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Message-ID: <20200917173209.GA3637@ubuntu> Date: Thu, 17 Sep 2020 19:32:09 +0200 From: John Wood <john.wood@....com> To: Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, John Wood <john.wood@....com>, Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>, Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>, Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>, Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@...hat.com>, Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@...aro.org>, Dietmar Eggemann <dietmar.eggemann@....com>, Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>, Ben Segall <bsegall@...gle.com>, Mel Gorman <mgorman@...e.de>, Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@...nel.org>, Iurii Zaikin <yzaikin@...gle.com>, James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>, "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, kernel list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, linux-fsdevel <linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>, linux-security-module <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org> Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 1/6] security/fbfam: Add a Kconfig to enable the fbfam feature On Thu, Sep 10, 2020 at 11:21:58PM +0200, Jann Horn wrote: > On Thu, Sep 10, 2020 at 10:21 PM Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> wrote: > > From: John Wood <john.wood@....com> > > > > Add a menu entry under "Security options" to enable the "Fork brute > > force attack mitigation" feature. > [...] > > +config FBFAM > > Please give this a more descriptive name than FBFAM. Some name where, > if a random kernel developer sees an "#ifdef" with that name in some > random piece of kernel code, they immediately have a rough idea for > what kind of feature this is. > > Perhaps something like THROTTLE_FORK_CRASHES. Or something else that > is equally descriptive. Ok, understood. This will be fixed for the next version. Thanks. > > + bool "Fork brute force attack mitigation" > > + default n > > "default n" is superfluous and should AFAIK be omitted. Ok. I will remove it. Thanks. > > + help > > + This is a user defense that detects any fork brute force attack > > + based on the application's crashing rate. When this measure is > > + triggered the fork system call is blocked. > > This help text claims that the mitigation will block fork(), but patch > 6/6 actually kills the process hierarchy. Sorry, it's a mistake. It was the first idea but finally the implementation changed and this description not was modified. Apologies. It will be fixed for the next version. Thanks, John Wood
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