Follow @Openwall on Twitter for new release announcements and other news
[<prev] [next>] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Date: Mon, 24 Feb 2020 17:02:05 +0100
From: Mickaël Salaün <>
Cc: Mickaël Salaün <>,
        Al Viro <>,
        Andy Lutomirski <>, Arnd Bergmann <>,
        Casey Schaufler <>,
        Greg Kroah-Hartman <>,
        James Morris <>, Jann Horn <>,
        Jonathan Corbet <>, Kees Cook <>,
        Michael Kerrisk <>,
        Mickaël Salaün <>,
        "Serge E . Hallyn" <>, Shuah Khan <>,
        Vincent Dagonneau <>,,,,,,,,
Subject: [RFC PATCH v14 00/10] Landlock LSM


This new version of Landlock is a major revamp of the previous series
[1], hence the RFC tag.  The three main changes are the replacement of
eBPF with a dedicated safe management of access rules, the replacement
of the use of seccomp(2) with a dedicated syscall, and the management of
filesystem access-control (back from the v10).

As discussed in [2], eBPF may be too powerful and dangerous to be put in
the hand of unprivileged and potentially malicious processes, especially
because of side-channel attacks against access-controls or other parts
of the kernel.

Thanks to this new implementation (1540 SLOC), designed from the ground
to be used by unprivileged processes, this series enables a process to
sandbox itself without requiring CAP_SYS_ADMIN, but only the
no_new_privs constraint (like seccomp).  Not relying on eBPF also
enables to improve performances, especially for stacked security
policies thanks to mergeable rulesets.

The compiled documentation is available here:

This series can be applied on top of v5.6-rc3.  This can be tested with
can be found in a Git repository here:
I would really appreciate constructive comments on the design and the code.

# Landlock LSM

The goal of Landlock is to enable to restrict ambient rights (e.g.
global filesystem access) for a set of processes.  Because Landlock is a
stackable LSM [3], it makes possible to create safe security sandboxes
as new security layers in addition to the existing system-wide
access-controls. This kind of sandbox is expected to help mitigate the
security impact of bugs or unexpected/malicious behaviors in user-space
applications. Landlock empower any process, including unprivileged ones,
to securely restrict themselves.

Landlock is inspired by seccomp-bpf but instead of filtering syscalls
and their raw arguments, a Landlock rule can restrict the use of kernel
objects like file hierarchies, according to the kernel semantic.
Landlock also takes inspiration from other OS sandbox mechanisms: XNU
Sandbox, FreeBSD Capsicum or OpenBSD Pledge/Unveil.

# Current limitations

## Path walk

Landlock need to use dentries to identify a file hierarchy, which is
needed for composable and unprivileged access-controls. This means that
path resolution/walking (handled with inode_permission()) is not
supported, yet. This could be filled with a future extension first of
the LSM framework. The Landlock userspace ABI can handle such change
with new option (e.g. to the struct landlock_ruleset).

## UnionFS

An UnionFS super-block use a set of upper and lower directories. An
access request to a file in one of these hierarchy trigger a call to
ovl_path_real() which generate another access request according to the
matching hierarchy. Because such super-block is not aware of its current
mount point, OverlayFS can't create a dedicated mnt_parent for each of
the upper and lower directories mount clones. It is then not currently
possible to track the source of such indirect access-request, and then
not possible to identify a unified OverlayFS hierarchy.

## Syscall

Because it is only tested on x86_64, the syscall is only wired up for
this architecture.  The whole x86 family (and probably all the others)
will be supported in the next patch series.

## Memory limits

There is currently no limit on the memory usage.  Any idea to leverage
an existing mechanism (e.g. rlimit)?

# Changes since v13

* Revamp of the LSM: remove the need for eBPF and seccomp(2).
* Implement a full filesystem access-control.
* Take care of the backward compatibility issues, especially for
  this security features.

