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Message-ID: <CAGXu5jLNwFfG-x-_Q6nTdU21t5B9z7dCgBekRiJ+MnUE14J12A@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 23 Apr 2019 12:36:43 -0700
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@...ionext.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>, James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
Alexander Popov <alex.popov@...ux.com>, Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@...gle.com>,
Kostya Serebryany <kcc@...gle.com>, Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>, Sandeep Patil <sspatil@...roid.com>,
Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>, Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>,
Michal Marek <michal.lkml@...kovi.net>, Emese Revfy <re.emese@...il.com>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>, Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>,
linux-security-module <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
Linux Kbuild mailing list <linux-kbuild@...r.kernel.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/3] security: Create "kernel hardening" config area
On Thu, Apr 11, 2019 at 6:39 PM Masahiro Yamada
<yamada.masahiro@...ionext.com> wrote:
>
> On Fri, Apr 12, 2019 at 3:01 AM Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> wrote:
> >
> > Right now kernel hardening options are scattered around various Kconfig
> > files. This can be a central place to collect these kinds of options
> > going forward. This is initially populated with the memory initialization
> > options from the gcc-plugins.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
> > ---
> > scripts/gcc-plugins/Kconfig | 74 +++--------------------------
> > security/Kconfig | 2 +
> > security/Kconfig.hardening | 93 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > 3 files changed, 102 insertions(+), 67 deletions(-)
> > create mode 100644 security/Kconfig.hardening
> >
> > diff --git a/scripts/gcc-plugins/Kconfig b/scripts/gcc-plugins/Kconfig
> > index 74271dba4f94..84d471dea2b7 100644
> > --- a/scripts/gcc-plugins/Kconfig
> > +++ b/scripts/gcc-plugins/Kconfig
> > @@ -13,10 +13,11 @@ config HAVE_GCC_PLUGINS
> > An arch should select this symbol if it supports building with
> > GCC plugins.
> >
> > -menuconfig GCC_PLUGINS
> > - bool "GCC plugins"
> > +config GCC_PLUGINS
> > + bool
> > depends on HAVE_GCC_PLUGINS
> > depends on PLUGIN_HOSTCC != ""
> > + default y
> > help
> > GCC plugins are loadable modules that provide extra features to the
> > compiler. They are useful for runtime instrumentation and static analysis.
> > @@ -25,6 +26,8 @@ menuconfig GCC_PLUGINS
> >
> > if GCC_PLUGINS
> >
> > +menu "GCC plugins"
> > +
>
>
>
> Just a tip to save "if" ... "endif" block.
>
>
> If you like, you can write like follows:
>
>
> menu "GCC plugins"
> depends on GCC_PLUGINS
>
> <menu body>
>
> endmenu
Ah yes, thanks! Adjusted.
> > +menu "Memory initialization"
> > +
> > +choice
> > + prompt "Initialize kernel stack variables at function entry"
> > + depends on GCC_PLUGINS
>
> On second thought,
> this 'depends on' is unnecessary
> because INIT_STACK_NONE should be always visible.
Oh yes, excellent point. Adjusted.
> Another behavior change is
> GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK was previously enabled by all{yes,mod}config,
> and in the compile-test coverage.
I could set the defaults based on CONFIG_COMPILE_TEST, though? I.e.:
prompt "Initialize kernel stack variables at function entry"
default GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL if COMPILE_TEST && GCC_PLUGINS
default INIT_STACK_ALL if COMPILE_TEST && CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT
default INIT_STACK_NONE
>
> It will be disabled for all{yes,mod}config with this patch.
>
> This is up to you. Just FYI.
Thanks for looking this over!
--
Kees Cook
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