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Message-ID: <20190426001143.4983-11-namit@vmware.com> Date: Thu, 25 Apr 2019 17:11:30 -0700 From: Nadav Amit <namit@...are.com> To: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com> CC: <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, <x86@...nel.org>, <hpa@...or.com>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@...il.com>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>, <linux_dti@...oud.com>, <linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org>, <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>, <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>, <linux-mm@...ck.org>, <will.deacon@....com>, <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>, <kristen@...ux.intel.com>, <deneen.t.dock@...el.com>, Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>, Nadav Amit <namit@...are.com> Subject: [PATCH v5 10/23] x86/kprobes: Set instruction page as executable Set the page as executable after allocation. This patch is a preparatory patch for a following patch that makes module allocated pages non-executable. While at it, do some small cleanup of what appears to be unnecessary masking. Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org> Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@...are.com> Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com> --- arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c index a034cb808e7e..1591852d3ac4 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c @@ -431,8 +431,20 @@ void *alloc_insn_page(void) void *page; page = module_alloc(PAGE_SIZE); - if (page) - set_memory_ro((unsigned long)page & PAGE_MASK, 1); + if (!page) + return NULL; + + /* + * First make the page read-only, and only then make it executable to + * prevent it from being W+X in between. + */ + set_memory_ro((unsigned long)page, 1); + + /* + * TODO: Once additional kernel code protection mechanisms are set, ensure + * that the page was not maliciously altered and it is still zeroed. + */ + set_memory_x((unsigned long)page, 1); return page; } @@ -440,8 +452,12 @@ void *alloc_insn_page(void) /* Recover page to RW mode before releasing it */ void free_insn_page(void *page) { - set_memory_nx((unsigned long)page & PAGE_MASK, 1); - set_memory_rw((unsigned long)page & PAGE_MASK, 1); + /* + * First make the page non-executable, and only then make it writable to + * prevent it from being W+X in between. + */ + set_memory_nx((unsigned long)page, 1); + set_memory_rw((unsigned long)page, 1); module_memfree(page); } -- 2.17.1
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