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Date: Thu, 29 Oct 2020 02:06:06 +0100
From: Jann Horn <>
To: Mickaël Salaün <>
Cc: James Morris <>, "Serge E . Hallyn" <>, 
	Al Viro <>, Andy Lutomirski <>, 
	Anton Ivanov <>, Arnd Bergmann <>, 
	Casey Schaufler <>, Jeff Dike <>, 
	Jonathan Corbet <>, Kees Cook <>, 
	Michael Kerrisk <>, Richard Weinberger <>, Shuah Khan <>, 
	Vincent Dagonneau <>, 
	Kernel Hardening <>, Linux API <>, 
	linux-arch <>, 
	"open list:DOCUMENTATION" <>, linux-fsdevel <>, 
	kernel list <>, 
	linux-security-module <>, 
	"the arch/x86 maintainers" <>, Mickaël Salaün <>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v22 04/12] landlock: Add ptrace restrictions

On Tue, Oct 27, 2020 at 9:04 PM Mickaël Salaün <> wrote:
> Using ptrace(2) and related debug features on a target process can lead
> to a privilege escalation.  Indeed, ptrace(2) can be used by an attacker
> to impersonate another task and to remain undetected while performing
> malicious activities.  Thanks to  ptrace_may_access(), various part of
> the kernel can check if a tracer is more privileged than a tracee.
> A landlocked process has fewer privileges than a non-landlocked process
> and must then be subject to additional restrictions when manipulating
> processes. To be allowed to use ptrace(2) and related syscalls on a
> target process, a landlocked process must have a subset of the target
> process's rules (i.e. the tracee must be in a sub-domain of the tracer).
> Cc: James Morris <>
> Cc: Jann Horn <>
> Cc: Kees Cook <>
> Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <>
> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <>

Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <>

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