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Message-Id: <20201103182109.1014179-13-mic@digikod.net>
Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2020 19:21:09 +0100
From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>
To: James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>
Cc: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>,
Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
Anton Ivanov <anton.ivanov@...bridgegreys.com>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
Jeff Dike <jdike@...toit.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@...il.com>,
Richard Weinberger <richard@....at>,
Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>,
Vincent Dagonneau <vincent.dagonneau@....gouv.fr>,
kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com,
linux-api@...r.kernel.org,
linux-arch@...r.kernel.org,
linux-doc@...r.kernel.org,
linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
x86@...nel.org,
Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ux.microsoft.com>
Subject: [PATCH v23 12/12] landlock: Add user and kernel documentation
From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ux.microsoft.com>
This documentation can be built with the Sphinx framework.
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@...lyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Vincent Dagonneau <vincent.dagonneau@....gouv.fr>
---
Changes since v22:
* Fix spelling and remove obsolete sentence (spotted by Jann Horn).
* Bump date.
Changes since v21:
* Move the user space documentation to userspace-api/landlock.rst and
the kernel documentation to security/landlock.rst .
* Add license headers.
* Add last update dates.
* Update MAINTAINERS file.
* Add (back) links to git.kernel.org .
* Fix spelling.
Changes since v20:
* Update examples and documentation with the new syscalls.
Changes since v19:
* Update examples and documentation with the new syscalls.
Changes since v15:
* Add current limitations.
Changes since v14:
* Fix spelling (contributed by Randy Dunlap).
* Extend documentation about inheritance and explain layer levels.
* Remove the use of now-removed access rights.
* Use GitHub links.
* Improve kernel documentation.
* Add section for tests.
* Update example.
Changes since v13:
* Rewrote the documentation according to the major revamp.
Previous changes:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20191104172146.30797-8-mic@digikod.net/
---
Documentation/security/index.rst | 1 +
Documentation/security/landlock.rst | 79 +++++++
Documentation/userspace-api/index.rst | 1 +
Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst | 258 +++++++++++++++++++++++
MAINTAINERS | 2 +
5 files changed, 341 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 Documentation/security/landlock.rst
create mode 100644 Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
diff --git a/Documentation/security/index.rst b/Documentation/security/index.rst
index 8129405eb2cc..16335de04e8c 100644
--- a/Documentation/security/index.rst
+++ b/Documentation/security/index.rst
@@ -16,3 +16,4 @@ Security Documentation
siphash
tpm/index
digsig
+ landlock
diff --git a/Documentation/security/landlock.rst b/Documentation/security/landlock.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..4c88a67a6958
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/security/landlock.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+.. Copyright © 2017-2020 Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>
+.. Copyright © 2019-2020 ANSSI
+
+==================================
+Landlock LSM: kernel documentation
+==================================
+
+:Author: Mickaël Salaün
+:Date: November 2020
+
+Landlock's goal is to create scoped access-control (i.e. sandboxing). To
+harden a whole system, this feature should be available to any process,
+including unprivileged ones. Because such process may be compromised or
+backdoored (i.e. untrusted), Landlock's features must be safe to use from the
+kernel and other processes point of view. Landlock's interface must therefore
+expose a minimal attack surface.
+
+Landlock is designed to be usable by unprivileged processes while following the
+system security policy enforced by other access control mechanisms (e.g. DAC,
+LSM). Indeed, a Landlock rule shall not interfere with other access-controls
+enforced on the system, only add more restrictions.
+
+Any user can enforce Landlock rulesets on their processes. They are merged and
+evaluated according to the inherited ones in a way that ensures that only more
+constraints can be added.
+
+User space documentation can be found here: :doc:`/userspace-api/landlock`.
+
+Guiding principles for safe access controls
+===========================================
+
+* A Landlock rule shall be focused on access control on kernel objects instead
+ of syscall filtering (i.e. syscall arguments), which is the purpose of
+ seccomp-bpf.
+* To avoid multiple kinds of side-channel attacks (e.g. leak of security
+ policies, CPU-based attacks), Landlock rules shall not be able to
+ programmatically communicate with user space.
+* Kernel access check shall not slow down access request from unsandboxed
+ processes.
+* Computation related to Landlock operations (e.g. enforcing a ruleset) shall
+ only impact the processes requesting them.
+
+Tests
+=====
+
+Userspace tests for backward compatibility, ptrace restrictions and filesystem
+support can be found here: `tools/testing/selftests/landlock/`_.
+
+Kernel structures
+=================
+
+Object
+------
+
+.. kernel-doc:: security/landlock/object.h
+ :identifiers:
+
+Ruleset and domain
+------------------
+
+A domain is a read-only ruleset tied to a set of subjects (i.e. tasks'
+credentials). Each time a ruleset is enforced on a task, the current domain is
+duplicated and the ruleset is imported as a new layer of rules in the new
+domain. Indeed, once in a domain, each rule is tied to a layer level. To
+grant access to an object, at least one rule of each layer must allow the
+requested action on the object. A task can then only transit to a new domain
+which is the intersection of the constraints from the current domain and those
+of a ruleset provided by the task.
