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Message-ID: <27cbe7f6-d372-f36c-d346-deb19b2cf39d@linux.com> Date: Mon, 17 Aug 2020 23:34:17 +0300 From: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@...ux.com> To: Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>, Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>, Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@...tuozzo.com>, Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>, Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>, Christoph Lameter <cl@...ux.com>, Pekka Enberg <penberg@...nel.org>, David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>, Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@....com>, Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@...nel.org>, Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>, Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>, Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@...nel.org>, Patrick Bellasi <patrick.bellasi@....com>, David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>, Eric Biederman <ebiederm@...ssion.com>, Johannes Weiner <hannes@...xchg.org>, Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>, Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>, kasan-dev@...glegroups.com, linux-mm@...ck.org, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, notify@...nel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC 1/2] mm: Extract SLAB_QUARANTINE from KASAN On 15.08.2020 21:54, Matthew Wilcox wrote: > On Thu, Aug 13, 2020 at 06:19:21PM +0300, Alexander Popov wrote: >> +config SLAB_QUARANTINE >> + bool "Enable slab freelist quarantine" >> + depends on !KASAN && (SLAB || SLUB) >> + help >> + Enable slab freelist quarantine to break heap spraying technique >> + used for exploiting use-after-free vulnerabilities in the kernel >> + code. If this feature is enabled, freed allocations are stored >> + in the quarantine and can't be instantly reallocated and >> + overwritten by the exploit performing heap spraying. >> + This feature is a part of KASAN functionality. > > After this patch, it isn't part of KASAN any more ;-) Ok, I'll change that to "this feature is used by KASAN" :) > The way this is written is a bit too low level. Let's write it in terms > that people who don't know the guts of the slab allocator or security > terminology can understand: > > Delay reuse of freed slab objects. This makes some security > exploits harder to execute. It reduces performance slightly > as objects will be cache cold by the time they are reallocated, > and it costs a small amount of memory. > > (feel free to edit this) Ok, I see. I'll start from high-level description and add low-level details at the end. >> +struct qlist_node { >> + struct qlist_node *next; >> +}; > > I appreciate this isn't new, but why do we have a new singly-linked-list > abstraction being defined in this code? I don't know for sure. I suppose it is caused by SLAB/SLUB freelist implementation details (qlist_node in kasan_free_meta is also used for the allocator freelist). Best regards, Alexander
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