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Message-ID: <202004020019.1F1EEC3669@keescook>
Date: Thu, 2 Apr 2020 00:19:34 -0700
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Adam Zabrocki <pi3@....com.pl>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@...mail.de>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, stable@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] signal: Extend exec_id to 64bits
On Wed, Apr 01, 2020 at 03:47:44PM -0500, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>
> Replace the 32bit exec_id with a 64bit exec_id to make it impossible
> to wrap the exec_id counter. With care an attacker can cause exec_id
> wrap and send arbitrary signals to a newly exec'd parent. This
> bypasses the signal sending checks if the parent changes their
> credentials during exec.
>
> The severity of this problem can been seen that in my limited testing
> of a 32bit exec_id it can take as little as 19s to exec 65536 times.
> Which means that it can take as little as 14 days to wrap a 32bit
> exec_id. Adam Zabrocki has succeeded wrapping the self_exe_id in 7
> days. Even my slower timing is in the uptime of a typical server.
> Which means self_exec_id is simply a speed bump today, and if exec
> gets noticably faster self_exec_id won't even be a speed bump.
>
> Extending self_exec_id to 64bits introduces a problem on 32bit
> architectures where reading self_exec_id is no longer atomic and can
> take two read instructions. Which means that is is possible to hit
> a window where the read value of exec_id does not match the written
> value. So with very lucky timing after this change this still
> remains expoiltable.
>
> I have updated the update of exec_id on exec to use WRITE_ONCE
> and the read of exec_id in do_notify_parent to use READ_ONCE
> to make it clear that there is no locking between these two
> locations.
>
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/kernel-hardening/20200324215049.GA3710@pi3.com.pl
> Fixes: 2.3.23pre2
> Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
Thanks for chasing this down. :)
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
-Kees
> ---
>
> Linus would you prefer to take this patch directly or I could put it in
> a brach and send you a pull request.
>
> fs/exec.c | 2 +-
> include/linux/sched.h | 4 ++--
> kernel/signal.c | 2 +-
> 3 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
> index 0e46ec57fe0a..d55710a36056 100644
> --- a/fs/exec.c
> +++ b/fs/exec.c
> @@ -1413,7 +1413,7 @@ void setup_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
>
> /* An exec changes our domain. We are no longer part of the thread
> group */
> - current->self_exec_id++;
> + WRITE_ONCE(current->self_exec_id, current->self_exec_id + 1);
> flush_signal_handlers(current, 0);
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(setup_new_exec);
> diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h
> index 04278493bf15..0323e4f0982a 100644
> --- a/include/linux/sched.h
> +++ b/include/linux/sched.h
> @@ -939,8 +939,8 @@ struct task_struct {
> struct seccomp seccomp;
>
> /* Thread group tracking: */
> - u32 parent_exec_id;
> - u32 self_exec_id;
> + u64 parent_exec_id;
> + u64 self_exec_id;
>
> /* Protection against (de-)allocation: mm, files, fs, tty, keyrings, mems_allowed, mempolicy: */
> spinlock_t alloc_lock;
> diff --git a/kernel/signal.c b/kernel/signal.c
> index 9ad8dea93dbb..5383b562df85 100644
> --- a/kernel/signal.c
> +++ b/kernel/signal.c
> @@ -1926,7 +1926,7 @@ bool do_notify_parent(struct task_struct *tsk, int sig)
> * This is only possible if parent == real_parent.
> * Check if it has changed security domain.
> */
> - if (tsk->parent_exec_id != tsk->parent->self_exec_id)
> + if (tsk->parent_exec_id != READ_ONCE(tsk->parent->self_exec_id))
> sig = SIGCHLD;
> }
>
> --
> 2.20.1
>
--
Kees Cook
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