kernel-hardening - Re: BTI interaction between seccomp filters in systemd and glibc mprotect calls, causing service failures

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Message-ID: <CAJHCu1JskXZTvSsspQD-wk4L59FxesvVJdjMSX=jiHg-R2zCuQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 24 Oct 2020 15:12:36 +0100
From: Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@...il.com>
To: Topi Miettinen <toiwoton@...il.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, Szabolcs Nagy <szabolcs.nagy@....com>, 
	Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@....com>, 
	"linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org" <linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org>, libc-alpha@...rceware.org, 
	systemd-devel@...ts.freedesktop.org, 
	"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>, 
	Mark Brown <broonie@...nel.org>, Dave Martin <dave.martin@....com>, 
	Catalin Marinas <Catalin.Marinas@....com>, Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>, 
	Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>, linux-hardening@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: BTI interaction between seccomp filters in systemd and glibc
 mprotect calls, causing service failures

On Sat, 24 Oct 2020 at 12:34, Topi Miettinen <toiwoton@...il.com> wrote:
>
> On 23.10.2020 20.52, Salvatore Mesoraca wrote:
> > Hi,
> >
> > On Thu, 22 Oct 2020 at 23:24, Topi Miettinen <toiwoton@...il.com> wrote:
> >> SARA looks interesting. What is missing is a prctl() to enable all W^X
> >> protections irrevocably for the current process, then systemd could
> >> enable it for services with MemoryDenyWriteExecute=yes.
> >
> > SARA actually has a procattr[0] interface to do just that.
> > There is also a library[1] to help using it.
>
> That means that /proc has to be available and writable at that point, so
> setting up procattrs has to be done before mount namespaces are set up.
> In general, it would be nice for sandboxing facilities in kernel if
> there would be a way to start enforcing restrictions only at next
> execve(), like setexeccon() for SELinux and aa_change_onexec() for
> AppArmor. Otherwise the exact order of setting up various sandboxing
> options can be very tricky to arrange correctly, since each option may
> have a subtle effect to the sandboxing features enabled later. In case
> of SARA, the operations done between shuffling the mount namespace and
> before execve() shouldn't be affected so it isn't important. Even if it
> did (a new sandboxing feature in the future would need trampolines or
> JIT code generation), maybe the procattr file could be opened early but
> it could be written closer to execve().

A new "apply on exec" procattr file seems reasonable and relatively easy to add.
As Kees pointed out, the main obstacle here is the fact that SARA is
not upstream :(

Salvatore

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