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Message-ID: <532eefa8-49ca-1c23-1228-d5a4e2d8af90@digikod.net>
Date: Tue, 8 Sep 2020 16:14:32 +0200
From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>
To: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@...il.com>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>
Cc: linux-kernel <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@...har.com>, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>, Andrew Morton
<akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
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LSM List <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
Linux FS Devel <linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>,
Thibaut Sautereau <thibaut.sautereau@....gouv.fr>,
Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ux.microsoft.com>,
John Johansen <john.johansen@...onical.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v8 1/3] fs: Introduce AT_INTERPRETED flag for
faccessat2(2)
On 08/09/2020 15:42, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On Tue, Sep 8, 2020 at 9:29 AM Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com> wrote:
>>
>> On Tue, 2020-09-08 at 08:52 -0400, Stephen Smalley wrote:
>>> On Tue, Sep 8, 2020 at 8:50 AM Stephen Smalley
>>> <stephen.smalley.work@...il.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> On Tue, Sep 8, 2020 at 8:43 AM Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On 08/09/2020 14:28, Mimi Zohar wrote:
>>>>>> Hi Mickael,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Tue, 2020-09-08 at 09:59 +0200, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
>>>>>>> + mode |= MAY_INTERPRETED_EXEC;
>>>>>>> + /*
>>>>>>> + * For compatibility reasons, if the system-wide policy
>>>>>>> + * doesn't enforce file permission checks, then
>>>>>>> + * replaces the execute permission request with a read
>>>>>>> + * permission request.
>>>>>>> + */
>>>>>>> + mode &= ~MAY_EXEC;
>>>>>>> + /* To be executed *by* user space, files must be readable. */
>>>>>>> + mode |= MAY_READ;
>>>>>>
>>>>>> After this change, I'm wondering if it makes sense to add a call to
>>>>>> security_file_permission(). IMA doesn't currently define it, but
>>>>>> could.
>>>>>
>>>>> Yes, that's the idea. We could replace the following inode_permission()
>>>>> with file_permission(). I'm not sure how this will impact other LSMs though.
>>
>> I wasn't suggesting replacing the existing security_inode_permission
>> hook later, but adding a new security_file_permission hook here.
>>
>>>>
>>>> They are not equivalent at least as far as SELinux is concerned.
>>>> security_file_permission() was only to be used to revalidate
>>>> read/write permissions previously checked at file open to support
>>>> policy changes and file or process label changes. We'd have to modify
>>>> the SELinux hook if we wanted to have it check execute access even if
>>>> nothing has changed since open time.
>>>
>>> Also Smack doesn't appear to implement file_permission at all, so it
>>> would skip Smack checking.
>>
>> My question is whether adding a new security_file_permission call here
>> would break either SELinux or Apparmor?
>
> selinux_inode_permission() has special handling for MAY_ACCESS so we'd
> need to duplicate that into selinux_file_permission() ->
> selinux_revalidate_file_permission(). Also likely need to adjust
> selinux_file_permission() to explicitly check whether the mask
> includes any permissions not checked at open time. So some changes
> would be needed here. By default, it would be a no-op unless there
> was a policy reload or the file was relabeled between the open(2) and
> the faccessat(2) call.
>
We could create a new hook path_permission(struct path *path, int mask)
as a superset of inode_permission(). To be more convenient, his new hook
could then just call inode_permission() for every LSMs not implementing
path_permission().
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