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Message-ID: <026b6f3f-d17a-d50e-4793-a76e6719cc1f@digikod.net>
Date: Wed, 6 Nov 2019 17:58:46 +0100
From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>
To: KP Singh <kpsingh@...omium.org>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@...il.com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
David Drysdale
<drysdale@...gle.com>,
Florent Revest <revest@...omium.org>, James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
Jann Horn <jann@...jh.net>,
John Johansen <john.johansen@...onical.com>,
Jonathan Corbet
<corbet@....net>, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@...il.com>,
Mickaël Salaün <mickael.salaun@....gouv.fr>,
Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>, Sargun Dhillon <sargun@...gun.me>,
"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>, Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>, Tejun Heo <tj@...nel.org>,
Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.SAKURA.ne.jp>,
Tycho Andersen <tycho@...ho.ws>, Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>,
bpf@...r.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com,
linux-api@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
netdev@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf-next v13 4/7] landlock: Add ptrace LSM hooks
On 06/11/2019 11:15, KP Singh wrote:
> On 05-Nov 19:01, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
>> On 05/11/2019 18:18, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
[...]
>>>
>>> I think the only way bpf-based LSM can land is both landlock and KRSI
>>> developers work together on a design that solves all use cases.
>>
>> As I said in a previous cover letter [1], that would be great. I think
>> that the current Landlock bases (almost everything from this series
>> except the seccomp interface) should meet both needs, but I would like
>> to have the point of view of the KRSI developers.
>
> As I mentioned we are willing to collaborate but the current landlock
> patches does not meet the needs for KRSI:
>
> * One program type per use-case (eg. LANDLOCK_PROG_PTRACE) as opposed to
> a single program type. This is something that KRSI proposed in it's
> initial design [1] and the new common "eBPF + LSM" based approach
> [2] would maintain as well.
As ask in my previous email [1], I don't see how KRSI would efficiently
deal with other LSM hooks with a unique program (attach) type.
[1]
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/813cedde-8ed7-2d3b-883d-909efa978d41@digikod.net/
>
> * Landlock chooses to have multiple LSM hooks per landlock hook which is
> more restrictive. It's not easy to write precise MAC and Audit
> policies for a privileged LSM based on this and this ends up bloating
> the context that needs to be maintained and requires avoidable
> boilerplate work in the kernel.
Why do you think it is more restrictive or it adds boilerplate work? How
does KRSI will deal with more complex hooks than execve-like with
multiple kernel objects?
>
> [1] https://lore.kernel.org/patchwork/project/lkml/list/?series=410101
> [2] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20191106100655.GA18815@chromium.org/T/#u
>
> - KP Singh
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