+
+The definition of a subject is implicit for a task sandboxing itself, which
+makes the reasoning much easier and helps avoid pitfalls.
+
+.. kernel-doc:: security/landlock/ruleset.h
+ :identifiers:
+
+.. Links
+.. _tools/testing/selftests/landlock/:
+ https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/tree/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/
diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/index.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/index.rst
index 69fc5167e648..4918fbed5be0 100644
--- a/Documentation/userspace-api/index.rst
+++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/index.rst
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ place where this information is gathered.
no_new_privs
seccomp_filter
+ landlock
unshare
spec_ctrl
accelerators/ocxl
diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..8f727de20479
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,258 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+.. Copyright © 2017-2020 Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>
+.. Copyright © 2019-2020 ANSSI
+
+=====================================
+Landlock: unprivileged access control
+=====================================
+
+:Author: Mickaël Salaün
+:Date: November 2020
+
+The goal of Landlock is to enable to restrict ambient rights (e.g. global
+filesystem access) for a set of processes. Because Landlock is a stackable
+LSM, it makes possible to create safe security sandboxes as new security layers
+in addition to the existing system-wide access-controls. This kind of sandbox
+is expected to help mitigate the security impact of bugs or
+unexpected/malicious behaviors in user space applications. Landlock empowers
+any process, including unprivileged ones, to securely restrict themselves.
+
+Landlock rules
+==============
+
+A Landlock rule describes an action on an object. An object is currently a
+file hierarchy, and the related filesystem actions are defined in `Access
+rights`_. A set of rules is aggregated in a ruleset, which can then restrict
+the thread enforcing it, and its future children.
+
+Defining and enforcing a security policy
+----------------------------------------
+
+We first need to create the ruleset that will contain our rules. For this
+example, the ruleset will contain rules which only allow read actions, but
+write actions will be denied. The ruleset then needs to handle both of these
+kind of actions.
+
+.. code-block:: c
+
+ int ruleset_fd;
+ struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = {
+ .handled_access_fs =
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_DIR |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_FILE |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_CHAR |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_DIR |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SOCK |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_FIFO |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_BLOCK |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM,
+ };
+
+ ruleset_fd = landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr, sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0);
+ if (ruleset_fd < 0) {
+ perror("Failed to create a ruleset");
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+We can now add a new rule to this ruleset thanks to the returned file
+descriptor referring to this ruleset. The rule will only allow reading the
+file hierarchy ``/usr``. Without another rule, write actions would then be
+denied by the ruleset. To add ``/usr`` to the ruleset, we open it with the
+``O_PATH`` flag and fill the &struct landlock_path_beneath_attr with this file
+descriptor.
+
+.. code-block:: c
+
+ int err;
+ struct landlock_path_beneath_attr path_beneath = {
+ .allowed_access =
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR,
+ };
+
+ path_beneath.parent_fd = open("/usr", O_PATH | O_CLOEXEC);
+ if (path_beneath.parent_fd < 0) {
+ perror("Failed to open file");
+ close(ruleset_fd);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ err = landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd, LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH,
+ &path_beneath, 0);
+ close(path_beneath.parent_fd);
+ if (err) {
+ perror("Failed to update ruleset");
+ close(ruleset_fd);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+We now have a ruleset with one rule allowing read access to ``/usr`` while
+denying all other handled accesses for the filesystem. The next step is to
+restrict the current thread from gaining more privileges (e.g. thanks to a SUID
+binary).
+
+.. code-block:: c
+
+ if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0)) {
+ perror("Failed to restrict privileges");
+ close(ruleset_fd);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+The current thread is now ready to sandbox itself with the ruleset.
+
+.. code-block:: c
+
+ if (landlock_enforce_ruleset_current(ruleset_fd, 0)) {
+ perror("Failed to enforce ruleset");
+ close(ruleset_fd);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ close(ruleset_fd);
+
+If the `landlock_enforce_ruleset_current` system call succeeds, the current
+thread is now restricted and this policy will be enforced on all its
+subsequently created children as well. Once a thread is landlocked, there is
+no way to remove its security policy; only adding more restrictions is allowed.
+These threads are now in a new Landlock domain, merge of their parent one (if
+any) with the new ruleset.
+
+Full working code can be found in `samples/landlock/sandboxer.c`_.
+
+Inheritance
+-----------
+
+Every new thread resulting from a :manpage:`clone(2)` inherits Landlock domain
+restrictions from its parent. This is similar to the seccomp inheritance (cf.
+:doc:`/userspace-api/seccomp_filter`) or any other LSM dealing with task's
+:manpage:`credentials(7)`. For instance, one process's thread may apply
+Landlock rules to itself, but they will not be automatically applied to other
+sibling threads (unlike POSIX thread credential changes, cf.
