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Message-ID: <0733fbed-cc73-027b-13c7-c368c2d67fb3@digikod.net>
Date: Mon, 10 Aug 2020 22:11:53 +0200
From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@...har.com>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>, Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@...ntu.com>,
Christian Heimes <christian@...hon.org>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
Deven Bowers <deven.desai@...ux.microsoft.com>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>, Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>,
Eric Chiang <ericchiang@...gle.com>, Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>, Jan Kara <jack@...e.cz>,
Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@...ux.microsoft.com>,
Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...gle.com>, Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>,
Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@...il.com>, Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>,
Philippe Trébuchet <philippe.trebuchet@....gouv.fr>,
Scott Shell <scottsh@...rosoft.com>,
Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>,
Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>, Steve Dower <steve.dower@...hon.org>,
Steve Grubb <sgrubb@...hat.com>,
Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.SAKURA.ne.jp>,
Thibaut Sautereau <thibaut.sautereau@...p-os.org>,
Vincent Strubel <vincent.strubel@....gouv.fr>,
kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, linux-api@...r.kernel.org,
linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 0/7] Add support for O_MAYEXEC
It seems that there is no more complains nor questions. Do you want me
to send another series to fix the order of the S-o-b in patch 7?
On 24/07/2020 21:06, Kees Cook wrote:
> I think this looks good now.
>
> Andrew, since you're already carrying my exec clean-ups (repeated here
> in patch 1-3), can you pick the rest of this series too?
>
> Thanks!
>
> -Kees
>
> On Thu, Jul 23, 2020 at 07:12:20PM +0200, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
>> Hi,
>>
>> This seventh patch series do not set __FMODE_EXEC for the sake of
>> simplicity. A notification feature could be added later if needed. The
>> handling of all file types is now well defined and tested: by default,
>> when opening a path, access to a directory is denied (with EISDIR),
>> access to a regular file depends on the sysctl policy, and access to
>> other file types (i.e. fifo, device, socket) is denied if there is any
>> enforced policy. There is new tests covering all these cases (cf.
>> test_file_types() ).
>>
>> As requested by Mimi Zohar, I completed the series with one of her
>> patches for IMA. I also picked Kees Cook's patches to consolidate exec
>> permission checking into do_filp_open()'s flow.
>>
>>
>> # Goal of O_MAYEXEC
>>
>> The goal of this patch series is to enable to control script execution
>> with interpreters help. A new O_MAYEXEC flag, usable through
>> openat2(2), is added to enable userspace script interpreters to delegate
>> to the kernel (and thus the system security policy) the permission to
>> interpret/execute scripts or other files containing what can be seen as
>> commands.
>>
>> A simple system-wide security policy can be enforced by the system
>> administrator through a sysctl configuration consistent with the mount
>> points or the file access rights. The documentation patch explains the
>> prerequisites.
>>
>> Furthermore, the security policy can also be delegated to an LSM, either
>> a MAC system or an integrity system. For instance, the new kernel
>> MAY_OPENEXEC flag closes a major IMA measurement/appraisal interpreter
>> integrity gap by bringing the ability to check the use of scripts [1].
>> Other uses are expected, such as for magic-links [2], SGX integration
>> [3], bpffs [4] or IPE [5].
>>
>>
>> # Prerequisite of its use
>>
>> Userspace needs to adapt to take advantage of this new feature. For
>> example, the PEP 578 [6] (Runtime Audit Hooks) enables Python 3.8 to be
>> extended with policy enforcement points related to code interpretation,
>> which can be used to align with the PowerShell audit features.
>> Additional Python security improvements (e.g. a limited interpreter
>> withou -c, stdin piping of code) are on their way [7].
>>
>>
>> # Examples
>>
>> The initial idea comes from CLIP OS 4 and the original implementation
>> has been used for more than 12 years:
>> https://github.com/clipos-archive/clipos4_doc
>> Chrome OS has a similar approach:
>> https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromiumos/docs/+/master/security/noexec_shell_scripts.md
>>
>> Userland patches can be found here:
>> https://github.com/clipos-archive/clipos4_portage-overlay/search?q=O_MAYEXEC
>> Actually, there is more than the O_MAYEXEC changes (which matches this search)
>> e.g., to prevent Python interactive execution. There are patches for
>> Bash, Wine, Java (Icedtea), Busybox's ash, Perl and Python. There are
>> also some related patches which do not directly rely on O_MAYEXEC but
>> which restrict the use of browser plugins and extensions, which may be
>> seen as scripts too:
>> https://github.com/clipos-archive/clipos4_portage-overlay/tree/master/www-client
>>
>> An introduction to O_MAYEXEC was given at the Linux Security Summit
>> Europe 2018 - Linux Kernel Security Contributions by ANSSI:
>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=chNjCRtPKQY&t=17m15s
>> The "write xor execute" principle was explained at Kernel Recipes 2018 -
>> CLIP OS: a defense-in-depth OS:
>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PjRE0uBtkHU&t=11m14s
>> See also an overview article: https://lwn.net/Articles/820000/
>>
>>
>> This patch series can be applied on top of v5.8-rc5 . This can be tested
>> with CONFIG_SYSCTL. I would really appreciate constructive comments on
>> this patch series.
>>
>> Previous version:
>> https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200505153156.925111-1-mic@digikod.net/
>>
>>
>> [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/1544647356.4028.105.camel@linux.ibm.com/
>> [2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190904201933.10736-6-cyphar@cyphar.com/
>> [3] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CALCETrVovr8XNZSroey7pHF46O=kj_c5D9K8h=z2T_cNrpvMig@mail.gmail.com/
>> [4] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CALCETrVeZ0eufFXwfhtaG_j+AdvbzEWE0M3wjXMWVEO7pj+xkw@mail.gmail.com/
>> [5] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200406221439.1469862-12-deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com/
>> [6] https://www.python.org/dev/peps/pep-0578/
>> [7] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/0c70debd-e79e-d514-06c6-4cd1e021fa8b@python.org/
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Kees Cook (3):
>> exec: Change uselib(2) IS_SREG() failure to EACCES
>> exec: Move S_ISREG() check earlier
>> exec: Move path_noexec() check earlier
>>
>> Mickaël Salaün (3):
>> fs: Introduce O_MAYEXEC flag for openat2(2)
>> fs,doc: Enable to enforce noexec mounts or file exec through O_MAYEXEC
>> selftest/openat2: Add tests for O_MAYEXEC enforcing
>>
>> Mimi Zohar (1):
>> ima: add policy support for the new file open MAY_OPENEXEC flag
>>
>> Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 2 +-
>> Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/fs.rst | 49 +++
>> fs/exec.c | 23 +-
>> fs/fcntl.c | 2 +-
>> fs/namei.c | 36 +-
>> fs/open.c | 12 +-
>> include/linux/fcntl.h | 2 +-
>> include/linux/fs.h | 3 +
>> include/uapi/asm-generic/fcntl.h | 7 +
>> kernel/sysctl.c | 12 +-
>> security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 3 +-
>> security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 15 +-
>> tools/testing/selftests/kselftest_harness.h | 3 +
>> tools/testing/selftests/openat2/Makefile | 3 +-
>> tools/testing/selftests/openat2/config | 1 +
>> tools/testing/selftests/openat2/helpers.h | 1 +
>> .../testing/selftests/openat2/omayexec_test.c | 325 ++++++++++++++++++
>> 17 files changed, 470 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
>> create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/openat2/config
>> create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/openat2/omayexec_test.c
>>
>> --
>> 2.27.0
>>
>
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