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Message-ID: <63b1b249-6bc7-ffd9-99db-d36dd3f1a962@intel.com>
Date: Mon, 17 Jun 2019 08:50:35 -0700
From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>
To: Alexander Graf <graf@...zon.com>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
Cc: Marius Hillenbrand <mhillenb@...zon.de>, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com,
linux-mm@...ck.org, Alexander Graf <graf@...zon.de>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>,
the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@...nel.org>, Andy Lutomirski
<luto@...nel.org>, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC 00/10] Process-local memory allocations for hiding KVM
secrets
On 6/17/19 12:38 AM, Alexander Graf wrote:
>> Yes I know, but as a benefit we could get rid of all the GSBASE
>> horrors in
>> the entry code as we could just put the percpu space into the local PGD.
>
> Would that mean that with Meltdown affected CPUs we open speculation
> attacks against the mmlocal memory from KVM user space?
Not necessarily. There would likely be a _set_ of local PGDs. We could
still have pair of PTI PGDs just like we do know, they'd just be a local
PGD pair.
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