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Message-ID: <CAG_fn=XYRpeBgLpbwhaF=JfNHa-styydOKq8_SA3vsdMcXNgzw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 3 Jul 2019 13:40:26 +0200
From: Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@...ux.com>, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, Michal Hocko <mhocko@...e.com>,
James Morris <jamorris@...ux.microsoft.com>,
Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@...ionext.com>, Michal Hocko <mhocko@...nel.org>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>, "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@...gle.com>, Kostya Serebryany <kcc@...gle.com>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>, Sandeep Patil <sspatil@...roid.com>,
Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>, Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>, Marco Elver <elver@...gle.com>, Qian Cai <cai@....pw>,
Linux Memory Management List <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
linux-security-module <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 1/2] mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and
init_on_free=1 boot options
On Wed, Jul 3, 2019 at 12:59 AM Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org> wrote:
>
> On Fri, 28 Jun 2019 11:31:30 +0200 Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com> wrote:
>
> > The new options are needed to prevent possible information leaks and
> > make control-flow bugs that depend on uninitialized values more
> > deterministic.
> >
> > This is expected to be on-by-default on Android and Chrome OS. And it
> > gives the opportunity for anyone else to use it under distros too via
> > the boot args. (The init_on_free feature is regularly requested by
> > folks where memory forensics is included in their threat models.)
> >
> > init_on_alloc=1 makes the kernel initialize newly allocated pages and heap
> > objects with zeroes. Initialization is done at allocation time at the
> > places where checks for __GFP_ZERO are performed.
> >
> > init_on_free=1 makes the kernel initialize freed pages and heap objects
> > with zeroes upon their deletion. This helps to ensure sensitive data
> > doesn't leak via use-after-free accesses.
> >
> > Both init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 guarantee that the allocator
> > returns zeroed memory. The two exceptions are slab caches with
> > constructors and SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU flag. Those are never
> > zero-initialized to preserve their semantics.
> >
> > Both init_on_alloc and init_on_free default to zero, but those defaults
> > can be overridden with CONFIG_INIT_ON_ALLOC_DEFAULT_ON and
> > CONFIG_INIT_ON_FREE_DEFAULT_ON.
> >
> > If either SLUB poisoning or page poisoning is enabled, those options
> > take precedence over init_on_alloc and init_on_free: initialization is
> > only applied to unpoisoned allocations.
> >
> > Slowdown for the new features compared to init_on_free=0,
> > init_on_alloc=0:
> >
> > hackbench, init_on_free=1: +7.62% sys time (st.err 0.74%)
> > hackbench, init_on_alloc=1: +7.75% sys time (st.err 2.14%)
> >
> > Linux build with -j12, init_on_free=1: +8.38% wall time (st.err 0.39%)
> > Linux build with -j12, init_on_free=1: +24.42% sys time (st.err 0.52%)
> > Linux build with -j12, init_on_alloc=1: -0.13% wall time (st.err 0.42%)
> > Linux build with -j12, init_on_alloc=1: +0.57% sys time (st.err 0.40%)
> >
> > The slowdown for init_on_free=0, init_on_alloc=0 compared to the
> > baseline is within the standard error.
> >
> > The new features are also going to pave the way for hardware memory
> > tagging (e.g. arm64's MTE), which will require both on_alloc and on_free
> > hooks to set the tags for heap objects. With MTE, tagging will have the
> > same cost as memory initialization.
> >
> > Although init_on_free is rather costly, there are paranoid use-cases where
> > in-memory data lifetime is desired to be minimized. There are various
> > arguments for/against the realism of the associated threat models, but
> > given that we'll need the infrastructure for MTE anyway, and there are
> > people who want wipe-on-free behavior no matter what the performance cost,
> > it seems reasonable to include it in this series.
> >
> > ...
> >
> > v10:
> > - added Acked-by: tags
> > - converted pr_warn() to pr_info()
>
> There are unchangelogged alterations between v9 and v10. The
> replacement of IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING)) with
> page_poisoning_enabled().
In the case I send another version of the patch, do I need to
retroactively add them to the changelog?
>
> --- a/mm/page_alloc.c~mm-security-introduce-init_on_alloc=1-and-init_on_free=1-boot-options-v10
> +++ a/mm/page_alloc.c
> @@ -157,8 +157,8 @@ static int __init early_init_on_alloc(ch
> if (!buf)
> return -EINVAL;
> ret = kstrtobool(buf, &bool_result);
> - if (bool_result && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING))
> - pr_warn("mem auto-init: CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING is on, will take precedence over init_on_alloc\n");
> + if (bool_result && page_poisoning_enabled())
> + pr_info("mem auto-init: CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING is on, will take precedence over init_on_alloc\n");
> if (bool_result)
> static_branch_enable(&init_on_alloc);
> else
> @@ -175,8 +175,8 @@ static int __init early_init_on_free(cha
> if (!buf)
> return -EINVAL;
> ret = kstrtobool(buf, &bool_result);
> - if (bool_result && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING))
> - pr_warn("mem auto-init: CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING is on, will take precedence over init_on_free\n");
> + if (bool_result && page_poisoning_enabled())
> + pr_info("mem auto-init: CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING is on, will take precedence over init_on_free\n");
> if (bool_result)
> static_branch_enable(&init_on_free);
> else
> --- a/mm/slub.c~mm-security-introduce-init_on_alloc=1-and-init_on_free=1-boot-options-v10
> +++ a/mm/slub.c
> @@ -1281,9 +1281,8 @@ check_slabs:
> out:
> if ((static_branch_unlikely(&init_on_alloc) ||
> static_branch_unlikely(&init_on_free)) &&
> - (slub_debug & SLAB_POISON)) {
> - pr_warn("mem auto-init: SLAB_POISON will take precedence over init_on_alloc/init_on_free\n");
> - }
> + (slub_debug & SLAB_POISON))
> + pr_info("mem auto-init: SLAB_POISON will take precedence over init_on_alloc/init_on_free\n");
> return 1;
> }
>
> _
>
--
Alexander Potapenko
Software Engineer
Google Germany GmbH
Erika-Mann-Straße, 33
80636 München
Geschäftsführer: Paul Manicle, Halimah DeLaine Prado
Registergericht und -nummer: Hamburg, HRB 86891
Sitz der Gesellschaft: Hamburg
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