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Date: Wed, 25 Mar 2020 12:15:12 +0000
From: "Reshetova, Elena" <>
To: Kees Cook <>, Jann Horn <>
CC: Thomas Gleixner <>, the arch/x86 maintainers
	<>, Andy Lutomirski <>, Peter Zijlstra
	<>, Catalin Marinas <>, "Will
 Deacon" <>, Mark Rutland <>, "Alexander
 Potapenko" <>, Ard Biesheuvel <>,
	Kernel Hardening <>,
	<>, Linux-MM <>, kernel
 list <>
Subject: RE: [PATCH v2 0/5] Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each

> > Also, are you sure that it isn't possible to make the syscall that
> > leaked its stack pointer never return to userspace (via ptrace or
> > SIGSTOP or something like that), and therefore never realign its
> > stack, while keeping some controlled data present on the syscall's
> > stack?

How would you reliably detect that a stack pointer has been leaked
to userspace while it has been in a syscall? Does not seem to be a trivial
task to me. 

Best Regards,

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