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Date: Wed, 4 Nov 2020 18:53:42 +0000
From: Mark Brown <>
To: Jeremy Linton <>
Cc: Szabolcs Nagy <>,,
	Catalin Marinas <>,
	Mark Rutland <>, Will Deacon <>,
	Florian Weimer <>,
	Kees Cook <>,
	Salvatore Mesoraca <>,
	Lennart Poettering <>,
	Topi Miettinen <>,,,,
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/4] aarch64: avoid mprotect(PROT_BTI|PROT_EXEC) [BZ

On Wed, Nov 04, 2020 at 12:47:09PM -0600, Jeremy Linton wrote:
> On 11/4/20 4:50 AM, Mark Brown wrote:

> > The effect on pre-BTI hardware is an issue, another option would be for
> > systemd to disable this seccomp usage but only after checking for BTI
> > support in the system rather than just doing so purely based on the
> > architecture.

> That works, but your also losing seccomp in the case where the machine is
> BTI capable, but the service isn't. So it should really be checking the elf
> notes, but at that point you might just as well patch glibc.

True, I guess I was assuming that a BTI rebuild is done at the distro
level but of course even if that's the case a system could have third
party binaries so you can't just assume that the world is BTI.

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