Previous version:



Mickaël Salaün (10):
  landlock: Add object and rule management
  landlock: Add ruleset and domain management
  landlock: Set up the security framework and manage credentials
  landlock: Add ptrace restrictions
  fs,landlock: Support filesystem access-control
  landlock: Add syscall implementation
  arch: Wire up landlock() syscall
  selftests/landlock: Add initial tests
  samples/landlock: Add a sandbox manager example
  landlock: Add user and kernel documentation

 Documentation/security/index.rst              |   1 +
 Documentation/security/landlock/index.rst     |  18 +
 Documentation/security/landlock/kernel.rst    |  44 ++
 Documentation/security/landlock/user.rst      | 233 +++++++
 MAINTAINERS                                   |  12 +
 arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl        |   1 +
 fs/super.c                                    |   2 +
 include/linux/landlock.h                      |  22 +
 include/linux/syscalls.h                      |   3 +
 include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h             |   4 +-
 include/uapi/linux/landlock.h                 | 315 +++++++++
 samples/Kconfig                               |   7 +
 samples/Makefile                              |   1 +
 samples/landlock/.gitignore                   |   1 +
 samples/landlock/Makefile                     |  15 +
 samples/landlock/sandboxer.c                  | 226 +++++++
 security/Kconfig                              |  11 +-
 security/Makefile                             |   2 +
 security/landlock/Kconfig                     |  16 +
 security/landlock/Makefile                    |   4 +
 security/landlock/cred.c                      |  47 ++
 security/landlock/cred.h                      |  55 ++
 security/landlock/fs.c                        | 591 +++++++++++++++++
 security/landlock/fs.h                        |  42 ++
 security/landlock/object.c                    | 341 ++++++++++
 security/landlock/object.h                    | 134 ++++
 security/landlock/ptrace.c                    | 118 ++++
 security/landlock/ptrace.h                    |  14 +
 security/landlock/ruleset.c                   | 463 +++++++++++++
 security/landlock/ruleset.h                   | 106 +++
 security/landlock/setup.c                     |  38 ++
 security/landlock/setup.h                     |  20 +
 security/landlock/syscall.c                   | 470 +++++++++++++
 tools/testing/selftests/Makefile              |   1 +
 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/.gitignore   |   3 +
 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/Makefile     |  13 +
 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/config       |   4 +
 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/test.h       |  40 ++
 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/test_base.c  |  80 +++
 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/test_fs.c    | 624 ++++++++++++++++++
 .../testing/selftests/landlock/test_ptrace.c  | 293 ++++++++
 41 files changed, 4429 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 Documentation/security/landlock/index.rst
 create mode 100644 Documentation/security/landlock/kernel.rst
 create mode 100644 Documentation/security/landlock/user.rst
 create mode 100644 include/linux/landlock.h
 create mode 100644 include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
 create mode 100644 samples/landlock/.gitignore
 create mode 100644 samples/landlock/Makefile
 create mode 100644 samples/landlock/sandboxer.c
 create mode 100644 security/landlock/Kconfig
 create mode 100644 security/landlock/Makefile
 create mode 100644 security/landlock/cred.c
 create mode 100644 security/landlock/cred.h
 create mode 100644 security/landlock/fs.c
 create mode 100644 security/landlock/fs.h
 create mode 100644 security/landlock/object.c
 create mode 100644 security/landlock/object.h
 create mode 100644 security/landlock/ptrace.c
 create mode 100644 security/landlock/ptrace.h
 create mode 100644 security/landlock/ruleset.c
 create mode 100644 security/landlock/ruleset.h
 create mode 100644 security/landlock/setup.c
 create mode 100644 security/landlock/setup.h
 create mode 100644 security/landlock/syscall.c
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/.gitignore
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/Makefile
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/config
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/test.h
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/test_base.c
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/test_fs.c
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/test_ptrace.c


Powered by blists - more mailing lists

Confused about mailing lists and their use? Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia and check out these guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.