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Date: Sun, 9 Aug 2020 00:17:48 +0200
From: Pavel Machek <>
To: "Madhavan T. Venkataraman" <>
Cc: Mark Rutland <>,,,,,,,,,
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 0/4] [RFC] Implement Trampoline File Descriptor


> Thanks for the lively discussion. I have tried to answer some of the
> comments below.

> > There are options today, e.g.
> >
> > a) If the restriction is only per-alias, you can have distinct aliases
> >    where one is writable and another is executable, and you can make it
> >    hard to find the relationship between the two.
> >
> > b) If the restriction is only temporal, you can write instructions into
> >    an RW- buffer, transition the buffer to R--, verify the buffer
> >    contents, then transition it to --X.
> >
> > c) You can have two processes A and B where A generates instrucitons into
> >    a buffer that (only) B can execute (where B may be restricted from
> >    making syscalls like write, mprotect, etc).
> The general principle of the mitigation is W^X. I would argue that
> the above options are violations of the W^X principle. If they are
> allowed today, they must be fixed. And they will be. So, we cannot
> rely on them.

Would you mind describing your threat model?

Because I believe you are using model different from everyone else.

In particular, I don't believe b) is a problem or should be fixed.

I'll add d), application mmaps a file(R--), and uses write syscall to change
trampolines in it.

> b) This is again a violation. The kernel should refuse to give execute
> ???????? permission to a page that was writeable in the past and refuse to
> ???????? give write permission to a page that was executable in the past.


(cesky, pictures)

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