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Message-ID: <704624a1-36b7-50d7-cf8d-2923b2a97367@huawei.com>
Date: Mon, 29 Jul 2019 21:43:35 +0800
From: Jason Yan <yanaijie@...wei.com>
To: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@....fr>, <mpe@...erman.id.au>,
<linuxppc-dev@...ts.ozlabs.org>, <diana.craciun@....com>,
<benh@...nel.crashing.org>, <paulus@...ba.org>, <npiggin@...il.com>,
<keescook@...omium.org>, <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>
CC: <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, <wangkefeng.wang@...wei.com>,
<yebin10@...wei.com>, <thunder.leizhen@...wei.com>,
<jingxiangfeng@...wei.com>, <fanchengyang@...wei.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 08/10] powerpc/fsl_booke/kaslr: clear the original
kernel if randomized
On 2019/7/29 19:19, Christophe Leroy wrote:
>
>
> Le 17/07/2019 à 10:06, Jason Yan a écrit :
>> The original kernel still exists in the memory, clear it now.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@...wei.com>
>> Cc: Diana Craciun <diana.craciun@....com>
>> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@...erman.id.au>
>> Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@....fr>
>> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@...nel.crashing.org>
>> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@...ba.org>
>> Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@...il.com>
>> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
>> ---
>> arch/powerpc/kernel/kaslr_booke.c | 11 +++++++++++
>> arch/powerpc/mm/mmu_decl.h | 2 ++
>> arch/powerpc/mm/nohash/fsl_booke.c | 1 +
>> 3 files changed, 14 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/kaslr_booke.c
>> b/arch/powerpc/kernel/kaslr_booke.c
>> index 90357f4bd313..00339c05879f 100644
>> --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/kaslr_booke.c
>> +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/kaslr_booke.c
>> @@ -412,3 +412,14 @@ notrace void __init kaslr_early_init(void
>> *dt_ptr, phys_addr_t size)
>> reloc_kernel_entry(dt_ptr, kimage_vaddr);
>> }
>> +
>> +void __init kaslr_second_init(void)
>> +{
>> + /* If randomized, clear the original kernel */
>> + if (kimage_vaddr != KERNELBASE) {
>> + unsigned long kernel_sz;
>> +
>> + kernel_sz = (unsigned long)_end - kimage_vaddr;
>> + memset((void *)KERNELBASE, 0, kernel_sz);
>
> Why are we clearing ? Is that just to tidy up or is it of security
> importance ?
>
If we leave it there, attackers can still find the kernel object very
easy, it's still dangerous especially if without
CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX enabled.
> If so, maybe memzero_explicit() should be used instead ?
>
OK
>> + }
>> +}
>> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/mm/mmu_decl.h b/arch/powerpc/mm/mmu_decl.h
>> index 754ae1e69f92..9912ee598f9b 100644
>> --- a/arch/powerpc/mm/mmu_decl.h
>> +++ b/arch/powerpc/mm/mmu_decl.h
>> @@ -150,8 +150,10 @@ extern void loadcam_multi(int first_idx, int num,
>> int tmp_idx);
>> #ifdef CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE
>> extern void kaslr_early_init(void *dt_ptr, phys_addr_t size);
>> +extern void kaslr_second_init(void);
>
> No new 'extern' please.
>
>> #else
>> static inline void kaslr_early_init(void *dt_ptr, phys_addr_t size) {}
>> +static inline void kaslr_second_init(void) {}
>> #endif
>> struct tlbcam {
>> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/mm/nohash/fsl_booke.c
>> b/arch/powerpc/mm/nohash/fsl_booke.c
>> index 8d25a8dc965f..fa5a87f5c08e 100644
>> --- a/arch/powerpc/mm/nohash/fsl_booke.c
>> +++ b/arch/powerpc/mm/nohash/fsl_booke.c
>> @@ -269,6 +269,7 @@ notrace void __init relocate_init(u64 dt_ptr,
>> phys_addr_t start)
>> kernstart_addr = start;
>> if (is_second_reloc) {
>> virt_phys_offset = PAGE_OFFSET - memstart_addr;
>> + kaslr_second_init();
>> return;
>> }
>>
>
> Christophe
>
> .
>
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