Follow @Openwall on Twitter for new release announcements and other news
[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Date: Thu, 7 May 2020 10:36:41 +0200
From: Mickaël Salaün <>
To: David Laight <David.Laight@...LAB.COM>,
 "" <>
Cc: Aleksa Sarai <>, Alexei Starovoitov <>,
 Al Viro <>, Andy Lutomirski <>,
 Christian Heimes <>,
 Daniel Borkmann <>,
 Deven Bowers <>,
 Eric Chiang <>, Florian Weimer <>,
 James Morris <>, Jan Kara <>,
 Jann Horn <>, Jonathan Corbet <>,
 Kees Cook <>,
 Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <>,
 Matthew Garrett <>, Matthew Wilcox <>,
 Michael Kerrisk <>,
 Mickaël Salaün <>,
 Mimi Zohar <>,
 Philippe Trébuchet <>,
 Scott Shell <>,
 Sean Christopherson <>,
 Shuah Khan <>, Steve Dower <>,
 Steve Grubb <>,
 Thibaut Sautereau <>,
 Vincent Strubel <>,
 "" <>,
 "" <>,
 "" <>,
 "" <>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 0/6] Add support for O_MAYEXEC

On 07/05/2020 10:05, David Laight wrote:
> From: Mickaël Salaün
>> Sent: 05 May 2020 16:32
>> This fifth patch series add new kernel configurations (OMAYEXEC_STATIC,
>> configure the security policy at kernel build time.  As requested by
>> Mimi Zohar, I completed the series with one of her patches for IMA.
>> The goal of this patch series is to enable to control script execution
>> with interpreters help.  A new O_MAYEXEC flag, usable through
>> openat2(2), is added to enable userspace script interpreter to delegate
>> to the kernel (and thus the system security policy) the permission to
>> interpret/execute scripts or other files containing what can be seen as
>> commands.
>> A simple system-wide security policy can be enforced by the system
>> administrator through a sysctl configuration consistent with the mount
>> points or the file access rights.  The documentation patch explains the
>> prerequisites.
>> Furthermore, the security policy can also be delegated to an LSM, either
>> a MAC system or an integrity system.  For instance, the new kernel
>> MAY_OPENEXEC flag closes a major IMA measurement/appraisal interpreter
>> integrity gap by bringing the ability to check the use of scripts [1].
>> Other uses are expected, such as for openat2(2) [2], SGX integration
>> [3], bpffs [4] or IPE [5].
>> Userspace needs to adapt to take advantage of this new feature.  For
>> example, the PEP 578 [6] (Runtime Audit Hooks) enables Python 3.8 to be
>> extended with policy enforcement points related to code interpretation,
>> which can be used to align with the PowerShell audit features.
>> Additional Python security improvements (e.g. a limited interpreter
>> withou -c, stdin piping of code) are on their way.
>> The initial idea come from CLIP OS 4 and the original implementation has
>> been used for more than 12 years:
>> An introduction to O_MAYEXEC was given at the Linux Security Summit
>> Europe 2018 - Linux Kernel Security Contributions by ANSSI:
>> The "write xor execute" principle was explained at Kernel Recipes 2018 -
>> CLIP OS: a defense-in-depth OS:
>> This patch series can be applied on top of v5.7-rc4.  This can be tested
>> with CONFIG_SYSCTL.  I would really appreciate constructive comments on
>> this patch series.
> None of that description actually says what the patch actually does.

"Add support for O_MAYEXEC" "to enable to control script execution".
What is not clear here? This seems well understood by other commenters.
The documentation patch and the talks can also help.

Powered by blists - more mailing lists

Confused about mailing lists and their use? Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia and check out these guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.