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Message-Id: <20200723171227.446711-4-mic@digikod.net>
Date: Thu, 23 Jul 2020 19:12:23 +0200
From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>,
	Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@...har.com>,
	Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
	Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
	Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@...ntu.com>,
	Christian Heimes <christian@...hon.org>,
	Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
	Deven Bowers <deven.desai@...ux.microsoft.com>,
	Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>,
	Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>,
	Eric Chiang <ericchiang@...gle.com>,
	Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>,
	James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
	Jan Kara <jack@...e.cz>,
	Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
	Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@...ux.microsoft.com>,
	Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...gle.com>,
	Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>,
	Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@...il.com>,
	Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>,
	Philippe Trébuchet <philippe.trebuchet@....gouv.fr>,
	Scott Shell <scottsh@...rosoft.com>,
	Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>,
	Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>,
	Steve Dower <steve.dower@...hon.org>,
	Steve Grubb <sgrubb@...hat.com>,
	Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.SAKURA.ne.jp>,
	Thibaut Sautereau <thibaut.sautereau@...p-os.org>,
	Vincent Strubel <vincent.strubel@....gouv.fr>,
	kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com,
	linux-api@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v7 3/7] exec: Move path_noexec() check earlier

From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>

The path_noexec() check, like the regular file check, was happening too
late, letting LSMs see impossible execve()s. Check it earlier as well
in may_open() and collect the redundant fs/exec.c path_noexec() test
under the same robustness comment as the S_ISREG() check.

My notes on the call path, and related arguments, checks, etc:

do_open_execat()
    struct open_flags open_exec_flags = {
        .open_flag = O_LARGEFILE | O_RDONLY | __FMODE_EXEC,
        .acc_mode = MAY_EXEC,
        ...
    do_filp_open(dfd, filename, open_flags)
        path_openat(nameidata, open_flags, flags)
            file = alloc_empty_file(open_flags, current_cred());
            do_open(nameidata, file, open_flags)
                may_open(path, acc_mode, open_flag)
                    /* new location of MAY_EXEC vs path_noexec() test */
                    inode_permission(inode, MAY_OPEN | acc_mode)
                        security_inode_permission(inode, acc_mode)
                vfs_open(path, file)
                    do_dentry_open(file, path->dentry->d_inode, open)
                        security_file_open(f)
                        open()
    /* old location of path_noexec() test */

Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200605160013.3954297-4-keescook@chromium.org
---
 fs/exec.c  | 12 ++++--------
 fs/namei.c |  4 ++++
 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index bdc6a6eb5dce..4eea20c27b01 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -147,10 +147,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(uselib, const char __user *, library)
 	 * and check again at the very end too.
 	 */
 	error = -EACCES;
-	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!S_ISREG(file_inode(file)->i_mode)))
-		goto exit;
-
-	if (path_noexec(&file->f_path))
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!S_ISREG(file_inode(file)->i_mode) ||
+			 path_noexec(&file->f_path)))
 		goto exit;
 
 	fsnotify_open(file);
@@ -897,10 +895,8 @@ static struct file *do_open_execat(int fd, struct filename *name, int flags)
 	 * and check again at the very end too.
 	 */
 	err = -EACCES;
-	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!S_ISREG(file_inode(file)->i_mode)))
-		goto exit;
-
-	if (path_noexec(&file->f_path))
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!S_ISREG(file_inode(file)->i_mode) ||
+			 path_noexec(&file->f_path)))
 		goto exit;
 
 	err = deny_write_access(file);
diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
index a559ad943970..ddc9b25540fe 100644
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -2863,6 +2863,10 @@ static int may_open(const struct path *path, int acc_mode, int flag)
 			return -EACCES;
 		flag &= ~O_TRUNC;
 		break;
+	case S_IFREG:
+		if ((acc_mode & MAY_EXEC) && path_noexec(path))
+			return -EACCES;
+		break;
 	}
 
 	error = inode_permission(inode, MAY_OPEN | acc_mode);
-- 
2.27.0

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