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Message-ID: <89b6bb7f-d841-cf0a-8d5c-26c611b56ae7@digikod.net>
Date: Thu, 13 Aug 2020 17:31:22 +0200
From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>
To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@...har.com>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>, Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, Andy Lutomirski
<luto@...nel.org>, Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@...ntu.com>,
Christian Heimes <christian@...hon.org>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
Deven Bowers <deven.desai@...ux.microsoft.com>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>, Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>,
Eric Chiang <ericchiang@...gle.com>, Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>, Jan Kara <jack@...e.cz>,
Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@...ux.microsoft.com>,
Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...gle.com>, Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>,
Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@...il.com>, Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>,
Philippe Trébuchet <philippe.trebuchet@....gouv.fr>,
Scott Shell <scottsh@...rosoft.com>,
Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>,
Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>, Steve Dower <steve.dower@...hon.org>,
Steve Grubb <sgrubb@...hat.com>,
Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.SAKURA.ne.jp>,
Thibaut Sautereau <thibaut.sautereau@...p-os.org>,
Vincent Strubel <vincent.strubel@....gouv.fr>,
kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, linux-api@...r.kernel.org,
linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 3/7] exec: Move path_noexec() check earlier
Kees Cook wrote this patch, which is in Andrew Morton's tree, but I
think you're talking about O_MAYEXEC, not this patch specifically.
On 11/08/2020 21:36, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net> writes:
>
>> From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
>>
>> The path_noexec() check, like the regular file check, was happening too
>> late, letting LSMs see impossible execve()s. Check it earlier as well
>> in may_open() and collect the redundant fs/exec.c path_noexec() test
>> under the same robustness comment as the S_ISREG() check.
>>
>> My notes on the call path, and related arguments, checks, etc:
>
> A big question arises, that I think someone already asked.
Al Viro and Jann Horn expressed such concerns for O_MAYEXEC:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/0cc94c91-afd3-27cd-b831-8ea16ca8ca93@digikod.net/
>
> Why perform this test in may_open directly instead of moving
> it into inode_permission. That way the code can be shared with
> faccessat, and any other code path that wants it?
This patch is just a refactoring.
About O_MAYEXEC, path-based LSM, IMA and IPE need to work on a struct
file, whereas inode_permission() only gives a struct inode. However,
faccessat2(2) (with extended flags) seems to be the perfect candidate if
we want to be able to check file descriptors.
>
> That would look to provide a more maintainable kernel.
Why would it be more maintainable?
>
> Eric
>
>
>> do_open_execat()
>> struct open_flags open_exec_flags = {
>> .open_flag = O_LARGEFILE | O_RDONLY | __FMODE_EXEC,
>> .acc_mode = MAY_EXEC,
>> ...
>> do_filp_open(dfd, filename, open_flags)
>> path_openat(nameidata, open_flags, flags)
>> file = alloc_empty_file(open_flags, current_cred());
>> do_open(nameidata, file, open_flags)
>> may_open(path, acc_mode, open_flag)
>> /* new location of MAY_EXEC vs path_noexec() test */
>> inode_permission(inode, MAY_OPEN | acc_mode)
>> security_inode_permission(inode, acc_mode)
>> vfs_open(path, file)
>> do_dentry_open(file, path->dentry->d_inode, open)
>> security_file_open(f)
>> open()
>> /* old location of path_noexec() test */
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>
>> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
>> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200605160013.3954297-4-keescook@chromium.org
>> ---
>> fs/exec.c | 12 ++++--------
>> fs/namei.c | 4 ++++
>> 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
>> index bdc6a6eb5dce..4eea20c27b01 100644
>> --- a/fs/exec.c
>> +++ b/fs/exec.c
>> @@ -147,10 +147,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(uselib, const char __user *, library)
>> * and check again at the very end too.
>> */
>> error = -EACCES;
>> - if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!S_ISREG(file_inode(file)->i_mode)))
>> - goto exit;
>> -
>> - if (path_noexec(&file->f_path))
>> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!S_ISREG(file_inode(file)->i_mode) ||
>> + path_noexec(&file->f_path)))
>> goto exit;
>>
>> fsnotify_open(file);
>> @@ -897,10 +895,8 @@ static struct file *do_open_execat(int fd, struct filename *name, int flags)
>> * and check again at the very end too.
>> */
>> err = -EACCES;
>> - if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!S_ISREG(file_inode(file)->i_mode)))
>> - goto exit;
>> -
>> - if (path_noexec(&file->f_path))
>> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!S_ISREG(file_inode(file)->i_mode) ||
>> + path_noexec(&file->f_path)))
>> goto exit;
>>
>> err = deny_write_access(file);
>> diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
>> index a559ad943970..ddc9b25540fe 100644
>> --- a/fs/namei.c
>> +++ b/fs/namei.c
>> @@ -2863,6 +2863,10 @@ static int may_open(const struct path *path, int acc_mode, int flag)
>> return -EACCES;
>> flag &= ~O_TRUNC;
>> break;
>> + case S_IFREG:
>> + if ((acc_mode & MAY_EXEC) && path_noexec(path))
>> + return -EACCES;
>> + break;
>> }
>>
>> error = inode_permission(inode, MAY_OPEN | acc_mode);
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