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Message-ID: <d7126fd7-cca1-42e4-6a7b-6a3b9e77306e@digikod.net>
Date: Mon, 14 Sep 2020 18:43:17 +0200
From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>
To: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>, Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@...il.com>,
linux-api@...r.kernel.org
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>, Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@...har.com>, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>, Andrew Morton
<akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@...ntu.com>,
Christian Heimes <christian@...hon.org>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
Deven Bowers <deven.desai@...ux.microsoft.com>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>, Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>,
Eric Chiang <ericchiang@...gle.com>, Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>,
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Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@...ux.microsoft.com>,
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Philippe Trébuchet <philippe.trebuchet@....gouv.fr>,
Scott Shell <scottsh@...rosoft.com>,
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Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>, Steve Dower <steve.dower@...hon.org>,
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Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.sakura.ne.jp>,
Thibaut Sautereau <thibaut.sautereau@...p-os.org>,
Vincent Strubel <vincent.strubel@....gouv.fr>,
kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v9 0/3] Add introspect_access(2) (was O_MAYEXEC)
Arnd and Michael,
What do you think of "should_faccessat" or "entrusted_faccessat" for
this new system call?
On 12/09/2020 02:28, James Morris wrote:
> On Thu, 10 Sep 2020, Matthew Wilcox wrote:
>
>> On Thu, Sep 10, 2020 at 08:38:21PM +0200, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
>>> There is also the use case of noexec mounts and file permissions. From
>>> user space point of view, it doesn't matter which kernel component is in
>>> charge of defining the policy. The syscall should then not be tied with
>>> a verification/integrity/signature/appraisal vocabulary, but simply an
>>> access control one.
>>
>> permission()?
>>
>
> The caller is not asking the kernel to grant permission, it's asking
> "SHOULD I access this file?"
>
> The caller doesn't know, for example, if the script file it's about to
> execute has been signed, or if it's from a noexec mount. It's asking the
> kernel, which does know. (Note that this could also be extended to reading
> configuration files).
>
> How about: should_faccessat ?
>
Sounds good to me.
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