PATCH v30 02/12] landlock: Add ruleset and domain management (James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>)

March 25 (1 message)

Re: [PATCH v30 02/12] landlock: Add ruleset and domain management (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)

March 26 (3 messages)

Re: [PATCH v31 12/12] landlock: Add user and kernel documentation (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH v31 10/12] selftests/landlock: Add user space tests (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH v6 7/8] Documentation: Add documentation for the Brute LSM (John Wood <john.wood@....com>)

March 27 (2 messages)

Re: [PATCH v5 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2) (Askar Safin <safinaskar@...l.ru>)
Re: [PATCH v5 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2) (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)

March 28 (2 messages)

Re: [PATCH v7 4/6] x86/entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support (Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>)
Re: [PATCH v7 3/6] stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall (Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>)

March 29 (4 messages)

two potential randstruct improvements (Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>)
Re: two potential randstruct improvements (Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@...cle.com>)
Re: [PATCH v7 3/6] stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH v7 4/6] x86/entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)

March 30 (15 messages)

Re: [PATCH v5 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2) (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
Re: [PATCH v5 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2) (Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>)
Re: [PATCH v5 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2) (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
Re: [PATCH v5 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2) (Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>)
Re: [PATCH v5 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2) (Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>)
Re: [PATCH v5 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2) (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
[PATCH v8 0/6] Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH v8 1/6] jump_label: Provide CONFIG-driven build state defaults (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH v8 2/6] init_on_alloc: Optimize static branches (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH v8 4/6] x86/entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH v8 6/6] lkdtm: Add REPORT_STACK for checking stack offsets (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH v8 3/6] stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH v8 5/6] arm64: entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: two potential randstruct improvements (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH v5 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2) (Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>)

March 31 (15 messages)

Re: [PATCH v5 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2) (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH v5 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2) (Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>)
Re: [PATCH v8 4/6] x86/entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support (Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>)
Re: [PATCH v8 3/6] stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall (Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>)
Re: [PATCH v31 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
Re: [PATCH v31 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH v9 0/6] Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH v9 2/6] init_on_alloc: Optimize static branches (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH v9 4/6] x86/entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH v9 1/6] jump_label: Provide CONFIG-driven build state defaults (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH v9 3/6] stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH v9 6/6] lkdtm: Add REPORT_STACK for checking stack offsets (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH v9 5/6] arm64: entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH v8 3/6] stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH v8 3/6] stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall (Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>)

244 messages

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