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Message-ID: <CAHC9VhSpwafSdcX97VPiy1Earns4UOBjywcM9R=j24KFUtWB8g@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 22 Jul 2019 20:36:06 -0400
From: Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@...hat.com>, selinux@...r.kernel.org,
NitinGote <nitin.r.gote@...el.com>, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] selinux: check sidtab limit before adding a new entry
On Mon, Jul 22, 2019 at 12:50 PM Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> wrote:
> On Mon, Jul 22, 2019 at 03:21:11PM +0200, Ondrej Mosnacek wrote:
> > We need to error out when trying to add an entry above SIDTAB_MAX in
> > sidtab_reverse_lookup() to avoid overflow on the odd chance that this
> > happens.
> >
> > Fixes: ee1a84fdfeed ("selinux: overhaul sidtab to fix bug and improve performance")
> > Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@...hat.com>
>
> Is this reachable from unprivileged userspace?
I believe it's reachable via selinuxfs under /sys/fs/selinux/context,
and the DAC permissions are for the relevant files are 0666, but the
SELinux policy might restrict that.
> > ---
> > security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c | 5 +++++
> > 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
> >
> > diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c
> > index e63a90ff2728..54c1ba1e79ab 100644
> > --- a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c
> > +++ b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c
> > @@ -286,6 +286,11 @@ static int sidtab_reverse_lookup(struct sidtab *s, struct context *context,
> > ++count;
> > }
> >
> > + /* bail out if we already reached max entries */
> > + rc = -ENOMEM;
> > + if (count == SIDTAB_MAX)
>
> Do you want to use >= here instead?
Yes, definitely.
--
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com
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