+:manpage:`nptl(7)`).
+
+When a thread sandboxes itself, we have the guarantee that the related security
+policy will stay enforced on all this thread's descendants. This allows
+creating standalone and modular security policies per application, which will
+automatically be composed between themselves according to their runtime parent
+policies.
+
+Ptrace restrictions
+-------------------
+
+A sandboxed process has less privileges than a non-sandboxed process and must
+then be subject to additional restrictions when manipulating another process.
+To be allowed to use :manpage:`ptrace(2)` and related syscalls on a target
+process, a sandboxed process should have a subset of the target process rules,
+which means the tracee must be in a sub-domain of the tracer.
+
+Kernel interface
+================
+
+Access rights
+-------------
+
+.. kernel-doc:: include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
+ :identifiers: fs_access
+
+Creating a new ruleset
+----------------------
+
+.. kernel-doc:: security/landlock/syscall.c
+ :identifiers: sys_landlock_create_ruleset
+
+.. kernel-doc:: include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
+ :identifiers: landlock_ruleset_attr
+
+Extending a ruleset
+-------------------
+
+.. kernel-doc:: security/landlock/syscall.c
+ :identifiers: sys_landlock_add_rule
+
+.. kernel-doc:: include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
+ :identifiers: landlock_rule_type landlock_path_beneath_attr
+
+Enforcing a ruleset
+-------------------
+
+.. kernel-doc:: security/landlock/syscall.c
+ :identifiers: sys_landlock_enforce_ruleset_current
+
+Current limitations
+===================
+
+File renaming and linking
+-------------------------
+
+Because Landlock targets unprivileged access controls, it is needed to properly
+handle composition of rules. Such property also implies rules nesting.
+Properly handling multiple layers of ruleset, each one of them able to restrict
+access to files, also implies to inherit the ruleset restrictions from a parent
+to its hierarchy. Because files are identified and restricted by their
+hierarchy, moving or linking a file from one directory to another imply to
+propagate the hierarchy constraints. To protect against privilege escalations
+through renaming or linking, and for the sack of simplicity, Landlock currently
+limits linking and renaming to the same directory. Future Landlock evolutions
+will enable more flexibility for renaming and linking, with dedicated ruleset
+flags.
+
+OverlayFS
+---------
+
+An OverlayFS mount point consists of upper and lower layers. It is currently
+not possible to reliably infer which underlying file hierarchy matches an
+OverlayFS path composed of such layers. It is then not currently possible to
+track the source of an indirect access request, and then not possible to
+properly identify and allow an unified OverlayFS hierarchy. Restricting files
+in an OverlayFS mount point works, but files allowed in one layer may not be
+allowed in a related OverlayFS mount point. A future Landlock evolution will
+make possible to properly work with OverlayFS, according to a dedicated ruleset
+flag.
+
+
+Special filesystems
+-------------------
+
+Access to regular files and directories can be restricted by Landlock,
+according to the handled accesses of a ruleset. However, files which do not
+come from a user-visible filesystem (e.g. pipe, socket), but can still be
+accessed through /proc/self/fd/, cannot currently be restricted. Likewise,
+some special kernel filesystems such as nsfs which can be accessed through
+/proc/self/ns/, cannot currently be restricted. For now, these kind of special
+paths are then always allowed. Future Landlock evolutions will enable to
+restrict such paths, with dedicated ruleset flags.
+
+Questions and answers
+=====================
+
+What about user space sandbox managers?
+---------------------------------------
+
+Using user space process to enforce restrictions on kernel resources can lead
+to race conditions or inconsistent evaluations (i.e. `Incorrect mirroring of
+the OS code and state
+<https://www.ndss-symposium.org/ndss2003/traps-and-pitfalls-practical-problems-system-call-interposition-based-security-tools/>`_).
+
+What about namespaces and containers?
+-------------------------------------
+
+Namespaces can help create sandboxes but they are not designed for
+access-control and then miss useful features for such use case (e.g. no
+fine-grained restrictions). Moreover, their complexity can lead to security
+issues, especially when untrusted processes can manipulate them (cf.
+`Controlling access to user namespaces <https://lwn.net/Articles/673597/>`_).
+
+Additional documentation
+========================
+
+* :doc:`/security/landlock`
+* https://landlock.io
+
+.. Links
+.. _samples/landlock/sandboxer.c:
+ https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/tree/samples/landlock/sandboxer.c
diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
index d46066e172a1..3a4eb57222a7 100644
--- a/MAINTAINERS
+++ b/MAINTAINERS
@@ -9832,6 +9832,8 @@ L: linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
S: Supported
W: https://landlock.io
T: git https://github.com/landlock-lsm/linux.git
+F: Documentation/security/landlock.rst
+F: Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
F: include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
F: security/landlock/
K: landlock
--
2.28.0
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