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Message-ID: <BL0PR11MB3281D8D615FA521401B8E320E7CE0@BL0PR11MB3281.namprd11.prod.outlook.com>
Date: Wed, 25 Mar 2020 12:15:12 +0000
From: "Reshetova, Elena" <elena.reshetova@...el.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>
CC: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, the arch/x86 maintainers
<x86@...nel.org>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, Peter Zijlstra
<peterz@...radead.org>, Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>, "Will
Deacon" <will@...nel.org>, Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>, "Alexander
Potapenko" <glider@...gle.com>, Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>,
Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>,
"linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org"
<linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org>, Linux-MM <linux-mm@...ck.org>, kernel
list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: RE: [PATCH v2 0/5] Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each
syscall
> > Also, are you sure that it isn't possible to make the syscall that
> > leaked its stack pointer never return to userspace (via ptrace or
> > SIGSTOP or something like that), and therefore never realign its
> > stack, while keeping some controlled data present on the syscall's
> > stack?
How would you reliably detect that a stack pointer has been leaked
to userspace while it has been in a syscall? Does not seem to be a trivial
task to me.
Best Regards,
Elena.
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