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Message-ID: <CALCETrXHbS9VXfZ80kOjiTrreM2EbapYeGp68mvJPbosUtorYA@mail.gmail.com> Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2019 18:30:03 -0700 From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org> To: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>, Nadav Amit <namit@...are.com> Cc: Marius Hillenbrand <mhillenb@...zon.de>, kvm list <kvm@...r.kernel.org>, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>, Linux-MM <linux-mm@...ck.org>, Alexander Graf <graf@...zon.de>, David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>, "the arch/x86 maintainers" <x86@...nel.org>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org> Subject: Re: [RFC 00/10] Process-local memory allocations for hiding KVM secrets On Wed, Jun 12, 2019 at 1:27 PM Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net> wrote: > > > > > On Jun 12, 2019, at 12:55 PM, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com> wrote: > > > >> On 6/12/19 10:08 AM, Marius Hillenbrand wrote: > >> This patch series proposes to introduce a region for what we call > >> process-local memory into the kernel's virtual address space. > > > > It might be fun to cc some x86 folks on this series. They might have > > some relevant opinions. ;) > > > > A few high-level questions: > > > > Why go to all this trouble to hide guest state like registers if all the > > guest data itself is still mapped? > > > > Where's the context-switching code? Did I just miss it? > > > > We've discussed having per-cpu page tables where a given PGD is only in > > use from one CPU at a time. I *think* this scheme still works in such a > > case, it just adds one more PGD entry that would have to context-switched. > > Fair warning: Linus is on record as absolutely hating this idea. He might change his mind, but it’s an uphill battle. I looked at the patch, and it (sensibly) has nothing to do with per-cpu PGDs. So it's in great shape! Seriously, though, here are some very high-level review comments: Please don't call it "process local", since "process" is meaningless. Call it "mm local" or something like that. We already have a per-mm kernel mapping: the LDT. So please nix all the code that adds a new VA region, etc, except to the extent that some of it consists of valid cleanups in and of itself. Instead, please refactor the LDT code (arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c, mainly) to make it use a more general "mm local" address range, and then reuse the same infrastructure for other fancy things. The code that makes it KASLR-able should be in its very own patch that applies *after* the code that makes it all work so that, when the KASLR part causes a crash, we can bisect it. + /* + * Faults in process-local memory may be caused by process-local + * addresses leaking into other contexts. + * tbd: warn and handle gracefully. + */ + if (unlikely(fault_in_process_local(address))) { + pr_err("page fault in PROCLOCAL at %lx", address); + force_sig_fault(SIGSEGV, SEGV_MAPERR, (void __user *)address, current); + } + Huh? Either it's an OOPS or you shouldn't print any special debugging. As it is, you're just blatantly leaking the address of the mm-local range to malicious user programs. Also, you should IMO consider using this mechanism for kmap_atomic(). Hi, Nadav!
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